Eichmann, Bureaucracy and the Holocaust (3 page)

It is somewhat disturbing, therefore, to find that Eichmann's position was inherently ordinary, in the sense that his role was governed by rules and regulations common to many, if not all, organisations. Having embarked on a career and gained employment and promotion on the basis of technical merit, Eichmann's case seems peculiarly consistent with Weber's schema (Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991, p.198; Hall cited by Brown in Kamenka & Krygier, (Eds.), 1979, p.137). Of course, this is not to suggest that Weber's conceptualisation is unproblematic. Eichmann was clearly not the highly qualified expert demanded by Weber, although this does not discredit the general thesis. Indeed, Brown's (ibid, p.140) qualified critique of Weber's thesis suggests that "… a typical bureaucracy is, for the most part, an organisation in which relatively unskilled workers become adept at performing routine tasks". Once again we're faced with the possibility that his so-called lies and evasions are perhaps closer to the truth than we dare to imagine: that when his Israeli interrogator accused him of continually "hiding behind 'it wasn't in my department'" (Less in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.105) Eichmann was, more or less, describing a factual situation.

I
n his memoirs, and during his interrogation and trial, Eichmann made repeated references to orders and his obedience to what was then German law (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.30 &
passim
, Arendt, 1994, p.24). While some more fundamental reasons for his obedience are examined in Part Two, it seems important to examine the status of law in Nazi Germany and assess whether or not this claim, so often used by Nazi war criminals as a means of defence, has any real validity. In this context, it is salient to note that Hitler was both Führer and Reich Chancellor, which from a Weberian perspective correspond to charismatic and rational-legal forms of authority respectively (Bendix, 1977, pp.299-303; Weber, 1964, p.329). As such, so-called "führer authority" can be seen as an extra-constitutional and thus extra-legal form of authority embracing "all members of the German community pledged to loyalty and obedience to the Führer" (Huber cited by Buchheim in Krausner et al, 1968, p.128). As a principle given formal expression in the
Ordinance for the Protection of the People and the State
of February 28th 1933, the state of emergency created thereby provided the premise on which Hitler could bypass the state in the name of his "historic mission", and also the basis on which the will of the Führer attained so-called legal status (ibid.).

Yet insofar as Hitler's orders were both extra-constitutional and criminal, such claims - illegitimate as they are in any case - appear doubly groundless. Obedience to Hitler's orders was not predicated on the ordinary obligation of a citizen to the state but rather on an obligation "voluntarily undertaken by individuals for all sorts of ideological or political reasons" (ibid, p.308). This has obvious relevance given that the S.S. was essentially the executive of the Führer's will and members pledged allegiance to Hitler personally, rather than to the state in an abstract sense. However, regardless of the status of Hitler's authority and the sincerity of defendants' claims, and irrespective of arguments pointing to the absence of any absolute moral imperative to obey the law (Johnson, 1974, p.520; Goodwin, 1992, p.305; Horton, 1992, p.51), it seems worthwhile to recall Weber's take on the issue. Accordingly, the issue seems to centre on the
perception
of legitimacy on the part of those who obeyed Hitler's orders: they believed Hitler's orders to be legitimate and acted accordingly. This is perfectly in keeping with Weber's understanding of the term: that authority is legitimate insofar as it is
perceived
to be legitimate. For Weber, perception and 'reality' are one and the same (Weber, 1968).

Viewed from this perspective, it is hardly surprising that Eichmann and his contemporaries sought to justify their actions in these terms. However, while the subject of obedience to the law conjures up Thoreau's famous maxim "It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right" (1995, p.4), it seems fallacious to assume that Eichmann's actions can or should be understood in terms of his understanding of his 'legal' obligations. Although this highlights the extent to which 'normal' rules, regulations and legal mechanisms were utilised to prosecute the Holocaust, to predicate an event of this magnitude on this premise alone suggests that the perpetrators were aware of the immorality of their actions and chose to sacrifice their moral sensibilities on the altar of the Statute Book. This is by no means certain, as we shall see in Part Two.

