The Road to Berlin (135 page)

Mightier events, however, were already shaping each battlefront and settling the fate of every army group, army division and unit, naval and air fleet. On taking up his heritage handed on from Hitler,
Gross–Admiral
Karl Dönitz had pledged himself to continue the fight against Bolshevism, whatever the odds and even if this meant further fighting with the British and Americans should they stand in his way of rescuing German troops and civilians from ‘slavery or destruction’ in the east. To this end he manoeuvred with increasing desperation to avoid a general capitulation on all battle fronts, seeking to delay any surrender in the east for as long a period as possible, his tactics centring on offering surrender on behalf of individual German armies to Western commanders. Elaborating carefully on this plan German plenipotentiaries sent to Field–Marshal Montgomery’s
HQ
on 3 May offered surrender on behalf of the three German armies in contact with the Red Army between Rostock and Berlin, a proposal which the Field–Marshal properly deflected and directed towards the Soviet command. A purely tactical surrender could be enacted but General Eisenhower advised that anything further would require the presence of German emissaries at his own headquarters.

On 6 May General Jodl joined Admiral Friedeburg at Rheims. In the presence of the Soviet liaison officer, General Susloparov, the German Admiral had already been shown a copy of an Act of Military Surrender: Jodl, empowered to offer simultaneous surrender on all fronts, hoped at least to gain acceptance of a surrender in two phases, capitulating only in full on the western fronts. General Eisenhower insisted on full and instantaneous capitulation, a position re-affirmed by General Walter Bedell Smith who pointed out that in the absence of agreement the talks must end and the Western Front would be fully sealed to all corners. Jodl reported this adamantine insistence and was authorized to sign, with the proviso that fighting would cease forty-eight hours later. The Act of Military Surrender was signed at 0241 hours on 7 May, General Susloparov adding his signature for the Soviet command.

Within hours irate Soviet reaction drilled upon General Eisenhower. General Antonov at the Soviet General Staff complained that though the surrender talks were designed to effect simultaneous capitulation, Admiral Dönitz was ordering further fighting in the east—the impression remained that here, in effect, was a separate truce with the West rather than general capitulation. Moreover, the Act of Military Surrender should have been concluded in Berlin and should bear the signature of Marshal Zhukov: General Susloparov had no authority to sign any act of surrender. Stalin made himself brusquely plain in a telephone call to Zhukov in Berlin. It was the Soviet people rather than the Allies who had borne the main brunt of the war and, therefore, the Germans should sign their surrender before the Supreme Command of the entire anti–Hitler coalition and not merely in the presence of the western Supreme Commander: nor had he agreed to the signing of surrender in some tuppeny-ha’penny town, only in Berlin itself—the Rheims document could be only a ‘preliminary protocol of surrender’, while the formal signing would take place in Berlin on 8 May, with the German High Command in attendance and in the presence of the Supreme Command of the Allies. Vyshinskii would fly to Berlin at once and act as Zhukov’s ‘assistant for political affairs’.

On the night of 7 May ‘Station Prague’ broadcast to the German military commander, disclosing the contents of the German surrender document signed at Rheims earlier in the day, a document reportedly delivered to the Czechs by an American officer from the US 1st Division. The document finally made it clear that the act of surrender applied to the Western and Eastern fronts alike. German unconditional surrender in Prague was enacted with some speed and accompanied by a protocol which promised Czech assistance in speeding the German withdrawal. Meanwhile Koniev’s tanks were closing on Prague, following
through the offensive which had been launched a day earlier than planned, the
Stavka
having decided that both Fronts—1st and 2nd Ukrainian—would move off before they had completed their regrouping. In this quest for as much speed as possible the
Stavka
on 5 May ordered Glagolev’s 9th Guards Army from 3rd Ukrainian Front to join Malinovskii, who received specific
Stavka
orders to use this additional army between 7th Guards and 46th Army in the attack aimed at Pilsen; the main attack would be executed by four rifle armies, one tank army (6th Guards) and a cavalry-mechanized group, leaving only 40th Army and 4th Rumanian Army to continue operations along the ‘Olomouc axis’. Yeremenko’s 4th Ukrainian Front would also concentrate against Olomouc, but in the event of a speedy collapse of German resistance Yeremenko had prepared several ‘mobile groups’ including one rifle battalion earmarked for an air-lift to Prague in transport planes. North of Opava 60th Army organized its own ‘mobile group’ to carry out a deep raid, an operation deemed of such significance that the Deputy Front commander, General G.F. Zakharov, took personal control of the planning and preparations.

Wasting no time Koniev decided at 10 o’clock on the morning of 6 May to launch his main assault force once lead battalions had discovered that there was no continuous line of German defences ahead and that west of Meissen German units were already retiring to the south. Attacking off the march, Koniev committed his two tank armies that same afternoon after a brief but powerful 32-minute artillery barrage, holding the tanks as yet within the infantry formations; to Koniev’s relief the German command had not detected the massive force on the extreme right flank of 1st Ukrainian Front—two tank armies (3rd and 4th Guards) and two rifle armies (13th and 3rd Guards)—and aligned to the west and north-west of Dresden. Zhadov’s 5th Guards Army, assigned to reduce Dresden, required more time to deploy and Koniev was forced to postpone that attack until the evening and leave Zhadov to a night assault. Pukhov with 13th Army provided some compensation, having pushed on for about fifteen miles; at this news Koniev ordered Pukhov to cut loose and make all speed for Prague, at the same time informing all commanders that he demanded an advance rate of at least twenty miles per day from the infantry and 30–35 miles from the tank formations.

