The World Was Going Our Way (93 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
84
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 102-3, 134-5, 166. Shebarshin identifies the head of Line PR only as ‘Vladimir G’; his name does not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes from the files.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 102-3, 134-5, 166. Shebarshin identifies the head of Line PR only as ‘Vladimir G’; his name does not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes from the files.
85
. Ustinov, the Defence Minister, and Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, also served on the Iran Commission; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 133.
. Ustinov, the Defence Minister, and Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, also served on the Iran Commission; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 133.
86
. Ibid., pp. 133-6. On the failure of the attempt to rescue the US hostages, see Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 451-3.
. Ibid., pp. 133-6. On the failure of the attempt to rescue the US hostages, see Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 451-3.
87
. Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 112-16.
. Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 112-16.
88
. Shemesh,
Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988
, p. 149.
. Shemesh,
Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988
, p. 149.
89
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. In March 1980 STOGOV was arrested in Tehran and accused of secret links with the KGB. He was released in September and allowed to leave Iran after requests from the PLO prompted by the KGB; vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 40.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. In March 1980 STOGOV was arrested in Tehran and accused of secret links with the KGB. He was released in September and allowed to leave Iran after requests from the PLO prompted by the KGB; vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 40.
90
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. The PUK had been founded in 1975 as a breakaway movement from the KDP, then headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani (see above, pp. 175-6), which it claimed was a ‘rightist tribalist command’. The PUK’s declared aim was ‘to join all the progressive, Leftist nationalist forces in Iraq’ in order to liberate the country from ‘the economic and political chains of neo-imperialism’. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 91-2. In 2005 Talabani became President of Iraq.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 39. The PUK had been founded in 1975 as a breakaway movement from the KDP, then headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani (see above, pp. 175-6), which it claimed was a ‘rightist tribalist command’. The PUK’s declared aim was ‘to join all the progressive, Leftist nationalist forces in Iraq’ in order to liberate the country from ‘the economic and political chains of neo-imperialism’. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 91-2. In 2005 Talabani became President of Iraq.
91
. k-26, 142.
. k-26, 142.
92
. k-26, 144.
. k-26, 144.
93
. k-26, 139.
. k-26, 139.
94
. k-26, 117.
. k-26, 117.
95
. k-26, 138.
. k-26, 138.
96
. Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 2, 136, 151.
. Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 2, 136, 151.
97
. Though he had no previous military record, in 1976 Saddam had persuaded Bakr to make him a four-star general; he subsequently promoted himself field marshal. Baram, ‘Saddam Husayn, the Ba‘th Regime and the Iraqi Officer Corps’, pp. 211-23.
. Though he had no previous military record, in 1976 Saddam had persuaded Bakr to make him a four-star general; he subsequently promoted himself field marshal. Baram, ‘Saddam Husayn, the Ba‘th Regime and the Iraqi Officer Corps’, pp. 211-23.
98
. k-26, 147. Mitrokhin’s notes do not make clear exactly how much money was sent to the ICP during 1981. A first instalment of $200,000, however, was given to Aziz Muhammad on 13 March 1981 by the Damascus resident; k-26, 120. During the same month the KGB residency in Lebanon handed over another $100,000 of Soviet funds and a further $68,185 collected from Iraqis in the USSR to Kerim Ahmad of the ICP Politburo; k-26, 122.
. k-26, 147. Mitrokhin’s notes do not make clear exactly how much money was sent to the ICP during 1981. A first instalment of $200,000, however, was given to Aziz Muhammad on 13 March 1981 by the Damascus resident; k-26, 120. During the same month the KGB residency in Lebanon handed over another $100,000 of Soviet funds and a further $68,185 collected from Iraqis in the USSR to Kerim Ahmad of the ICP Politburo; k-26, 122.
99
. Shemesh,
Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988
, p. 222.
. Shemesh,
Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988
, p. 222.
100
. Ibid., pp. 223-5; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 236-7; Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 158-9.
. Ibid., pp. 223-5; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 236-7; Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 158-9.
101
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 166-8.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 166-8.
102
. Information from Sir Nicholas Barrington.
. Information from Sir Nicholas Barrington.
103
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 168.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 168.
