The Road to Berlin (166 page)

Sharokhin, Col.-Gen. M.N. and Petrukhin, Colonel V.S.,
Put’ k Balatonu
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1966), 143 pp. (Combined memoir-operational analysis, Sharokhin commander 57th Army, lake Balaton operations, information on German offensive, p. 90, co-ordination problems, p. 95, also on special artillery deployment, plan Shtorm, pp. 88–9.)

Shtemenko, S.M.,
General’nyi sbtab v gody voiny
, vol. 2. See pp. 269–76 on Balaton, German blow against Shumilov’s 7th Guards Army, Tolbukhin’s exchange with Stalin on 9th Guards Army (p. 275) and Stalin’s comment on Tolbukhin’s suggestion that he might pull his HQ at least over to the eastern side of the Danube—‘Comrade Tolbukhin, if you are thinking of dragging on the war for a further five–six months, then by all means pull back beyond the Danube.…’
(IVMV
, 10, has relied quite heavily on Shtemenko’s text and the interpretation of Soviet knowledge of German plans and intentions; however, M.M. Minasyan furnishes a more reliable and credible analysis.)

Vorontsov, T.F.
et al., Ot volzhskikh stepei do avstriiskikh Alp
, (4th Guards Army). See ‘Na Venu’, 4th Guards Army, Balaton defensive operation, assault on Szekesfehervar, pp. 186–98.

Zakharov, M.V. (ed.),
Osvobozhdenie …
, pp. 409–51, Balaton operations, position of 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, General Marshall’s signal Feb. 20 on possible German counter-blows (p. 413), unfortunately failed to mention transfer of 6th
SS Panzer
(similar information from the British), German strength and operational plans, unfavourable position of 3rd Ukrainian Front, Tolbukhin’s decisions on defensive operations (pp. 419–20), operations Mar. 6, deterioration of situation at centre of 3rd Ukrainian Front,
Stavka
categorically refuses to allow Tolbukhin to use 9th Guards Army in defensive battle (p. 441), concentration of 6th Guards Tank Army SW Budapest, final German push Mar. 14–15, Dulles–Wolff talks in Switzerland (pp. 448–9), final German defeat with loss of 45,000 men, 500 tanks, 280 guns.

Zavizion, G.T. and Kornyushin, P.A.,
I na Tikhom Okeane
… (6th Guards Tank Army), pp. 152–70, 6th Guards Tank in Balaton operations, German attack on 7th Guards Army (2nd Ukrainian Front) on the Hron, Tolbukhin’s defensive measures, 6th Guards Tank Army re-equipping (during winter of 1944–5 663 tanks and
SP
guns returned to service by field workshops), tank army and 9th Guards Army held in reserve, 6th Guards Tank initially assigned to exploit 46th Army operations on 2nd Ukrainian Front by March 16, assigned to 3rd Ukrainian Front in order to operate with 4th and 9th Guards Army which had only 200 tanks (6th Guards Tank at that time
fielded 406 tanks and SP guns)
, redeployment of tank army, assigned by Tolbukhin to attack with 9th Guards Army on morning of March 19, encirclement of German tank forces assigned to 5th Guards Tank Corps with outer encirclement by 9th Guards Mechanized Corps, drive on the ‘Vienna axis’.

The flanks: E Pomerania and Silesia, Feb.-Mar. 1945   pp.
517
–
526

Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns 1944–45
, pp. 306–15, East Prussia, Danzig/Stettin: defensive resources of E Prussia, struggle for Samland, preparation of attack on Königsberg, capture of Heiligenbeil, breakthrough to Pomeranian coast, thrust on Kolberg, approach to Danzig, storming of Gdynia and then Danzig, fighting for Altdamm. (Based on Soviet communiqués.)

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
, pt 6, ‘Waiting for a Telegram’, pp. 772–6, claim that 6–8,000 Soviet tanks destroyed since mid-January, General Staff conviction that assault on Berlin imminent in spite of danger from Army Group Vistula (Himmler), General von Hauenschildt designated commander of the Berlin district, Zhukov’s massive breakthrough in Pomerania Feb. 27, Soviet thrust on Köslin and the Baltic coast, Hiler’s promise of immediate reinforcement for Himmler, Danzig corridor to be held at all costs, deception measures to convey impression of formidable defences between Oder and Berlin, inevitable loss of East and West Prussia without success of Himmler’s counter-attack, deterioration of situation March 8, Hitler’s loss of faith in Himmler, General Raus in Berlin to explain defeat in Pomerania, Manteuffel to replace Raus, Guderian March 8 predicts main Soviet assault on Berlin within one week now that threat to Red Army’s northern flank removed.

