The Road to Berlin (152 page)

Krainyukov, Col.-Gen. K.V.,
Oruzhie osobovo roda
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1977). See pt 3 under ‘V Stavke’, pp. 214–23:
Stavka
instructions for 1st Ukrainian Front offensive early June, Front operational plan prepared in draft, submitted to Front military soviet before transmission to
Stavka
, summoned by Stalin 23 July, questions double blow, asserts that Koniev stubborn in clinging to this plan but thinks it ‘not a bad idea’, Krainyukov asserts that Stalin would and did listen ‘attentively and patiently’ to the opinions of front–line commanders, General Staff alters ‘unreal’ rate of advance for infantry units, Stalin shows both a ‘victory salute’ fired off in Moscow—‘not just fireworks’ but a salute to heroism—Krainyukov visits Shcherbakov, Chief of Main Political Administration.

Krasovskii, Air Marshal S., ‘2-ya vozdushnaya armiya v Lvovsko–Sandomirskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1964 (7), pp. 31–41. 2nd Air Army operations, 1st Ukrainian Front.

Kurochkin, General P., ‘Proryv oborony protivnika na L’vovskom napravlenii’,
VIZ
, 1964 (7), pp. 22–30. Composition 60th Army (four corps), co–operation with 3rd Guards Tank Army, characteristics of breakthrough operations, danger presented by difficult situation of neighbour to the left (38th Army), morning 17 July 3rd Guards Tank committed followed by 4th Tank Army, operations in the ‘Koltuv corridor’, tank formations make for Lvov after deep penetration, conclusion of Brody encirclement.

Moskalenko, K.S.,
Na yugo-zapradnom napravlenii, 2
, ch. 12, Lvov-Sandomierz operation, pp. 392–414: three corps operating with 38th Army (10 divisions), assignment to co–operate with 4th Tank and 60th Army in destroying enemy forces at Lvov, offensive timed for 2100 hours 13 July, shortcomings of artillery/ air opening bombardments, co–operation with armour (4th Tank Army), Maj.–Gen. A.A. Yepishev (member military soviet, 38th Army) wounded 22 July, operations to capture Lvov, concentric attacks by 4th Tank, 3rd Guards Tank, 38th and 60th Army.

Panov, Colonel B. and Anov, Lt.-Col. S., ‘K voprosu o proryve na rava-russkom napravlenii’,
VIZ
, 1970 (2), pp. 94–9. Detailed analysis of breakthrough operation, Rava–Russkaya (1st Ukrainian Front), making particular use of captured German documents (especially
Fourth Panzer Army
records)
held in the Soviet General Staff
.

Polushkin, Colonel M., ‘Lvovsko–Sandomirskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya 1-vo Ukrainskovo fronta v tseifrakh (13.7–29.8.1944 g.)’,
VIZ
, 1969 (8), pp. 54–67. Lvov–Sandomierz operation, statistics, list of commanders (to corps).

Polushkin, M.
Na sandomirskom napravlenii Lvovsko–Sandomirskaya operatsiya (iyul–avgust 1944 g.)
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1969). Detailed monograph, 1st Ukrainian Front operations: ch. 2, Front planning/operational decisions, Koniev’s double attack plan (pp. 17–22), assignments to rifle armies (pp. 22–5), role of armoured/ mechanized forces (pp. 25–31), air support (pp. 35–9); ch. 3, operational narrative, first stage of operations (13–27 July), breakthrough operations (pp. 55–66), commitment of Front mobile forces (3rd Guards Tank and 4th Tank Army), 3rd Guards Tank committed with 2nd Air Army in support (pp. 66–72), Brody encirclement, advance on Lvov (pp. 72–80), right-flank offensive operations, advance to W Bug, bridgeheads secure by 24 July (pp. 80–87), assault on Lvov (pp. 87–104).

Rakitskii, Colonel A., ‘Nastupatel’naya operatsiya 3-i gvardeiskoi armii (iyul 1944 g.)’,
VIZ
, 1978 (9), pp. 70–78. Detailed operational narrative 3rd Guards Army, 1st Ukrainian Front (article in series ‘little known operations’—
maloizvestnye operatsii)
.

Vysotskii, F.I.
et al., Gvardeiskaya tankovaya
(2nd Guards Tank Army), pp. 113–28, 2nd Guards Tank in Lublin–Brest operation, assigned Lublin-Warsaw axis operating as mobile group for left flank 1st Belorussian Front, forcing of W Bug (21 July), capture of Lublin 24 July, drive towards the Vistula; pp. 128–34, 2nd Guards, 27 July, first-echelon units pushing to Warsaw suburbs (Praga), 31 July approach to Praga but contact with elements of five German divisions, 2nd Guards Tank had already lost 500 tanks and
SP
guns, decision not to attack Praga.