104
. Wright,
In the Name of God
, pp. 124, 235-6; Moin,
Khomeini
, p. 255. Shebarshin was succeeded as resident by Anatoli Nikolayevich Kocheskov (codenamed CHIZHOV), previously resident in Belgium; vol. 2 misc., item 2.
. Wright,
In the Name of God
, pp. 124, 235-6; Moin,
Khomeini
, p. 255. Shebarshin was succeeded as resident by Anatoli Nikolayevich Kocheskov (codenamed CHIZHOV), previously resident in Belgium; vol. 2 misc., item 2.
105
. Abrahamian,
Tortured Confessions
, ch. 4.
. Abrahamian,
Tortured Confessions
, ch. 4.
106
. Beschloss and Talbott,
At the Highest Levels
, chs. 12, 13; Baker,
The Politics of Diplomacy
, pp. 396-8.
. Beschloss and Talbott,
At the Highest Levels
, chs. 12, 13; Baker,
The Politics of Diplomacy
, pp. 396-8.
107
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, p. 502.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, p. 502.
108
. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, p. 51.
. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, p. 51.
109
. Baker,
The Politics of Diplomacy
, p. 398.
. Baker,
The Politics of Diplomacy
, p. 398.
110
. Though Kryuchkov and Yazov were among the leading coup plotters, Primakov was opposed to it.
. Though Kryuchkov and Yazov were among the leading coup plotters, Primakov was opposed to it.
111
. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, pp. 63-4.
. Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, pp. 63-4.
112
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, p. 16.
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, p. 16.
The Making of the Syrian Alliance
1
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 33-6.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 33-6.
2
. k-12, 201; t-1, 174.
. k-12, 201; t-1, 174.
3
. k-5, 254; k-2, 14.
. k-5, 254; k-2, 14.
4
. Aldrich,
The Hidden Hand
, pp. 583-5.
. Aldrich,
The Hidden Hand
, pp. 583-5.
5
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 314-15.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, pp. 314-15.
6
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 315.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 315.
7
. vol. 6, ch. 12, part 10, p. 497.
. vol. 6, ch. 12, part 10, p. 497.
8
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, p. 38.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, p. 38.
9
. k-26, 148, 165, 173.
. k-26, 148, 165, 173.
10
. See above, pp. 151-2.
. See above, pp. 151-2.
11
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 142-3. Jundi committed suicide in March 1969, probably to avoid arrest and execution for his various crimes and atrocities; ibid., pp. 151-2.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 142-3. Jundi committed suicide in March 1969, probably to avoid arrest and execution for his various crimes and atrocities; ibid., pp. 151-2.
12
. Ibid., pp. 117, 145-8; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 214.
. Ibid., pp. 117, 145-8; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 214.
13
. k-24, 58. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to KERIM after April 1968.
. k-24, 58. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to KERIM after April 1968.
14
. Asad’s friend ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam (thought to have operated previously as his spy in the entourage of Salah Jadid) served successively as Foreign Minister and Vice-President (still with major foreign policy responsibilities until 1978) from 1971 to Asad’s death in 2001; Mustafa Talas, another old friend of Asad who had become Chief of the General Staff in 1968, was Defence Minister from 1972 to Asad’s death; Hikmat Shihabi, head of military intelligence from 1971 to 1974, was Chief of the General Staff from 1974 to 1998.
. Asad’s friend ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam (thought to have operated previously as his spy in the entourage of Salah Jadid) served successively as Foreign Minister and Vice-President (still with major foreign policy responsibilities until 1978) from 1971 to Asad’s death in 2001; Mustafa Talas, another old friend of Asad who had become Chief of the General Staff in 1968, was Defence Minister from 1972 to Asad’s death; Hikmat Shihabi, head of military intelligence from 1971 to 1974, was Chief of the General Staff from 1974 to 1998.
15
. Khuly became head of the BNS only in 1978. In 1987 he was transferred to the post of deputy commander (later commander) of the air force after the scandal caused by the attempt by Syrian intelligence to plant a bomb on an El Al plane at Heathrow Airport. He was finally pensioned off in 1999. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 181-2, 475-82; Zisser,
Asad’s Legacy
, pp. 42, 166, 171.
