The Road to Berlin (138 page)

Shtemenko, General S.M.,
Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1968). See Soviet translation and publication,
The Soviet General Staff at War 1941–1945
(Moscow: Progress 1970), pp. 70–80, Stalin instructions to General Staff (4 January 1943, pp. 72–3), General Staff planning, Stalin rebuke to Maslennikov (p. 76), Stalin to General Staff (8 January, p. 78), approval of
Gory
plan,
Stavka
instructions to Southern Front (23 January, p. 80), co-ordination of Southern Front and Black Sea Group.

Shtemenko, S.M. ‘Vtoraya voennaya zima na Yuge’,
VIZ
, 1967 (12), pp. 63–70: on plans to cut off First
Panzer
Army, Southern Front objectives, planned isolation of N Caucasus, Stalin’s orders to General Staff (4 January, p. 65), Stalin rebuke to Maslennikov (p.
66), Gory/More
operations and Stalin’s directions (pp. 66–8).

Tyulenev, General I.V.,
Cherez tri voiny
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1960), pp. 246–52, Operations
Gory/More
, Stalin’s personal instructions about Petrov (p. 250), Northern Group reorganized into N Caucasus Front (24 January).

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
(2nd edn), pp. 294–308, ‘Na Verkhnem Donu’, Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh operation, report to Stalin (6 January, p. 301), submission of Voronezh–Kastornoe plan to Stalin (18 January, p. 307).

Zavyalov, A.S. and Kalyadin, T.E.,
Bitva za Kavkaz 1942–1943 gg. Voen. ist. ocherk
. (Moscow: Voenizdat 1957), also
Die Schlacht um den Kaukasus
(E. Berlin: Verlag d. Min. Nat. Verteidigung 1959).

‘Koltso’: final phase

Laskin, Lt.-Gen. I.A.,
Na puti k perelomu
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1977), pt 2, Laskin receives surrender of von Paulus, pp. 324–41.

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
Velikaya pobeda na Volge
, pp. 429–67, preparations for final assault, Don Front decisions/planning operations, 10–12 January, 13–17 January and to German capitulation.

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
Soldatskii dolg
. (Moscow: Voenizdat (VM), 1st edn 1968, 2nd edn 1972). Soviet translation and publication (Moscow: Progress 1970),
A Soldier’s Duty
, see ‘Finale at Stalingrad’, pp. 157–74.

Voronov, N., ‘Operatsiya “Koltso”;
VIZ
, 1962 (6), pp. 67–76 (final phase).

Stavka, General Staff, Stalin’s promotions pp.
38
–
44

IVOVSS
, 3 (Voenizdat, 1961), pp. 210–27, on strengthening Soviet forces, orders and decorations, Party–political work.

KZ
, 19 January 1943. Appointment of Zhukov as Marshal SU.

KZ
, 16 February 1943. Details of
pogon
(illustrations).

Evseyev, Maj.-Gen. A., ‘Organizatsiya informatsionnoi raboty v General’nom shtabe, shtabakh frontov i armii’,
VIZ
, 1981 (3), pp. 10–18.

Gaglov, 1.1.,
General Antonov
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1973). See ‘V General’nom shtabe’, pp. 64–75.

Khrulev, General A., ‘Kistorii wedeniya pogon’,
VIZ
, 1963(1), pp. 109–16: introduction of shoulder–boards
(pogon)
, NKO Order No. 25, 15 January 1943.

Lomov, Col.-Gen. N., ‘Ob organizatsii i metodakh raboty General’novo shtaba’,
VIZ
, 1981 (2), pp. 12–19 (working methods of General Staff).

Saltykov, Maj.-Gen. N., ‘Predstaviteli General’novo shtaba …’,
VIZ
, 1971 (9), pp. 54–9 (on General Staff ‘representatives’).

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
(2nd edn), see ‘V General’nom shtabe’, pp. 515–51 (on the General Staff, Stalin and command procedures).