W
eber's conceptualisation of bureaucracy deals with the issue of ideology in relation to its utilisation in the form of a "glorifying myth" predicated on cultural values, church, or party. Its purpose is to legitimise the actions and ethos of the institution, integrate the individual into the group and shape behaviour for the benefit of the organisation. As such, the myth may blind group members to the organisation's failings, create an atmosphere inimical to challenges to the status quo, and serve as a surrogate for the 'other-worldly' personal master replaced by the formal and impersonal rules of bureaucratic organisation (Weber, 1978, 1959; Blau & Meyer, 1987, pp.54-8). These points are important because of the gradual transformation of the S.S. under Himmler's tutelage, from its initial humble beginnings into an elite organisation of the 'racially superior' governed along Teutonic and pseudo-mystical lines. This led to the creation of a so-called 'S.S. ethos' of particular relevance to this discussion.

Himmler's mysticism is well demonstrated by the pseudo-religious nature of the oath sworn by all S.S. members. Known as the Sippeneid (Kith and Kin Oath), all S.S. men were required to recite the following:

"I swear to Thee, Adolf Hitler, as Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, Loyalty and Bravery. I vow to Thee and to the superiors whom Thou shalt appoint, Obedience unto death, So help me God" (in Graber, 1978, p.82).

This is interesting because the Sippeneid clearly amounts not to a rejection of Christian values
per se
, but rather to their redirection in the form of a personal moral puritanism. As Burleigh (2000, p.197) observes, "excessive drinking or pilfering were significant moral failures; throwing a concentration camp inmate off a cliff was unremarkable". Strict impersonality and "necessary hardness" were prerequisites for the performance of one's duties, whereas negative emotions and personal motivations were expressly forbidden* (Hilberg, 1961, p.648). Similarly, as one gathers from the Sippeneid itself, obedience and devotion to duty were considered primary virtues and took the form of extreme concern with achievement and efficiency, these being the yardsticks against which the S.S. man was measured (Buchheim in Krausnick et al (eds.), 1968, p.328). Loyalty also was of paramount importance, as indicated by the S.S. motto "Loyalty is Thine Honour" derived from Hitler's comments following the Stennes putsch of April 1933 (ibid, 1968, p.142).

* The focus on "necessary hardness" represents a typically totalitarian attempt to make white black and black white. The term actually referred to the individual's willingness to forsake his own private sensibilities and experience the joy of unconditional obedience. "Hardness" entered the equation only in relation to the brutal treatment metered out to those with the temerity to value their individuality (see Buchheim in Krausnick et al, 1968, pp.371-87). However, as a desk-bound officer it is highly unlikely that Eichmann would have faced similar treatment had he disobeyed orders.

Despite this, it seems important to question the extent to which these values are unique to the S.S., given that the S.S. as an organisation tends to be regarded as one of a kind, as the bureaucratic personification of evil itself. In fact, Weber cites impersonality, loyalty, obedience and duty as integral features and products of the bureaucratic form and its administrative staff. Moreover, the S.S. concern with achievement and efficiency clearly correlates with Weber's claim that bureaucracy is the most efficient of organisational forms (Weber in Gerth &Mills, 1991, p.214; Bendix, 1977, p.426). Even the more bizarre pseudo-mystical and Teutonic features are relevant to Weber's conception of the "glorifying myth", inasmuch as the Sippeneid and possession of the "necessary hardness" correspond with the wider Nazi concern with annihilating the Jews, with Hitler's self-titled "historic mission" and his status as the living embodiment of the "glorifying myth". Furthermore, the redeployment of morality forms an integral part of Bauman's framework, a point that also serves to demonstrate that core components of the 'S.S. ethos and mentality' are by no means novel or extraordinary. Today in fact most organisations inculcate their employees with corporate values, mission statement slogans and 'evangelical' seminars and team-building exercises - in addition to company songs and mandatory physical exercises in some cases - as part of an ideological 'hearts and minds' exercise to harness the individual to the organisation's overall aims and objectives.