. Khuly became head of the BNS only in 1978. In 1987 he was transferred to the post of deputy commander (later commander) of the air force after the scandal caused by the attempt by Syrian intelligence to plant a bomb on an El Al plane at Heathrow Airport. He was finally pensioned off in 1999. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 181-2, 475-82; Zisser,
Asad’s Legacy
, pp. 42, 166, 171.
16
. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, ch. 4.
. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, ch. 4.
17
. Ibid., pp. 29-30, 43; Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 177-82, 399-44.
. Ibid., pp. 29-30, 43; Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 177-82, 399-44.
18
. Information from Sir Roger Tomkys, British ambassador in Syria 1984-86.
. Information from Sir Roger Tomkys, British ambassador in Syria 1984-86.
19
. t-1, 177.
. t-1, 177.
20
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 319-20; Zisser,
Asad’s Legacy
, pp. 32, 157, 170.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 319-20; Zisser,
Asad’s Legacy
, pp. 32, 157, 170.
21
. t-1, 177. The KGB also claimed that its active measures successfully influenced Rif’at Asad in 1976; k-24, 426.
. t-1, 177. The KGB also claimed that its active measures successfully influenced Rif’at Asad in 1976; k-24, 426.
22
. k-12, 185.
. k-12, 185.
23
. k-12, 182.
. k-12, 182.
24
. See above, p. 195; t-1, 174; k-4, 56; k-12, 201; k-201. Al-Din was killed in an accident in 1980.
. See above, p. 195; t-1, 174; k-4, 56; k-12, 201; k-201. Al-Din was killed in an accident in 1980.
25
. t-1, 161, 162.
. t-1, 161, 162.
26
. t-1, 164.
. t-1, 164.
27
. t-1, 160, 169.
. t-1, 160, 169.
28
. t-1, 163.
. t-1, 163.
29
. t-1, 172.
. t-1, 172.
30
. k-24, 61.
. k-24, 61.
31
. t-1, 167.
. t-1, 167.
32
. t-1, 173, 168.
. t-1, 173, 168.
33
. t-1, 176.
. t-1, 176.
34
. t-1, 165.
. t-1, 165.
35
. Only al-Din (IZZAT) and VATAR are clearly identified as agents.
. Only al-Din (IZZAT) and VATAR are clearly identified as agents.
36
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 274.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 274.
37
. Report from Grigori Grigorenko to Andropov, seeking approval for bugging Asad’s apartments in the Kremlin, 30 June 1972; approved by Andropov, 3 July 1972; k-6, 168. Though this was the only document relating to the bugging of Asad’s apartments during his visits to Moscow transcribed by Mitrokhin, there can be little doubt that this was normal procedure. Mitrokhin was unable to note any of the transcripts of the bugged conversations which were filed in the archives of the Second Chief Directorate.
. Report from Grigori Grigorenko to Andropov, seeking approval for bugging Asad’s apartments in the Kremlin, 30 June 1972; approved by Andropov, 3 July 1972; k-6, 168. Though this was the only document relating to the bugging of Asad’s apartments during his visits to Moscow transcribed by Mitrokhin, there can be little doubt that this was normal procedure. Mitrokhin was unable to note any of the transcripts of the bugged conversations which were filed in the archives of the Second Chief Directorate.
38
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 192.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 192.
39
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, ch. 7; Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 74-7. Bakdash’s KGB codename is given in k-26, 172.
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, ch. 7; Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 74-7. Bakdash’s KGB codename is given in k-26, 172.
40
. k-6, 168.
. k-6, 168.
41
. Ibid. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record whether or not Shaya’s confidences to OSIPOV on 12 September 1973 took place during a hunting expedition. On another occasion Shaya told OSIPOV that the former Syrian Foreign Minister, Dr Ibrahim Makhus, had remarked during a shooting party that Arab leaders would do well to try to imitate the efficiency and devotion to duty shown by the gundog.
. Ibid. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record whether or not Shaya’s confidences to OSIPOV on 12 September 1973 took place during a hunting expedition. On another occasion Shaya told OSIPOV that the former Syrian Foreign Minister, Dr Ibrahim Makhus, had remarked during a shooting party that Arab leaders would do well to try to imitate the efficiency and devotion to duty shown by the gundog.