2 THE DUEL IN THE SOUTH: FEBRUARY–MARCH 1943

Soviet offensive, Operations ‘Zvezda’ and ‘Skachok’, Kharkov battle pp.
45
–
55

Carell, Paul,
Scorched Earth
(‘Hitler’s War on Russia’, vol. 2) (London: Harrap 1970), pt 2: Manstein, ‘Third Battle of Kharkov’, pp. 173–204.

Jukes, Geoffrey,
Kursk. The Clash of Armour
(London, 1968—Purnell History of World War II, bk no. 7), see ‘The Salient is formed’, pp. 8–24 (on Soviet winter offensive).

Manstein, Erich von,
Lost Victories
, pt III: battles second half January 1943, pp. 393–401; plan to hold Donets basin, pp. 401–4; Hitler–Manstein conference 6 February, pp. 414–20; planning ‘German counter–stroke’, pp. 420–28; Donets–Dnieper success 19 February-2 March, pp. 428–33; battle of Kharkov, pp. 433–42.

Philippi, A. and Heim, F.,
Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland
, pp. 201–8 (Soviet offensive, German counter–blow).

Read, Anthony and Fisher, David,
Operation Lucy
(London: Hodder & Stoughton 1980). See ch. 10, ‘Success and Failure’, on reduced flow of material from
ULTRA
, Stalin’s conviction of German retreat, supposed success of encirdement plan, pp. 147–50.

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, pp. 341–50, German withdrawal into the Ukraine.

German materials

KTB
, III/1: entries/Ostfront/1 February-9 March 1943, pp. 90–197.

KTB
, III/2: see App. c/VIII:
Führung der Operationen
, ‘Stalingrad und die Abstützung der Ostfront von Januar bis März 1943’, pp. 1598–1602 (also bibliographical footnote, p. 1602).

GMD

FHO
Intelligence assessments/agents’ reports:

Feindlage: 28.1.43. T-78/R466, 6445929.

Kräftebild/weitere russ. Operationsmöglichkeiten/Südbereich/Ostfront: 19.1.43. R466, 6446303–6.

Vermütete Feindabsichten: 33.43. R466, 6446284–6.

Feindlage: Mitte, Nord, Süd, Mitte 7–12.3.43. R466, 6445942–6 (5947–8 to 15.3).

‘Gesamtbild der Feindlage’ (Hgr. Süd, signed Manstein), 26.3.43 (note on movement of Soviet 64th Army). R466, 6446277–8.

Feindlagebeurteilung vor deutscher Ostfront (tabulation of Soviet reserves): 19.2.43. R466, 6446293–6.

Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im Grossen: 22.2.43. R466, 6445936–39 (also Zusammenfassung: agent reports, Stalin’s military conference …). R466, 6445951–6.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 3 (1961), ch. 2, ‘Borba za osvobozhdenie Ukrainy’. Front organization and forces, German strength, offensive aimed at Kharkov, SW Front operations, German counter–offensive planning, mistaken Soviet estimates of German moves (p. 118), depleted Soviet tank strength (p. 118), breach between 69th Army and 3rd Tank Army, development of German attack, pp. 111–23.

IVMV
, 6 (1976), ch. 5, ‘The SW axis’, offensive into Donbas codenamed
Skachok
(‘Leap’), plan to seize Dnieper crossings, Voronezh Front operations, German withdrawal, fall of Kharkov, SW Front operations (no second echelon, weak reserves), pp. 127–34; German counter–blow, Popov refused permission by Vatutin to break off offensive (p. 136), Popov left with only 25 tanks,
Stavka
fails to perceive German threat (p. 137), Vassilevskii assigned to Voronezh Front (where only 70 tanks left), no operational reserves, tardy movement of 64th Army from Stalingrad, mid–March
Stavka
moves strategic reserves to Voronezh Front, Soviet reverses due to weakness, lack of air cover and mistaken assessment by Front command of German intentions and Soviet capabilities, pp. 134–41.
(IVMV
is more cautious than
IVOVSS
in apportioning blame for Soviet reverses; adds some detail on Soviet strength, involves Stalin less directly.)