Yushchuk, Maj.-Gen. I.I.,
Odinnadtsatyi tankovyi korpus v boyakh za Rodinu
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1962), pt IV, pp. 64–92, from Kovel to the Vistula, 11th Tank Corps operations 1st Belorussian Front, operating with 8th Guards Army as ‘mobile group’ (corps strength 233 tanks and
SP
guns), to advance to W Bug, corps committed 19 July, force crossing of W Bug 20 July, tanks refuelled and rearmed, advance on Siedlce, counter-attacks by
SS Panzer
, 31 July final attack for Siedlce, 11th Tank Corps had covered average of 57 km per day after crossing W Bug.

Zukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya
… , 2, pp. 259–71, summoned by Stalin July 7, Stalin in very good humour, Molotov joins conversation, discussion of Hitler’s prospects and his possible attempts to secure separate peace with Great Britain and USA, Stalin insists Churchill and Roosevelt will not do separate deal with Hitler, Stalin also argues that Germans will fight to the end in E Prussia, hence need to take Lvov and E Poland first, Zhukov to meet Bierut, Bulganin to be representative with the Poles, Zhukov to 1st Ukrainian Front July 11, Zhukov meanwhile argued that success in the Belorussian operation and along the ‘Berlin axis’ meant that the Red Army should strike without delay at E Prussia—‘off the march’—with three Belorussian fronts, aim for E Prussia and the Vistula in the Gulf of Danzig (or at least cut off E Prussia from central Germany), Zhukov’s draft ‘E Prussia attack plan’—see pp. 264–6 for full text—submitted July 19, rejected by Stalin even though reserves were available, this ‘a serious blunder by the Supreme Commander’ in Zhukov’s view, necessitating a complex costly operation later (see p. 266), discussion of 1st Ukrainian Front operation, Zhukov’s criticism of poor planning, poor reconnaissance, ineffective artillery/air support, Zhukov cannot understand why these mistakes ‘never mentioned’ by historians, talk with Koniev July 22, Stalin insists on taking Lvov first followed by drive to Vistula—‘it won’t run away from you’—Khrushchev agreed with Stalin, capture of Lvov, drive to Sandomierz.
(Note:
Zhukov’s ‘E. Prussia attack plan’, no. 316, 19 July, is not cited in the single-volume edition of his memoirs and is perforce missing from
The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.)

Polish materials

Dolata, Boleslaw,
Wyzwolenie Polski 1944–1945
(Warsaw: MON 1971), ch. 2— Dzialania wojsk 1 frontu Bialoruskiego i oddzialów ludowego Wojska Polskiego …’ (including 1st Polish Army operations), pp. 32–53. On
1st Polish Army
operations, July 1944, see also
Boevye deistviya narodnovo voiska pol’skovo 1943–1945 gg
. (trans. from Polish,
Wybrane operacje i walki Ludowego Wojska Polskiego)
, pp. 81–103.

‘The Polish question’:
diplomacy, politics and insurrection pp.
247
–
274

It is an all too obvious point that there is a mass of material relevant to ‘the Polish question’ at large and the anguished circumstances of the Warsaw rising in particular. However, here I have confined myself largely to documentary collections/diplomatic records and to the limited range of Soviet expositions of policy towards Poland and the Warsaw rising. I did broach the latter aspect with Marshal Rokossovskii and received from him (as from other Soviet commanders) vehement denials that the Red Army deliberately and as part of a specific plan abandoned the Poles in Warsaw—not mere apologias but much detailed explanation with operational maps, tables, logistics records and signals traffic. In addition, emphasis was laid on Soviet battle casualties (1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts) for August–September—
166,808 and 122,578 killed and wounded respectively, a total of 289,386 men
. I was told that whatever interpretation I might place on the evidence, the figures were absolutely correct and in no way manipulated.

Alan Clark in
Barbarossa: The Russian–German Conflict 1941–1945
(London: Hutchinson 1965) tended also to the view that to speak of a deliberate decision is to attribute such a move (or the lack of it) to circumstances ‘largely accidental’.

I must also record my deep appreciation for the opportunity to discuss select Polish records and materials with Professor Rozek, who could illuminate this documentation from his personal interviews.

Diplomatic correspondence, diplomatic documents Correspondence: Stalin–Churchill–Roosevelt

Perepiska
… , vol. 1,
Stalin–Churchill:
see No. 235, 1 Feb., Churchill–Stalin, British urging settlement on Poles, pp. 230–34; No. 236, 4 Feb., Stalin–Churchill, emphasizes frontier question, pp. 234–6; No. 243, 27 Feb., Churchill–Stalin, Polish government abandons Riga line, composition of Polish government, pp. 240–4; No. 249, March 3, Stalin–Churchill denounces London Polish government, p. 247; No. 250, March 7, Churchill–Stalin, dangers of rift over Polish question, pp. 247–8; No. 257, March 23, Stalin–Churchill, claim to Curzon line in accordance with Teheran meeting, pp. 253–5; No. 299, July 20, Churchill–Stalin, suggest Mikolajczyk visit, p. 286; No. 301, July 23, Stalin–Churchill, on Poland, setting up of National Council of Poland, plans for administration, pp. 287–8; Nos 305–6, July 27–28, Mikolajczyk visit to Moscow, pp. 292–3.

