The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (54 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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that their supervisor allowed them to become involved in the formulation of agenda for policy. It is interesting to note, however, that this is
down
one point from 1989 when, presumably, the attitude of the Reagan appointees would have kept the career bureaucracy at arm's length from discussions of policy making.
Though the SES was designed to bring career and political executives into one service in a cooperative venture, suspicion and distrust still characterize feelings on each side, according to many careerists in the personal interviews. The problem is only partially one of miscommunication. The larger problem is that the two streams of executives compose two competing cultures that are defined to a certain extent by their opposition to one another. The irony is that the competing sides find themselves in a situation where "success, in the end, is dependent on their cooperation;" neither can live without the other (Huddleston 1987, 62).
This dismal picture was nearly universally painted prior to the 1991 pay raise, which may change the political landscape. In regard to the effect of the salary increase on job satisfaction, one measure of contentment is retention of employees. Retention has, indeed, gone up and, as noted, retirement has gone down significantly as careerists work through their "high three" years. Nevertheless, other measures will have to be analyzed in the next few years to determine if there has been real improvement in political-career relations or if the salary increase simply bought a short-term respite for a system in long-term trouble.
Sound Management as a Government Priority?
While there is consensus that the "presidential control apparatus" has grown, there is little analysis to indicate if that growth has improved public management. "The Reagan administration is especially troublesome in this regard. Good management was not an early priority," particularly in the first two years, according to Newland. "The focus was on confident and decisive changeimplementing a fixed idea of governanceto the neglect of matters of importance to longer term success, including management" (Newland qtd. in Ingraham 1987, 425).
In the second half of his first administration Reagan did implement some management-oriented initiatives, notably "'Reform 88' which focused on managerial processes and systems: budgeting, resource management, and management information systems, as well as the broader area of 'general administration"' (Ingraham 1987, 425). Other initiatives, however, were directed at gaining political control over the career bureaucracy, for example, "the extensive use of carefully chosen political ap-
 
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pointees, the aggressive pursuit of clearly defined partisan policy objectives in most federal agencies and programs, and, in some cases, the creation of new networks within the bureaucracy which permit[ted] political staff to bypass career executives" (ibid.).
As discussed previously, the political purpose of these activities was unambiguous in the Nixon and Reagan administrations. While giving lip service to the importance of solid policy formulation, quality implementation, and sound management practices in government, the operating principle of those eras was "you cannot achieve management, policy or program control unless you have established political control" (ibid., 425).
While "quality of management" is difficult to define with precision, the public administration community must continue to struggle with it. The political establishment of the day must also recognize that it is inappropriate and ultimately self-defeating to use managerial means to achieve political ends by filling what should be career positions with political appointees.
It is wrong to view the extension of political appointments to more management and line positions as benign. Further, "good management" initiatives do not fill the gap. They are somewhat akin to tinkering with the ship's engines while the vessel wanders aimlessly about the sea. At a minimum, "good" management requires clear direction, appropriate political and career management skills, full utilization of those talents, collaboration, and trust. On these rudimentary components, the present system is seriously deficient. (Ibid., 432)
Ingraham suggests that the search for solutions to management issues must be
both empirical and normative. . . . Not enough is known about political appointees, about what they want to achieve, about what they feel about their public service jobs, about why they change jobs so frequently. Of equal significance, a normative model is lacking for public service which is relevant to both political appointees and career managers. To achieve reasonable consensus . . . [it is necessary to achieve] a consistent and heightened awareness of the centrality of effective public management to the long-term public interest. (Ibid., 432-33)
Increased presidential control carries significant weight to largely negative effect. Based on recent developments in public service, Ingraham calls for "a new assessment of political direction and control." She notes
 
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four characteristics that mandate this new assessment: First, the greater number of political appointees and their increased infiltration of the bureaucracy through Schedule C and the SES results in political appointees in line as well as in management and staff positions. This reduces the role and influence of the careerists because it "allows top level political executives to bypass career executives and rely instead upon lower-level political appointees" (ibid., 426).
Second, "the extremely short tenure of the majority of political executives . . . creates a serious management void, . . . [with] a cadre of political executives almost constantly in flux." As noted previously, this means, in effect, that political executives spend the majority of their time learning their job and career executives spend much of their time teaching it to them (ibid., 426). The cultures of the two camps lead in opposite directions. As the name implies, careerists are making a career out of government service; they are in it for the long haul. Political appointees, on the other hand, tend to be policy experts with a particular agenda, not system managers. Indeed, Ingraham and Ban's 1985 interviews with careerists contradicted the widely accepted figure of the 18-24-month tenure of political appointees: "interviewees reported an average tenure by their superiors of 12 months. Some noted that appointees who stayed longer than eight months were considered 'old timers"' (Ingraham and Ban 1986, 155).
Third, political appointees often demonstrate a lack of preparation for their jobs. This may refer to "lack of management experience; lack of understanding of, and experience in, the public sector; and/or inadequate understanding of the programs and policies for which the political executive is responsible." The vaunted "fresh perspective" that political appointees are supposed to bring to government is virtually useless "unless it translates into constructive policy change, improved management, and enhanced public service." The lack of preparation and short tenure of political appointees decreases the chances of that translation occurring (Ingraham 1987, 426).
And fourth, the SES, though designed partially to enhance the morale and flexibility of senior executives and the personnel management system, was also designed, as discussed above, to increase political control over career executives through performance reviews, bonuses, and political decision making over career executives' assignments, transfers, and career paths. This increased political muscle in the personnel system was augmented by the ability to place political appointees in line positions (ibid.). This trend, too, must be assessed anew to consider its negative effects on the government's ability to do its work.
 
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Within the context of presidential ambivalence (when not outright hostility) toward the senior career civil service, the siren song of bureaucrat bashing, the inherent conflict of political-career relations, and often minimal commitment to sound management principles, how do political and career executives actually relate to one another, and how might they better do so? Several models of political-career relations are next explored, beginning with the political models of conquest-bureauphobia, capture-bureauphilia, and comity-realpolitik. Then, the goal congruency and politics/administration models are discussed, followed by the technical models of neutral, responsive, and managerial competence, the moral-ethical models, the public service model, and finally, an assessment of relations within George Bush's administration.
Clearly, the models do not have clean lines of demarcation between them. They overlap nearly as often as they contradict one another. Nonetheless, an attempt to delineate them can clarify the complex issues of political-career relations.
Political Models: Conquest, Capture, and Comity
As noted, tension between the president and the bureaucracy was not the invention of Ronald Reagan. "In 1913, federal employees shuddered as the Democrats returned to the White House after a 16-year absence. William Jennings Bryan and other spoilsmen hoped to undo the merit system extensions of previous years, and despite the efforts of President Wilson, they had some successes. The Harding transition eight years later was essentially similar" (Maranto 1991, 248).
FDR's election brought a new approach to political appointments. Federal jobs became less a source of jobs outright, and more an instrument for policy implementation. Roosevelt simply bypassed the existing bureaucratic machinery and its Harding-Coolidge-Hoover conservatism to establish his New Deal outside the civil service system (though the New Deal agencies and their employees were soon blanketed into the merit system).
Eisenhower entered office with a distrust of the bureaucracy based on its twenty years of service to Democrats, combined with a basic distrust of big government that he bequeathed to his successors; presidential suspicions of the career civil service and anti-big-government campaign rhetoric continue to this day to one degree or another, regardless of party or house of Congress.

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