The Road to Berlin (156 page)

Diplomatic correspondence/diplomatic history

Diplomatic correspondence

Perepiska …
, vol. 1, No. 294, Churchill to Stalin, on ‘working arrangement’ for Russians to ‘take the lead’ in Rumania, the British to do the same in Greece, Roosevelt’s agreement to a three-months trial, July 12, pp. 280–81; No. 297, Stalin to Churchill, requires US reply and resolution of ‘certain doubts’ by US government, July 15, p. 283.

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy
(single-volume), see ch. XVII, British policy towards Yugoslavia, pp. 332–48; also ch. XVIII, on Greece, to the Caserta agreement and the ELAS rebellion, pp. 350–58.

Woodward, Sir L.,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, vol. Ill, (1) British policy towards Yugoslavia: see ch. XLI (iii–vi), pp. 296–335, Brigadier MacLean’s report on the partisans, issue of withdrawing British support for Mihailovic: Churchill–Tito correspondence (Dec. 43–March 44), Tito’s refusal to co-operate with King Peter, dismissal of Puric government, appointment of Subasic, Tito–Subasic, Tito’s attitude to King Peter. See also ch. XLII (i–ii), pp. 336–50, Brig. MacLean’s suggestion to Tito that his movement be extended into Serbia, Churchill opposes ‘grovelling to Tito’, Churchill meeting with Tito (Aug. 12), British memorandum on British views (pp. 340–41), Tito–Subasic meeting, Churchill meeting with Tito and Subasic together (Aug. 13), British concern for
Serb
interests to prevent civil war, Tito ‘disappears’ (Sept. 18–19)
en route
for USSR, Molotov on Soviet views of Yugoslav question (pp. 348–9), imminence of entry of Red Army into Yugoslav territory, Moscow conference and the Balkans.

(2) British policy and
Greece
. See ch. XLIII (i–ii), pp. 383–402,
EAM
and
ELAS
, Greek guerrilla groups, role of Greek Communist Party
(KKE)
, the anti-Communist
EDES, EKKA
and Col. Psarros, problems for British policy, role and importance of SOE operations, reports of Major Wallace emphasizing unpopularity of the King, renewal of civil war in Greece, British force designated for liberated Greece,
EAM–ELAS
plans to seize control after German withdrawal, Roosevelt fails to support British proposals to put to King, King finally agrees to compromise on his possible return. Also (iii–iv), pp. 410–11, Merekovo conference to reunite guerrilla groups (Feb. 44), Col. Woodhouse in attendance with US Major Win, plans to broaden Greek government but the King rejects idea of a regency, meeting of Greek units at Alexandria (April 3),
EAM
and the Lebanon conference, Churchill–Papandreou meeting in Italy, Caserta agreement,
EAM–ELAS
rebellion in Athens,
ELAS
rejection of Caserta agreement designed to prevent civil war, British troops enter 14 Oct. 1944.

KTB/GMD

KTB/OKW
, IV (1): 6. Abschnitt, ‘Der südöstliche Kriegsschauplatz’/II Teil. On Yugoslav and Greek partisan/resistance movements, pp. 632–712. See also
Anhänge
, ‘Kroatien’, pp. 732–57; ‘Rumänien’ (Jan.–Aug. 44), Antonescu–Hitler, Allied air attacks on Rumanian oilfields, negotiations May 44, pp. 757–97.

OKH/GenStdH/Op. Abt. II
, Tagesmeldungen Ob. Südost. (For 1 Jan.–24 July 1944.) T-78/R330, 6288099–6289114. Also ‘Balkan–Bib–Allgemein’ (Balkans, Greece, Crete: Yugoslav situation, Mihailovic and Četniks, Pavelič and Croats/1943) T-78/R332, 6289729–845. Also Balkan I (c) politisch, Band I, Lagebeurteilungen/Ob. Südost, partisan operations, Tito, Mihailović, Greek guerrillas (1943), 6289845–6290105.

Bulletins

Forschungsdienst Ost. Politische Informationen
. (Printed bulletins—1944/Jan. 1945—on a wide variety of subjects: personalities, politics, organizations in the east.) See ‘Allslavismus in Rahmen der bolschew. Aussenpolitik’ (pp. 145–62) and ‘Die Tito–Bewegung und ihr Ziel’ (pp. 277–90), T-78/R493, 6480045.

Soviet materials

Biryuzov, Marshal SU S.S. (ed.),
Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v bor’be za osvobozhdenie narodov Yugoslavii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960). See pt 1, pp. 47–53, Soviet aid to the Yugoslav partisan movement (table of deliveries for 1944, p. 52); also pt 2, pp. 201–5, Lt.-Gen. N.V. Korneyev, ‘Voennaya missiya SSSR v Yugoslavii’, Soviet military mission sent 17 Jan. 1944, ‘spiriting Tito away’ —ischeznovenie— to Moscow (p. 205). (A remarkably terse and primly discreet account of the Soviet mission.)

Kir’yakidis, G.K.,
Gretsiya no vtoroi mirovoi voine
(Moscow: Nauka 1967). Detailed monograph on
EAM–ELAS
, the ‘reactionary offensive’ against
EAM
(extensive use of ‘documents and materials’ of the Greek Communist Party,
EAM–ELAS, EP0N
and
PEEA)
.

