The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (33 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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nological positions require someone of recognized competence in those fields with partisan acceptance coming in second. It "is not altogether impossible for presidents to identify candidates who are politically in tune with administration policies and also have the necessary scientific qualifications in the eyes of their professional peers. A good fit, however, is often hard to find" (ibid., 128).
Another limitation on the president's appointing power is the prospect of the Senate confirmation process and a public grilling in the Senate and the press. Though the Senate rarely rejects a presidential nomination, the process itself may make a president or candidate reconsider an appointment. As one PAS noted, a nominee who values her or his privacy doesn't want to find herself or himself on the front page of the
Washington Post
for something innocuous outside of the governmental pressure cooker but easily made to look suspicious in Washington's supercharged political atmosphere.
As discussed above, presidents also have to decide how much appointing power they share with their cabinet officers. "Presidents like Nixon and Carter, who delegated the power to make subcabinet selections to their cabinet, subsequently regretted that decision" (ibid., 128). However, some secretaries (e.g., Jim Baker at Bush's State Department) come on board with the explicit understanding that they will choose their own top people in a take-it-or-leave-it deal. Also, presidents do not want to be too closely involved in the appointment of lower-level appointees for time reasons and to avoid the pressures for patronage, as well as to avoid responsibility when things go badly with appointees or agencies (e.g., Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the
Challenger
disaster) (ibid., 128).
Another limiting factor is that the later it gets in the president's term, the harder it is to attract competent individuals as they start to look for the proverbial greener pastures in the private sector, particularly if the president is not running for reelection or if his chances of winning seem slim. At this point careerists are often appointed to positions they would not have been considered politically qualified for earlier. In these cases and in some others, "the goal of an appointment is not so much to secure the loyalty of an executive agency to the president's goals as it is to symbolize the president's own loyalty to the goals and programs of the agency" (ibid., 129).
These "appointments that a president has no choice but to make" included FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Paul Volcker. Hoover was reappointed to his position by presidents of both parties "to demonstrate . . . both their dedication to tough law enforcement and their fervent opposition to subversive activities in the
 
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United States." It is also widely assumed that Hoover had amassed so much influence and damaging information through his largely unrestrained power of investigation that no president dared replace him. Fed Chair Volcker was reappointed by Reagan to reassure the financial community of Reagan's commitment to fighting inflation. "As one Reagan aide put it, 'We didn't reappoint Volcker . . .. The markets reappointed Volcker"' (ibid., 129).
Clearly, then, presidents operate within a complex web of both competing and interlocking interests and agendas in exercising their personnel prerogatives.
Executive-Legislative Tensions in the Short-Termer System: Appointment Time Lines
Executive-legislative tensions are a given in American politics because of the way powers and authority are apportioned in the Constitution.
This separation and sharing of power between Congress and the President has made for a turbulent and divisive relationship. One effect is that those political appointees chosen by the President to head the executive agencies frequently find themselves in an ambiguous situation: They are accountable to the Congress for their authority, funds, and performance, but they are also accountable to the President who appointed them, who sets the general policy framework in which they must work, and who is responsible for seeing that the laws are faithfully executed. (NAPA 1980, 31)
It is ironic that the most careful presidential preparation is often coupled with the least timely appointments. As discussed above, this is due to a confluence of factors: the expansion of government in the modern era has meant many more positions to fill, and the political parties no longer act as clearing houses for patronage requests (these often go directly to the White House). Another factor contributing to delay is the ongoing need to scrutinize and make careful decisions. The post-Watergate emphasis on ethical and conflict-of-interest considerations, while providing benefits, has also introduced a new and complicating factor into the appointment process, "raising the stakes, and in some cases the financial costs," of government service (Macy et al. 1983, 40).
Generally, it is to the advantage of the president to fill positions as quickly as possible.
 