Wartime press

Sovinformbyuro
. Reports/communiqués for period 1.2.43–9.3.43, vol. 4, pp. 87–170.

SWN
. No. 473: Stalin’s Order of the Day, 25.1.43.

No. 497: Stalin’s Order of the Day, 23.2.43.

No. 500: G. Alexandrov’s ‘Decisive stage of the War’, 1.3.43.

No. 507: Stalin’s appointment as Marshal SU, 9.3.43.

No. 509: German counter–offensive held, 11.3.43.

Documentary-memoir materials

Collective authorship,
Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran-uchastnits Varshavskovo dogovora 1941–1949 gg
. (Moskow: Nauka 1975), pp. 33–50, Czechoslovak People’s Army.

Grachev, S.I. (ed.),
Rozhdenie Chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii
(translated from Czechoslovak) (Moscow: Voenizdat 1959), pp. 82–133 (origins/raising of Czech units in USSR).

Kazakov, M.I.,
Nad kartoi bylykh srazhenii
, see ‘Operatsiya
“Zvezda”
…’, pp. 172–88 (Golikov’s signal on distance to Dnieper and spring mud, p. 187).

Kazakov, M.I., ‘Ot verkhnevo Dona k Dnepru’,
VIZ
, 1965 (11), pp. 62–70: Voronezh Front and
Zvezda
.

Lelyushenko, D.D.,
Moskva-Stalingrad
…, pp. 157–68, on Donbas operations.

Morozov, V.P.,
Zapadnee Voronezha
, chs 3–5
passim
. (Very detailed, indispensable operational study of Soviet offensive, Voronezh/Bryansk Fronts, Kharkov offensive.)

Morozov, V.P., ‘Pochemu ne zavershilos nastuplenie v Donbasse vesnoi 1943 goda’,
VIZ
, 1963 (3), pp. 14–43: article of singular importance analysing failure of Soviet Donbas operations, with intelligence assessments (e.g. Bogolyubov, 21 February, p. 17, Golikov’s September report,
ibid.)
, Popov-Vatutin (pp. 26–7), Vatutin to
Stavka
February (p. 31), Stalin’s decisions, summary (pp. 33–4).

Moskalenko, K.S.,
Na Yugo-zapadnom napravlenii
, vol. 1 (2nd edn), ch. 14, ‘forming south face of the Kursk salient’, pp. 431–49. (Important for operational directives, also Front report to Stalin 16 February, pp. 432–3.)

Moskalenko, K.S., ‘Ot Voronezha do Khar’kova’,
VIZ
, 1963 (4), pp. 30–33, directives for Kharkov offensive, Donbas, N Caucasus, Kharkov operation, lack of Soviet reserves.

Svoboda, General Lyudvik,
Ot Buzuluka do Pragi
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1st edn 1963; here 2nd edn 1969) (translated from Czech), pp. 110–47.

East European materials (Czechoslovak military units in USSR)

Svoboda, General Ludvik, Z
Buzuluku do Prahy
(Prague: Naše Vojsko 1967).

Za armádu lidu
, Sborník dokumentu k bojovým tradicim našeho lidu a vojenske politice KSČ, 1918–1945 (Prague, 1960).

Soviet offensive operations centre, ‘Iskra’ (Leningrad), north-west pp.
55
–
63

Carell, Paul,
Scorched Earth
, pt 3, ‘Battles on the Northern Wing’: Leningrad siege, pp. 205–14; south of Ladoga, pp. 214–19; Demyansk, pp. 248–66; Rzhev and Operation ‘Buffalo’
(Büffel)
, pp. 266–75.