One undisputed success on 6 May was the surrender of Breslau, the
Festung
which had held out for almost three months and suffered grievous casualties among soldiers and civilians alike. In the evening at 1800 hours General Nickhoff finally accepted terms of surrender presented by General Gluzdovskii, the commander of the Soviet 6th Army who had more than once badgered Koniev to be allowed to carry out a storming attack on the city. The Soviet surrender terms were generous on paper but malignant in practice. Koniev refused to see Nickhoff and ordered that he be given the same treatment as other German prisoners. During the night Koniev kept his mobile columns on the move along the western
bank of the Elbe, though heavy rain made the going difficult. During the course of the day Meissen fell to 3rd Guards Army, while Lelyushenko and Pukhov each raced for the German–Czech frontier and the routes through the Krusnehory mountains. As Zhadov continued to batter his way into Dresden supported by Rybalko’s tanks, to the south-east of Prague Malinovskii launched his own attack with Shumilov’s 7th Guards Army in the lead and assigned to open a path for 6th Guards Tank Army which still showed all the signs and retained the scars of the heavy fighting in Hungary—9th Guards Mechanized Corps could now only field twenty-one tanks.

As an abject and defeated German High Command proceeded under guard on 8 May to Berlin, there to re-enact their full capitulation in the presence of the Russians and on a site of Russian choosing, Lelyushenko’s tanks and Pukhov’s lorried infantry were already over the Czechoslovak frontier as Zhadov closed tightly on Dresden. Marshal Koniev found the situation somewhat bemusing, for while Field–Marshal Keitel signed away Germany’s surrender in Berlin 1st Ukrainian Front was still fighting Field–Marshal Schörner. The
Stavka
had already informed Front commanders of the act of military surrender signed in Rheims in the early hours of 7 May and instructed Soviet commanders to use radio and leaflets in order to inform German troops of the act of capitulation and the need to lay down their arms; failure to comply would be met by a ‘decisive response’. Stalin was not over-eager to meet British and American wishes for a speedy announcement of the German surrender. On 7 May he intimated, to the Prime Minister that there was no certainty as yet that the German armies on the Eastern Front would obey their own High Command and capitulate—on the contrary, there were signs that a ‘considerable grouping of German troops’ to the east had openly declared their intention of ignoring the capitulation call. Accordingly Stalin suggested that all wait ‘until the German surrender takes effect’ and announce the surrender on 9 May at 7 pm Moscow time. The Allies, however, could not wait: none could hide a surrender transmitted
en clair
to German troops in so many locations. Western capitals erupted in immediate jubilation but in Moscow the guns fired off just one more salute—greeting the capture of Dresden.

Marshal Koniev duly transmitted details of the capitulation order at 2000 hours on 8 May to all German units in western Czechoslovakia, allowing the German command three hours in which to submit. When no reply came, at 2300 hours Koniev fired off a massive barrage from his guns and ordered every army under his Front command—twelve armies in all—to resume military operations. Travelling at breakneck speed Lelyushenko’s tanks reached Prague in the early hours of the morning of 9 May. At 0300 hours Belov’s 10th Guards Tank Corps was in the north-western suburbs, followed by the 70th Guards Self-Propelled Gun Brigade and Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army drawing into the northern suburbs at about six o’clock that morning. The rifle armies also drew up to the city somewhat later when the lead elements of two corps from
3rd Guards and 13th Army took their place alongside the tank columns. Shortly after noon the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade (6th Guards Tank Army) leading Malinovskii’s attack from 2nd Ukrainian Front linked up in Prague with Koniev’s units.

The very last Soviet trap had snapped shut.

References and Sources

This compilation needs some little explanation. As I explained in my Preface, here is virtually a second book, presenting a profile of the materials and literature relevant to the operational narrative, with each set of references related to the sub-sections of the chapters. The main division is between non-Soviet and Soviet materials (with an additional classification for East European items, where this is relevant). Equally, I have made separate provision for identifying diplomatic documents and materials, where necessary. Finally the Bibliography, which follows, can be used either independently or as a supplement to these notes and references.

While it is my earnest hope that the classification and presentation is self-explanatory, perhaps it is not out of place to specify the treatment of the German materials, particularly the documentary assemblies. In general, I have divided these into two sections: first, the printed volumes of the War Diary of the
Webrmacht
High Command (
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
, vols. I-IV, abbreviated to
KTB/OKW
, with volume/page number); and second, the microfilmed records, filmed at Alexandria, Virginia, USA, and held in the National Archives (USA)—duly administered by the National Archives and Records Service (General Services Administration). The microfilmed records present some complexities of their own. The reader will notice that I have first identified the source of the document under the general description of
German Military Documents (GMD)
, followed by a note of the title of the document or a brief description and, in turn, by its provenance—the microcopy number (for example, T-78), the roll number (R488 and the like) plus the frame numbers from that same roll: T-78/R499, 6487746–788 is an illustration.