Perepiska
… , vol. 2,
Stalin–Roosevelt:
No. 159, February 11, Roosevelt–Stalin, on Polish question, pp. 124–5; No. 171, Feb. 28, Roosevelt–Stalin, oudine of tentative settlement, p. 133; No. 172; March 3, Stalin–Roosevelt, Polish government rejects Curzon line, p. 133; No. 203, June 19, Roosevelt-Stalin, impressions of Mikolajczyk visit, pp. 153–5; No. 206, June 24, Stalin-Roosevelt, need for ‘reconstruction’ of London Polish government, pp. 155–6.

Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations 1939–1945
. General Sikorski Historical Institute, vol. II:
1943–1945
(London: Heinemann 1967). Doc. No. 68, Polish
aide-mémoire
, 30 Dec. 1943, on conditions for Soviet-Polish collaboration, pp. 121–2; No. 69, Sir Owen O’Malley to Mikolajczyk, 3 Jan. 1944, pp. 122–3; No. 71, Romer-Eden talk on co-operation of Polish Underground with Soviet troops, Jan. 6, pp. 125–7; No. 72, Mikolajczyk broadcast to Poland, Jan. 6, pp. 127–8; No. 73, Mikolajczyk-Beneš talk, Jan. 10, pp. 129–32; No. 74, Soviet statement on Soviet-Polish frontier, Jan. 11, pp. 132–4 (proposed Polish reply, pp. 134–6, Eden-Mikolajczyk), Polish reply, Jan. 14, pp. 138–9; No. 79, Raczynski to FO on situation in Poland/ entry of Soviet troops, Jan. 16, pp. 140–42; No. 83, Churchill–Mikolajczk–Eden, possible revision of Treaty of Riga, Jan. 20, pp. 144–9; No. 85, Raczynski to Eden four questions about British guarantee of Polish independence, Jan. 23, pp. 150–51; No. 87, Mikolajczyk on British proposal for new Polish frontier/Curzon line, Jan. 25–26, pp. 153–5; No. 93, Churchill to Stalin, frontier problem, Feb. 1, pp. 160–62, and Stalin to Churchill, Feb. 4, pp. 163–4; No. 96, Churchill–Mikolajczyk talk, eventuality of Polish rejection
of
Soviet terms, Feb. 6, pp. 166–71; No. 97, Roosevelt to Stalin, Feb. 7, pp. 171–2; No. 99, draft message, Churchill to Stalin changes in Polish government, Feb. 12, pp. 173–6; No. 103, Churchili-Mikolajczyk on reply to Soviet demands, Feb. 16, pp. 180–7; No. 107, Churchill to Stalin on frontiers, Feb. 20, pp. 191–3; No. 113, Churchill to Stalin, March 7, pp. 199–200; No. 117, Mikolajczyk to Roosevelt, March 18, pp. 207–11; Nos 118–19, Churchill to Stalin, March 21, Stalin to Churchill, March 23, pp. 212–14; No. 123, Raczynski–Eden, ‘Volhynia division’ agreement, April 7, pp. 218–20; No. 124, Mikolajczyk–Churchill and Stettinius-Winant: behaviour of Soviet troops, April 9, pp.220–24; No. 130, Romer–Stettinius, need for US co-operation, April 30, pp. 229–33; No. 132, Stalin–Professor Lange–Molotov, territory/future of Poland, May 17, pp. 235–40; No. 136, Churchill–Mikolajczyk–Eden–Romer, Polish governmental changes, May 31, pp. 243–6; No. 143, Ciechanowski note on Mikolajczyk–Lange talks, June 13, pp. 258–63; No. 144, conversation, Planning Group (OSS) supplies for AK, June 13, pp. 263–6; No. 145, Mikolajczyk farewell visit to Roosevelt, June 14, pp. 266–8; No. 152, Mikolajczyk–Raczkiewicz–Sosnkowski conference, instructions to AK during ‘Tempest’, July 6, pp. 274–6; No. 155, Romer–Eden on Mikolajczyk’s visit to Moscow, July 11, pp. 279–80; No. 161, Mikolajczyk–Churchill, request for British Liaison Mission to Poland, July 18, pp. 288–90; No. 171, Churchill–Stalin, proposing Mikolajczyk visit to Moscow, July 27, pp. 301–2.