42
. The old Russian calendar was thirteen days behind the Western calendar which was adopted after the October Revolution. Its anniversary thus fell on 7 November rather than 25 October.
. The old Russian calendar was thirteen days behind the Western calendar which was adopted after the October Revolution. Its anniversary thus fell on 7 November rather than 25 October.
43
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 99-102.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 99-102.
44
. Ibid., p. 84 n. 35.
. Ibid., p. 84 n. 35.
45
. k-26, 94; k-26, 148.
. k-26, 94; k-26, 148.
46
. k-26, 94. On 26 March 1975 the General Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Aziz Muhammad, agreed to a similar request.
. k-26, 94. On 26 March 1975 the General Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Aziz Muhammad, agreed to a similar request.
47
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, p. 108.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, p. 108.
48
. k-22, 442.
. k-22, 442.
49
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 108-12; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 221.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 108-12; Roberts, ‘The USSR in Syrian Perspective’, p. 221.
50
. k-26, 221.
. k-26, 221.
51
. k-26, 219. Though the files on the July and September 1976 KGB transfers of money via Damascus to the Lebanese Communist Party were the only ones noted by Mitrokhin, there were undoubtedly others.
. k-26, 219. Though the files on the July and September 1976 KGB transfers of money via Damascus to the Lebanese Communist Party were the only ones noted by Mitrokhin, there were undoubtedly others.
52
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 112-13, 130-34; Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 286-9. Human Rights Watch includes Jumblatt in a list of foreign assassinations carried out by Syrian intelligence agencies; Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, p. 153.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 112-13, 130-34; Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 286-9. Human Rights Watch includes Jumblatt in a list of foreign assassinations carried out by Syrian intelligence agencies; Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, p. 153.
53
. See above, p. 165.
. See above, p. 165.
54
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 305.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 305.
55
. k-24, 45; see above, p. 167. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not mention Asad, it is scarcely conceivable that discussion of the assassination plan could have gone ahead without his authorization.
. k-24, 45; see above, p. 167. Though Mitrokhin’s notes do not mention Asad, it is scarcely conceivable that discussion of the assassination plan could have gone ahead without his authorization.
56
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 134-5.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 134-5.
57
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 314; k-24, 44.
. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3, p. 314; k-24, 44.
58
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 335.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, p. 335.
59
. Pipes,
The Hidden Hand
, pp. 59, 71 n.38.
. Pipes,
The Hidden Hand
, pp. 59, 71 n.38.
60
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 137, 140-45. On Muhammad, see above, pp. 188-90.
. Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 137, 140-45. On Muhammad, see above, pp. 188-90.
61
. See above, ch. 9.
. See above, ch. 9.
62
. k-26, 143. On Carrillo’s and Marchais’s involvement in Eurocommunism, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 300- 6.
. k-26, 143. On Carrillo’s and Marchais’s involvement in Eurocommunism, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 300- 6.
63
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, p. 202. The Syrian Communist Party split into three groups: the main party led by Bakdash, a group led by his younger rival, Yusuf Faisal, and a breakaway Communist Party-Political Bureau, led by Riyadh al-Turk. Bakdash’s and Faisal’s groups were members of the ruling National Progressive Front. The Communist Party-Political Bureau was outlawed and viciously persecuted (see below).
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, p. 202. The Syrian Communist Party split into three groups: the main party led by Bakdash, a group led by his younger rival, Yusuf Faisal, and a breakaway Communist Party-Political Bureau, led by Riyadh al-Turk. Bakdash’s and Faisal’s groups were members of the ruling National Progressive Front. The Communist Party-Political Bureau was outlawed and viciously persecuted (see below).
64
. Al-Turk is known to have been taken to hospital in critical condition in February 1981, January 1982, December 1983, December 1984, December 1987 and November 1988. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, pp. 57, 67; Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 77-8; Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, pp. 196-7. Amazingly, al-Turk survived to be released from jail in 1998.
. Al-Turk is known to have been taken to hospital in critical condition in February 1981, January 1982, December 1983, December 1984, December 1987 and November 1988. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, pp. 57, 67; Ramet,
The Soviet-Syrian Relationship
, pp. 77-8; Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, pp. 196-7. Amazingly, al-Turk survived to be released from jail in 1998.
