The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (51 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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Also, the growth of government programs has created a concomitant tendency for agency jurisdictions to overlap. As the agencies compete for power in the decision-making process, none any longer enjoys sole power. While FDR excelled at the practice of divide and conquer within his bureaucracy, "modern presidents do not need to engage in such artificial contrivances. Today's agencies have a statutory mandate to compete for power" (ibid., 139). In the resulting stalemate, issues inevitably get pushed upward to the White House for resolution.
Additionally, interest groups have moved into the political mix and have created diverse constituencies that may work in concert with the White House against the agency, thus further eroding careerists' power base. The current era sees strengthened presidential control over the bureaucracy, given the factors acting to weaken the bureaucracies vis-à-vis the White House and the establishment of the SES and other management innovations (ibid., 140).
The Senior Executive Service: An Idea Whose Time Finally Came
The United States has been notably lax in developing theories of political administration. Rather than having "a coherent set of roles and relationships" between political and career executives, the United States has what Heclo terms "a widely varying free form exercise" as appointees and careerists seek to outmaneuver one another.
For several generations now we have been accumulating a massive non-system of political management in the echelons between top agency heads and career officials in operating units. There are staffs to staff, offices atop offices, circles within circles. Almost no one can say yes to anything and almost everybody can say no-and even yes's are only provisional until the next no. In this situation the total amount of energy expended in defending boundaries and advancing personal projects can easily exceed the amount spent in accomplishing the purpose of government (Congress is no exception). (Heclo 1984b, 13)
Seeking to address this situation, the Carter administration initiated a reform of the civil service system. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act was the result. A key component of the CSRA, the Senior Executive Service, was established in 1979 to provide the nation an elite specialized corps of civil servants. It was the product of long-sought reform and the Carter administration's desire for a civil service less independent and more responsive to presidential policy initiatives. The SES is a hybrid, not
 
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composed solely of career or political executives but rather a mix (albeit a lopsided one) of both. The establishment of the SES marked a reversal of the trend away from the politicization noted by Mosher (1968) a decade earlier.
Prior to the CSRA there was no coherent executive personnel system across the executive branch or even within agencies. In many cases Congress made the decisions about number, placement, and pay for federal executives. Congressional influence in the process led some careerists to see the Congress as their principal patron. Thus, their loyalties rested more in Congress or its subcommittees than in their agency head. In addition, the political appointees who headed the agencies had very limited power to reassign careerists internally, as rank-in-the-position made it difficult for them to move personnel to match changed agency priorities (Marzotto et al. 1985, 114).
The Senior Executive Service was designed to correct what were considered the worst flaws of the civil service system. When it was established there was a top limit of 10,777 positions allocated to the agencies and filled by them on request to the Office of Personnel Management. It is now composed of nearly 7,000 senior officials, approximately 90 percent of whom are career civil servants. The rest are noncareer political appointees.
In essence, "the SES encompasses the real managers of the American bureaucracy. Its members work at the strategic interstices of politics and administration-just below the president and his top political appointees." They are, for example: assistant and associate administrators, deputy assistant secretaries, directors of various government centers, research directors, and office and division chiefs of nearly every executive agency of the federal government (Huddleston 1987, 28-29).
The organizing principle of the SES was the forging of a
unified, integrated higher civil service from the traditionally disparate shards of senior departmental administration. . . . the SES was to be America's answer to Europe's superbureaucratsa general civilian officer corps, staffed by highly trained and broadly experienced men and women who could be shifted from assignment to assignment as the needs of government required. . . . the vigorous, competent, and spirited bureaucracy that democratic government requires. (Ibid., 29)
The SES has several key features. It makes performance a central principle; removes its members from traditional civil service protections; bases rank in the person rather than in the position; features enhanced
 
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pay, a merit-based bonus system, and broader opportunities with a wider range of placements over the course of the executive's career; and places SES personnel under the more direct control of political appointees. This last increases the likelihood of policy implementation, as well as the possibility of political harassment (ibid., 7).
Under the provisions of the CSRA, agencies have been empowered in new ways to control their internal personnel practices. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially certifies persons to SES rank and allocates the number of them assigned to each agency, but the political agency head is free to decide where and how they will be used. Within limits, the PASs are also free to exercise more control over the SES members, punishing and rewarding them without the constraints of the merit system protections (Marzotto et al. 1985, 116).
The concept of a professional corps of federal bureaucrats has been around since at least the Hoover Commissions of 1949 and 1955. It had been rebuffed by successive presidents until Carter's reorganization. While Carter was successful in creating the SES, it continued to face opposition for various reasons. The SES
clashed with the ingrained traditions of our federal civil service; one which has evolved as an unwieldy bureaucracy characterized by a large number of technicians and specialist managers; which is top-heavy with political appointees; which is based on a fragmentation of power between the executive and legislative branches of government; and which has an intricate, decentralized administrative structure that often fosters loyalties within bureaus and agencies rather than across the executive branch. The SES has also run counter to our historic suspicion of specialized knowledge, our traditional fear of strong, centralized government, and our antipathy to authority in hierarchical structures. (Huddleston 1987, 4)
Backlash was not far behind inauguration of the new system.
The Genesis of the SES Quiet Crisis in the 1980s
The backlash took the form of politics that quickly intervened to withhold what the new civil service reforms promised.
First, Congress and the Carter administration came to believe that the SES bonuses were too generous and were given to too many people. Over the next several months, by law and regulation, the original provisions were amended by decreasing from 50 to 20 percent the employees eligible

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