The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (52 page)

Read The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush Online

Authors: Judith E. Michaels

Tags: #test

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
3.4Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
 
Page 164
for bonuses. This was the first of many actions that slowly disillusioned the SES members. Second, the personal development plans promised by the CSRA were scaled down (i.e., in the first six years of the SES, only 12 senior executives used the sabbatical provisions of the Act). Another disappointment to employees was the merit pay system for mid-level managers (GS 13-15), which was never adequately funded to provide attractive bonuses for high performers. Finally, reassignments and relocations, supposedly a positive feature of the new system, were sometimes used by the Reagan administration in its first years in a way many SES members regarded as punitiveas a means to get them out of the way or to force them to retire. (Levine 1986, 201-02)
Careerists' unhappiness with the system soon surfaced. A 1984 study found that "45% felt that the disadvantages of the SES outweighed the advantages. Only 45% of mid-level staff (GS 13-15) said they would join the SES if given the opportunity" (CRS 1987, 8).
According to many, "'Carter's gift to Reagan' . . . [the CSRA and SES] enabled the latter to gain easy control over a bureaucracy made more vulnerable by the CSRA" and contributed significantly to the politicization of the executive branch (Levine 1986, 202). As one careerist put it, "Scotty Campbell [the architect of the CSRA] did more to move careerists out of OPM than [Ronald Reagan's OPM chief,] Don Devine."
Over and above the politics of the SES, there is the bedrock systemic problem of continuity: only five years after its inception there was not a single person at OPM or the White House who was responsible for the original design of the SES. As is clear,
There is no surer recipe for failure than to separate someone's personal stakes from the fate of the projects he or she is called upon to manage. Yet that is what we have done. . . . To ask temporary political appointees to superintend most of the major operations of the SES system is approximately comparable to entrusting the family heirlooms to a two-year-old, which is roughly how long most political appointees remain on the scene to account for their handiwork. (Heclo 1984b, 13-14)
The short-termer system as it currently operates builds into the larger structure disincentives for a competent career executive service. Because political appointees are temporary, they can escape the consequences of their actions. They do not have to worry about staff development or the long-term health of their agencies because they will likely be gone before any long-term problems they generate surface. In fact, "for political ap-
 
Page 165
pointees it is personally rational to be institutionally foolish-not to worry about long-term resentments, not to worry about the executive development of officials who will be of use only to a successor administration, not to look past short-term responsiveness in judging performance" (Heclo 1984b, 14). Such a situation fairly cries out for trouble, which soon followed the creation of the SES.
Crashing Morale: The Wages of Bureaucrat Bashing
Despite grand hopes for it, the SES in its first decade was acknowledged by many (CRS 1992; GAO 1992, 1990, 1988, 1987a, 1985; Heclo 1986, 1984a; Huddleston, 1987; Levine, 1986; etc.) to be a system in trouble, a victim of low pay and pay compression, retrenchment on promised bonuses and career advancement, agency interference, general hostility to the concept of a managerial elite, less-than-competent coordination by the OPM, and the "widespread sense that the system has been politicized and that neutral competence is no longer valued" (Huddleston 1987, 30). As discussed above, declining morale in the SES was the inevitable outgrowth of these problems. Some career SES members even went so far as to sue the federal government, charging breach of faith over changes in bonuses and other aspects mentioned earlier. Between 8 percent and 16 percent left the service annually since 1980, further indicating dissatisfaction with the SES (CRS 1987).
A Merit Systems Protections Board survey of former members of the SES found in 1989 that while low pay and operation of the bonus system were the most frequently cited reasons given for their departure, large percentages left because of job dissatisfaction. It was revealed that "46% left the Federal service, in part, because they did not enjoy the work anymore and 42% . . . , in part, because their skills had not been used appropriately" (USMSPB 1989, 1).
The MSPB study also showed that SES careerists generally were not happy with their political bosses. They held
the nonpolitical skills and abilities of politically appointed senior executives in low regard. Fewer than a quarter of the former career executives believe[d] that non-career executives [brought] valuable experience, good managerial skills, or leadership qualities to their positions. Moreover, career executives who worked for noncareer senior executives and political appointees more frequently listed the following concerns as reasons for leaving the Service than did executives not supervised by noncareer and political executives: 1. the lack of competence of their immediate super-
 
Page 166
visor; 2. the politicization of their agencies, and 3. the ethics of higher management in their agencies. (Ibid., 2-3)
It is well-documented (USMSPB 1990) that career executives are faced with declining morale and career mobility as a result of bureaucrat bashing, the increase in political appointments, and the decrease in career appointments, among other factors. The increased numbers and placement of political appointees were discussed in detail in chapter 4. In this context, it is sufficient to note that the morale and mobility of the careerists are inextricably linked in inverse proportion to the increased numbers of their political counterparts. Between (fiscal years) 1980 and 1986, the numbers of noncareer (political) SES members and Schedule C employees increased 12.8 percent and 13.1 percent respectively, while the number of career SES members decreased 5.3 percent (GAO 1987b). Certainly, this growth affects their relationships, when political executives displace career executives in agencies, limiting the latter's sources of influence, power, and upward career movement and contributing to the politicization of the public service.
Other factors contribute to morale problems as well. Bureaucrat and government bashing have made public service less attractive to both career and political executives, as have salary caps, personnel cutbacks, and the sluggish state of the economy. Political replacement of career executives in OPM and in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) politicized the personnel process itself. Also, pervasive doubts about the qualifications of the Reagan political appointees in particular contributed to the lowered morale of the career executives and the diminished esteem of the public service.
The "quiet crisis" literature assumes that the toll taken on the professional civil service has affected the quality of that work force. "There is evidence on all sides of an erosion of performance and morale across government in America. Too many of our most talented public servantsthose with the skills and dedication that are the hallmarks of an effective career serviceare ready to leave. Too few of our brightest young peoplethose with the imagination and energy that are essential for the futureare willing to join" (Volcker 1989, 1).
Both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan fanned the flames of bureaucrat bashing. But while Jimmy Carter made much of being an outsider unencumbered by Washington politics, alliances, and obligations in his successful campaign for the presidency in 1976, Ronald Reagan turned bureaucrat bashing into a fine art as he rode a popular wave of discontent into the White House in 1980. The campaign appeal to "get the govern-

Other books

Jewel of Darkness by Quinn Loftis
Undercover Hunter by Rachel Lee
Bright Spark by Gavin Smith
El Narco by Ioan Grillo
My Perfect Imperfections by Jalpa Williby
Good Greek Girls Don't by Georgia Tsialtas
Landscape: Memory by Matthew Stadler, Columbia University. Writing Division