65
. k-26, 143.
. k-26, 143.
66
. The KGB paid the Syrian Communist Party $50,000 in January 1979, $50,000 in April, $45,000 in November, $70,000 and $60,000 in December; k-26, 166. It is possible that further payments are recorded in files not noted by Mitrokhin.
. The KGB paid the Syrian Communist Party $50,000 in January 1979, $50,000 in April, $45,000 in November, $70,000 and $60,000 in December; k-26, 166. It is possible that further payments are recorded in files not noted by Mitrokhin.
67
. k-26, 168.
. k-26, 168.
68
. Mitrokhin noted a payment of $30,000 to the Syrian Communist Party in February 1980 and two much larger payments in December: $100,000 to Bakdash and $199,000 to FARID; k-26, 170, 172.
. Mitrokhin noted a payment of $30,000 to the Syrian Communist Party in February 1980 and two much larger payments in December: $100,000 to Bakdash and $199,000 to FARID; k-26, 170, 172.
69
. k-26, 164, 197.
. k-26, 164, 197.
70
. k-26, 169.
. k-26, 169.
71
. k-26, 171.
. k-26, 171.
72
. k-26, 151.
. k-26, 151.
73
. k-26, 197.
. k-26, 197.
74
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, pp. 206-25.
. Ismael and Ismael,
The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon
, pp. 206-25.
75
. Shlaim,
The Iron Wall
, pp. 395-410.
. Shlaim,
The Iron Wall
, pp. 395-410.
76
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 397-9.
. Seale,
Asad of Syria
, pp. 397-9.
77
. ‘These conversations’, writes Kirpichenko, ‘have stuck in my memory by virtue of their seriousness and richness.’ However, Asad’s questions ‘were often difficult to answer because of the incompatibility of our state structures and the specifics of local problems in the security sphere’ - a tactful reference to the contrast between the centralized Soviet intelligence system and the chaotic structure of Syria’s fifteen overlapping intelligence and security agencies.
. ‘These conversations’, writes Kirpichenko, ‘have stuck in my memory by virtue of their seriousness and richness.’ However, Asad’s questions ‘were often difficult to answer because of the incompatibility of our state structures and the specifics of local problems in the security sphere’ - a tactful reference to the contrast between the centralized Soviet intelligence system and the chaotic structure of Syria’s fifteen overlapping intelligence and security agencies.
78
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 186-8. On Asad and deception, see Pipes, ‘Asad’s Art of the Double Game’.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 186-8. On Asad and deception, see Pipes, ‘Asad’s Art of the Double Game’.
79
. The most reliable assessment of human rights abuses under the Asad regime is in Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
.
. The most reliable assessment of human rights abuses under the Asad regime is in Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
.
80
. See above, pp. 199-200. Rif’at lost most of his influence after an unsuccessful coup attempt during Asad’s illness in 1984.
. See above, pp. 199-200. Rif’at lost most of his influence after an unsuccessful coup attempt during Asad’s illness in 1984.
81
. ‘Europe on alert for Syrian “Hit” Squads’,
Sunday Telegraph
, 21 March 1982; ‘L’attentat de la rue Marbeuf relance la polémique sur la sécurité’,
Le Monde
, 24 April 1982. Others believed to have been the victims of Asad’s hitmen abroad in the early 1980s included the former Syrian Prime Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the leading Lebanese journalists Riyad Taha and Salim al-Lawzi, the wife of ‘Issam al-‘Attar, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the French ambassador in Beirut, Louis de la Mar. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, pp. 153-4.
. ‘Europe on alert for Syrian “Hit” Squads’,
Sunday Telegraph
, 21 March 1982; ‘L’attentat de la rue Marbeuf relance la polémique sur la sécurité’,
Le Monde
, 24 April 1982. Others believed to have been the victims of Asad’s hitmen abroad in the early 1980s included the former Syrian Prime Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the leading Lebanese journalists Riyad Taha and Salim al-Lawzi, the wife of ‘Issam al-‘Attar, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the French ambassador in Beirut, Louis de la Mar. Middle East Watch,
Syria Unmasked
, pp. 153-4.
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