I
n turn, these issues highlight a fact overlooked by many: that the Holocaust was prosecuted using fundamentally modern methods, systems and procedures common to all Western societies. This requires us to acknowledge that the Holocaust, though horrific and
sui generis
, is a product
of
modernity rather than its failure. From this perspective, the Holocaust can be seen as a major challenge to commonly held assumptions regarding western civilisation and culture, the "civilising myth" and pursuit of reason and humanity (Landau, 1992, p.8). These points are vital for Bauman (1989, pp.1-12), for whom the normality of the Holocaust lies in its being "fully in keeping with everything we know about our civilisation, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the world" (ibid, p.8). Here, modern systems of organisation, together with modern technology and the insights and methods of science, are seen as necessary conditions for the Holocaust. Indeed, in the absence of such means and techniques Bauman finds it literally inconceivable to imagine the perpetration of the Holocaust on so gigantic a scale; they are in this sense its vital ingredients (ibid).

Hilberg (1961, p.19) and Landau (1992, pp.7-8) offer a similar perspective. Both point to the normality of the institutions responsible, and also, like Bauman (ibid, p.18-21), include the perpetrators themselves in their conceptualisation of 'normality'. Landau goes so far as to suggest that explaining the Holocaust in terms of its 'demonic' perpetrators prevents us "… from searching for it inside ourselves and, most significantly, within the societies, technological systems and bureaucratic structures we have created" (1992, p.7). In a similar vein, Hilberg (1961, p.649) denies the common assumption that the perpetrator was a special or peculiarly evil kind of German. How can this be? How can 'normal' individuals be perfectly capable or indeed willing to contribute to, or engage in, inhuman and criminal acts? A clue is provided by Arendt (1986, p.337), for whom "the masses … were capable of even greater crimes than so-called professional criminals, provided only that these crimes were well organised and assumed the appearance of routine jobs". If we take Arendt's assertion at face value, and accept that those responsible for the Holocaust were in no way 'abnormal', then it seems reasonable to ask whether an answer can be found in the structures and mechanisms used to prosecute the Holocaust? This is the key assumption that will now be tested in relation to Eichmann's actual documented role in the Final Solution.

Part Two:
Bureaucracy
and
Morality

"What I said to myself was this: The Head of State has ordered it, and those exercising judicial authority over me are now transmitting it. I escaped into other areas and looked for a cover for myself which gave me some peace of mind at least, and so in this way I was able to shift - no, that is not the right term - to attach this whole thing one hundred per cent to those in judicial authority who happened to be my superiors, to the Head of State - since they gave the orders. So, deep down, I did not consider myself responsible and I felt free of guilt. I was greatly relieved that I had nothing to do with the actual physical extermination. The part I was ordered to deal with was quite enough for me."

E
ven if Eichmann's claims are true and it is correct to regard him as nothing more than a "cog in the machine" the fact remains that, like many others, he did not renounce his position in the Nazi hierarchy when presented with the Final Solution. Heydrich informed Eichmann of the Final Solution in August 1941, and over the proceeding twelve months, acting on instructions from Heydrich and Heinrich Müller, he visited some of the extermination facilities, gaining first hand knowledge of the destruction process (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, pp.75-80). He was thus well aware of the fate of those transported to the death camps. Yet despite informing his superiors of his horror, and making a number of unsuccessful transfer requests (ibid, pp.166-7), Eichmann continued to do his duty with efficiency and professionalism*. These are the glaring inconsistencies - the blatant facts - that lead many to believe Eichmann
was
in fact a monster, for surely only a monster could deliver millions of innocents to certain death in the gas chambers, or permit thousands more to succumb through over-work, starvation and disease (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.91). It is almost comforting to think so, for when we label Eichmann a monster we also provide ourselves with an equally comforting explanation for his actions. If we extrapolate from this and assume that his co-perpetrators were also monsters then the need to explain or understand the Holocaust disappears entirely. In other words, such a view reduces the Holocaust to an historical aberration perpetrated by unique group of peculiarly evil men, the likes of which will never be seen again.