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During a transition of the presidency, the permanent career bureaucracy continues to operate the government. But the machinery of government is in neutral. Routine operation will go on without many problems, but new directions in policy making will not be undertaken. Leadership is required that can only be provided by the appointees of a new president, and the longer the bureaucracy drifts, the longer it will be before the new president's priorities and policies can be implemented. (Pfiffner 1987a, 62)
In some cases a strategic inaction is employed. For example, it was generally understood that Reagan's anger at Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Margaret Heckler was the cause of the lack of appointments to fill vacancies there. It was his way of punishing her but it also hurt the agency, which may not have been coincidental, given his antipathy toward its mission.
Each side, executive and legislative, blames the other for the long delays that often accompany presidential nominations. The Senate appointed a Task Force on Confirmation Delay to study the appointments and confirmation process and make recommendations to ameliorate the situation. Its report, issued in early 1992, charged the White House with responsibility for most of the delay, noting that while the Senate takes, on average, forty-eight days to consider a nominee, the White House takes nearly three hundred days, on average, to announce an appointment and submit information papers to the Senate. Even something as simple and direct as delivering the nominee's paperwork to the committee takes from one to two months after the nomination is announced by the White House. Additionally, as the report noted, many posts simply sit vacant. "Currently, almost one of every six federal judgeships is vacant. Yet for 91 of these 135 posts, the president has failed to submit any nominee to the Senate" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1992).
The
Report
called on the White House to consult more with senators prior to nominating key PASs and to restore to the Judiciary Affairs Committee full access to FBI investigative reports on the nominees. Previously allowed, this had been denied since October 1991 due to presidential anger over leaks during the Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas. A standoff ensued when, in retaliation, the Judiciary Committee had, with bipartisan unanimity, refused to consider any confirmations not already in its pipeline. Subsequent to the report's issuance, however, the White House restored full access to the FBI reports nearly in accord with the previous agreement with the committee. The impasse passed. The other Senate committees dealing with confirmations continued, as before, to receive only summary memoranda of the FBI report.
 
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The
Task Force Report
also called on the White House as well as the Senate to streamline its paperwork by adopting one standard form for all nominees, using specific addenda as appropriate. Currently, each Senate committee may have its own form but the body as a whole requires only one form to be completed for the nominee under its scrutiny. The executive branch often demands the same basic information on three different forms from each nominee. The
Report
also called for a more thorough FBI background report to save later investigation by the FBI or the committees (which do their own investigating, often more thorough than the FBI's). It also stressed the need to stop leaks of confidential information to protect the privacy of individuals under consideration (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1992).
The Senate, despite a few well-publicized battles with the White House over nominations (e.g., Clarence Thomas, Robert Gates, Robert Bork, John Tower), is markedly compliant in most of its confirmation decisions; it confirms some 97 percent of the White House's nominees. One committee, the Judiciary Affairs Committee, serves as an example. Judiciary processes about one hundred nominees a year, forty federal judges and sixty U.S. marshals and attorneys (the latter are executive branch, not judicial appointments, but have significant independent powers). Judicial branch appointees enjoy lifetime tenure. As the White House has to fill as many slots as possible before the clock runs out (read: the presidential term expires), there is a strong incentive to go for quantity over quality; consequently, this particular committee examines candidates closely.
However, even for judicial appointments, as one Senate staffer noted, "The process is remarkably nonpartisan. The number of partisan confirmation fights is unbelievably small. When persons are not confirmed it is almost always a joint decision between [Democrat] Biden, the chair, and Thurmond" (the ranking Republican committee member). Of those not confirmed, the smallest percent (1 percent) are denied.
Not all nominees reach the hearing stage, of course. In about 5 percent of the cases the chair simply refuses to schedule a hearing, allowing the nominee to "languish until he or she withdraws" or simply declining to consider a candidate until the president gives up and withdraws the name. This is due to low quality, lack of qualifications, or damaging information uncovered about the candidate that the White House did not know about or let slide, hoping it would not be discovered. Sometimes the president, responding to pressure from an interest group, submits a candidate who clearly is not qualified, leaving it for the committee to take the heat for rejecting her or him.
Nevertheless, between 1987 and early 1992, Judiciary held 212 hear-

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