The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (55 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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Page 174
Conquest: Bureauphobia
The language used to describe this intrabranch tension borrows heavily from that of warfare, calling to mind macho images of conquest and surrender, victor and vanquished. Whipped up by the antibureaucracy rhetoric of recent presidential campaigns, most newly appointed appointees carry this warfare mentality into office with them: "many Washington denizens believe that either conquest or capture is almost inevitable. For example, one Heritage Foundation writer maintains that 'recurring, prolonged warfare doesn't go on-one side wins or the other gets captured"' (ibid., 248-49).
The conquest approach is, perhaps, best embodied in Richard Nixon, who
warned his cabinet against becoming captives of the career bureaucracy: ". . . We can't depend on people who believe in another philosophy of government to give us their undivided loyalty or their best work. . . . If we don't get rid of these people, they will either sabotage us from within, or they'll just sit back on their well-paid asses and wait for the next election to bring back their old bosses." (Maranto, 1993, 1)
Theorists of this school seem to have an approach that is angry and personal as much as political. Butler, for example, comments that "The bureaucratic entrepreneur will not be content merely to block administration proposals; he wishes to impose his policy agenda on an unwary administration" (Butler et al. 1984, 492). Conquest is the goal when the White House chooses persons to head an agency who are fundamentally opposed to the mission of that agency. Their assignment is to serve as internal change agents, to bore from within. This was seen most clearly in the Reagan political appointees who: "'carried the campaign into office,' held career executives at arm's length, viewed any dissenting career advice as a sign of disloyalty, and in effect created a self-fulfilling prophecy in respect to their negative views on government and bureaucracy" (Lorentzen 1984, 8).
There is a broader politicizing trend inherent in the conquest mentality. It acts to the detriment of the larger public service and on both sides of the executive equation.
Relations between political and career executives have become increasingly blurred as political levels have become bureaucratized and presidents have tried to gain controlespecially in the higher career ranks and without the political orientation provided by old-style party ties. Yet this
 
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situation damages the basic idea of a civil service far more than it threatens bureaucratic self-interests. Caught up in a politicizing trend, career officials have every incentive to neglect civil service norms of objective responsiveness and instead to survive by relying on their own buddy systems or by showing they can be as unquestioningly loyal as any personal aide who might be brought in (with the added asset of knowing how to work the system). In this sense, bureaucratized power can become more entrenched while the broader concept of a civil service declines. (Heclo 1977, 76)
In addition to the effects of White House reorganization of central agencies such as OMB and OPM, a generalized politicization removes decision-making power from career executives by various means. In the Reagan administration these means included:
the threatened use of sanctions on agency officials who did not follow administration policies . . . ; maximum use of . . . RIFs; greater use of political appointees at both higher and lower levels in agencies; ideological litmus tests for important bureaucratic positions; and the politicized OMB which emphasized political oversight and regulatory control. Presidential loyalty appeared, at times, to be more important than responsibility to the law. (Cigler 1990, 644)
The result of this general politicization was that career professional expertise was significantly excluded from the higher levels of policy and implementation.
"Public administration under President Reagan [was], to a significant extent, ideological political administration"
(Newland 1983, 2).
This conquest model, what Durant (1990) terms the bureauphobic perspective, is embodied in appointees who distrust careerists. They are likely to rely on threats and confrontations to accomplish administration ends. This approach is criticized for leaning toward authoritarianism and political rigidity.
A more subtle form of career exclusion and political control is what is referred to as "jigsaw puzzle management," another Sanera-Heritage Foundation concept:
Very little information will be put in writing. Career staff will supply information, but they should never become involved in the formulation of agenda-related policy objectives. Similarly, once controversial policy goals are formulated, they should not be released in total to the career

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