Note on Stalin’s PW son
. See David Irving,
Hitler’s War
, notes to p. 285 (v. p. 847): Stalin’s son, a PW since 1941,
committed suicide in 1943
, after British PWs ‘made life unbearable for him’ on account of his ‘uncouth behaviour’.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, pp. 138–53, East Pomerania and Upper Silesia operations,
Stavka
directive Feb. 8 to 2nd Belorussian Front, originally 1st Belorussian Front not to be wholly involved in E Pomerania operation, Feb. 15 Zhukov authorized to participate with 2nd Belorussian Front, revised dates for offensive—Feb. 24 and March 1—in five days 1st Belorussian Front broke through German defences and split Third
Panzer
, further assignment to clear Baltic coast between the Vistula and the Oder, 1st Guards Tank Army transferred to 2nd Belorussian Front, Himmler removed from command and replaced by Heinrici, Soviet thrust on Danzig and Gdynia, German Second Army finally destroyed, Baltic Fleet able to play only limited role, meanwhile 1st Belorussian Front operations to improve Küstrin position, Koniev’s Upper Silesian operation, encirclement of four German divisions SW of Oppeln, important role of Lelyushenko’s 4th Tank Army (March 17 awarded Guards designation).

IVMV
, 10, pt 1, Ch. 5 (1–2), E Pomerania and Silesia: (1), pp. 139–49, early Feb.
Stavka
decision to continue with preparations for offensive aimed at Berlin and Dresden but to attack E Pomerania group and reach lower Vistula, this the basis of Feb. 8 directive assigning E Pomerania blow to 2nd Belorussian Front, problem of heavy German pressure on Zhukov’s right flank, Feb. 15 Rokossovskii report proposing reinforcement for his left flank, following day (Feb. 16) Zhukov’s plan to use his right-flank forces in E Pomeranian operation,
Stavka
acceptance and plan envisaging 2nd Belorussian Front attacking towards Köslin and 1st Belorussian Front towards Kolberg to split up German forces, on Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front two tank armies—with 955 tanks/
SP
guns—assigned to this operation (560 other tanks/
SP
guns available in tank and mech. corps, or for infantry support), 2nd Belorussian Front offensive renewed Feb. 24, 1st Belorussian Front attack opened March 1 with relatively slow progress by 2nd Guards Tank Army operating in 61st Army area but rapid advance by 1st Guards Tank Army to Baltic coast, encirclement of 10th
SS
Corps also one ‘Corps group’ (finished off by 1st Polish Army), March 5 Third
Panzer
virtually crippled, German losses 103,000 men, 188 tanks captured,
Stavka
directive Mar. 5 with further assignment for 2nd Belorussian Front and transfer of 1st Guards Tank Army to Rokossovskii, March 13–21 heavy German resistance and slow Soviet progress, fall of Danzig and Gdynia, destruction of German Second Army.

(2), pp. 149–59, results of Lower Silesia operation,
Stavka
’s concern over possible German thrust to recover Silesia and flank blow on ‘Ratibor axis’, 1st Ukrainian Front plan to
Stavka
Feb. 28 for left-flank operation Upper Silesia,
Stavka
order to 4th Ukrainian Front to attack Mar. 10 towards Olomouc in order to hinder movement of German reserves, Koniev’s two assault groups (31 rifle divisions, 5,640 guns, 988 tanks/
SP
guns) but several rifle divisions down to 3,000 men (p. 155), operation concluded with encirclement of five German divisions—total German losses in Silesia amounted to 28 divisions routed, five destroyed. (This account concentrates particularly on the planning/command decisions aspect. The E Pomerania operation is assessed as gain in that it freed 11 armies (including two tank armies) for operations on the ‘Berlin axis’; in conjunction with the Silesian operation, this removed appreciable threats to Soviet flanks, while the Silesian operation itself prevented the movement of German forces into Hungary—or to the north—while actually weakening Army Group Centre in an attempt to head off disaster in Silesia.)

Achkasov, Navy Captain V.I. (ed.),
Krasnoznamennyi Baltiiskii flot 1944–1945 gg
. (Moscow: Nauka 1976). See pp. 165–71, V.I. Achkasov on Baltic Fleet operations against German sea communications, Soviet submarine actions against convoys, Baltic Fleet directives Jan. 7 and 24, sinking of German transport
Goya
by Soviet submarine
L–3
(out of 7,000 aboard, only 195 saved), effectiveness of Soviet submarine operations limited by
RAF
minelaying operations which impinged on Baltic Fleet operational zones, Soviet MTB operations against German shipping involved using larger groups of boats (6–12 torpedo boats), problem posed by mines and shortage of minesweepers, Baltic Fleet aviation employed torpedo bombers and attack bombers.

Chuikov, V.I.,
Ot Stalingrada do Berlina
, pt 3, storming of the Küstrin citadel, pp. 569–75. (See also
The End of the Third Reich
, ch. VIII, fall of Poznan Feb. 23, pp. 123–9 and ch. IX, Küstrin, pp. 130–36.)

Katukov, M.E.,
Na ostrie glavnovo udara
(2nd edn), (1st Guards Tank Army), pp. 374–86, E Pomerania operation, westerly thrust halted and swing northwards, briefing from Zhukov (p. 377), rapid drive to the Baltic, 1200 hrs Mar. 8 assigned to 2nd Belorussian Front, Rokossovskii’s briefing for drive on Stolp, joint attack with 19th Army on Gdynia.

Koniev, I.S.,
Year of Victory
(Moscow), pp. 67–78. See ‘The so-called lull’, on the Upper Silesian operation, Stalin’s warnings about possible German attempts to recover Silesia—‘You had better look out …’ (p. 68)—German reinforcement in Oppeln area, Koniev’s encirclement plan with two assault groups (North and South), Gusev’s mistake in trying to conserve artillery ammunition, heavy losses to Soviet tank units, Moskalenko’s attack on 4th Ukrainian Front, 60th Army captured Rybnik and crossed Oder, fall of Ratibor.

Pyatkov, V.K.
et al., Tret’ya udarnaya
(3rd Shock Army), ch. 4, 3rd Shock operations, E Pomerania, pp. 141–69. (Based largely on military archives, unit actions in detail.)

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
A Soldier’s Duty
(Moscow), pp. 293–312. See under ‘Eastern Pomerania’, informed by Vasilevskii of Zhukov’s E Pomerania plan, Rokossovskii proposes attack with his left flank, joint strike by two Fronts (1st and 2nd Belorussian), attack timed for Feb. 24 but inevitable delay in acquiring 19th Army and 3rd Tank Corps, fighting actually began Feb. 22, few tanks available to 2nd Belorussian Front, attack on exposed left flank of 19th Army, Stalin query—‘Zhukov is up to something?’ (p. 300)—German assault on flanks, capture of Koslin, 3rd Tank Corps reaches Baltic cutting German forces in half, transfer of 1st Guards Tank Army to 2nd Belorussian Front, Zhukov requires return of 1st Tank in ‘same state’ (p. 305), approach to Danzig, clearing Sopot and Oliwa, fighting for Gdynia, storming of Danzig (Gdansk).

Tributs, Admiral V.F.,
Baltiitsy nastupayut
(Kalingrad: Knizh. Izd. 1968), pp. 327–47, Baltic Fleet operations in support of 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Front operations, attack on German communications.

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Vostochno–Prusskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (3), pp. 34–55. Report to Stalin Feb. 17 on E Prussia situation, rapid conclusion would mean reinforcement for ‘Berlin axis’ and free troops for transfer to the Far East (where Vasilevskii himself would be going—two armies, 5th and 39th, latterly withdrawn from E Prussian operations for transfer to Far East), request to be relieved from post of Chief of General Staff, news of Chernyakhovskii’s death (Feb. 18), immediate conference with Stalin, assigned to command 3rd Belorussian Front, also officially included in membership of the
Stavka
(pp. 43–4)—thus amending GKO ordinance of 10 July 1941, hitherto Zhukov the only Front commander included in the
Stavka
—decision of Feb. 24 to wind up Bagramyan’s 1st Baltic Front (converted into the Samland Group), Bagramyan simultaneously into Group commander and deputy commander 3rd Belorussian Front, problem of reducing German ‘Heilsberg group’, preparations for attack Feb. 22–Mar. 12; March 16 Vasilevskii’s submission to Stalin (Königsberg attack plan—document No. 215/k, March 16, signed Vasilevskii, Makarov, Pokrovskii, full text pp. 46–50), accepted March 17, operation to begin not later than March 28, same night (March 17) Vasilevskii requested postponement from Stalin, Stalin agreed. (This is a much more detailed and explicit account than the published memoir,
Delo vsei zhizni
, pp. 496–504. Nevertheless, Marshal Vasilevskii went to considerable pains to refute criticism of the planning and handling of operations in E Prussia—a point aimed at Rokossovskii.)