Kir’yakidis, G.K., ‘Dvizhenie soprotivleniya v Gretsii (1940–1944). See
Sovetskii Soyuz i bor’ba narodov Tsentral’noi i Yugo–Vostochnoi Evropy za svodbodu i nezavisimost’ 1941–1945 gg
. (Moscow: Nauka 1978), pp. 384–439. (A detailed account of
EAM/ELAS
, extensive use of Greek sources, Soviet accounts, also some Western memoir literature.)

Yugoslav materials

Documents: Mihailović trial

Dokumenti o izdajstvu Draže Mihajlovicá
, Vol. 1 (in Serb), (Belgrade, Sept. 1945). ‘Državna komisija …’ 735 pp. (Text of documents, also facsimiles.)

Bibliography

Dedijer, Vladimir,
Tito Speaks. His Self-Portrait and Struggle with Stalin
(London: Weidenfeld 1955). Pt III, ‘War of Liberation’, see ch. 11, pp. 169–80, partisan resentment of publicity for Mihailović, Stalin’s displeasure, lack of Soviet aid, Stalin and King Peter’s government; ch. 13, pp. 201–14, Stalin’s displeasure over Jajce decisions, cessation of British aid to Mihailović, Djilas mission to Moscow, Soviet supplies to partisans; ch. 14, pp. 215–30, Tito–Šubašić meeting, two meetings between Tito and Churchill.

Djilas, Milovan,
Conversations with Stalin
(New York: Harcourt, Brace 1952; London: Rupert Hart-Davis 1962 and Penguin Books 1963). On Djilas’s first mission to Moscow, see under ‘Raptures’: this section and the book as a whole is generally and justifiably regarded as one of the most remarkable political portraits of Stalin ever penned. (On Mesić, see note below under Klajkić.)

Djonlagić, Ahmet
et al., Yugoslavia in the Second World War
(English text) (Belgrade, 1967). See First and Second AVNOJ sessions, pp. 101–41; on the Teheran Conference, pp. 145–50: Tito–Šubašic agreement, pp. 162–7; agreement between the National Commmittee of AVNOJ and the Soviet government, pp. 173–7.

Kijakić, Dragan,
Ustaško Domobranska Legija…
. See note, pp. 193–4, on Artillery Colonel Marko Mesić and the formation in the USSR of the ‘Odred jugoslavenske vojske u SSSR’, with Mesić as commander and Prišlin as chief of staff: in 1943 the force was redesignated ‘Odred NOVJ, formiran u SSSR’.

Pajović, B. and Radević, M.,
Bibliografija o ratu i revoluciji u Jugoslaviji
, Posebna izdanja 1945–1965 (Belgrade, 1969). See pt 1, ‘Dokumenti, Nauka Publicistika’, pp. 25–303.

Terzić, Col.-Gen. V. (ed.),
Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945
, vol. 2 (Belgrade, 1958). See pt 1, chs I–VIII, ‘Od drugog zasedanja AVNOJ-a do oslobodjenja Beograda’, pp. 7–344 (operational narrative, also ch. VIII on ‘Sporazum Tito–Šubašić …’).

Planning the Jassy–Kishinev operation
(2nd and 3rd Ukrainia n Fronts) pp.
356
–
369

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 254–67, planning/preparation of Jassy–Kishinev operation: role of the Rumanian Communist Party in organizing anti-Fascist front, reactionary, bourgeois support for Antonescu, in Soviet military planning need to complete destruction of German forces on the flanks before striking along the ‘Warsaw–Berlin axis’, German defences/strength in Rumania, additional German units (security,
SS
units), strength of Soviet 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, total of 90 divisions,
Stavka
conference July, decisions of the Front commanders, 6th Tank Army assignment, assignments to 18th Tank, 4th Guards and 7th Mech. Corps, air support 5th and 17th Air Armies, logistics problems and solutions (p. 263), success of Soviet deception measures and German conviction that little likelihood of major Soviet attack, even at late date mistakenly assessed role of 3rd Ukrainian Front.

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 97–104, operational planning for Jassy–Kishinev operation:
Stavka
directive, Front planning, table of comparative strength (p. 104).

Antosyak, Colonel A.V.,
V boyakh za svobodu Rumynii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1974). Ch. 2, Soviet victories, influence on the Rumanian anti-fascist movement (pp. 32–49), formation in USSR of ‘1st Rumanian Volunteer Division’ (Oct. 43)—‘Tudor Vladimirescu Division’—(pp. 49–56), Soviet entry on to Rumanian territory, repulse of German counter-attacks, Soviet losses May 30-June 5 (52nd, 27th Army, 2nd and 6th Tank Army) 14,871 men (2,800 killed), 96 tanks and
SP
guns, 132 aircraft (p. 60).

Biryuzov, Marshal SU S.S.,
Surovye gody
(Moscow: Nauka 1966), pt 2 (published earlier in VM series as
Sovetskii soldat na Balkanakh)
, pp. 313–52, Antonov issues warning order July 15 for offensive, Tolbukhin assembles military soviet July 16, discussion of ‘Kitskan bridgehead’,
Stavka
directive Aug. 2 (text, pp. 344–6), Malinovskii–Tolbukhin conference, Gorshkov and planning of amphibious operation. (Many pen-portraits of commanders involved.)

Biryuzov, S.S., ‘Poiski pravil’novo resheniya’,
VIZ
, 1963 (5), pp. 59–77. Detailed, at times racy, account of operational planning 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, special reference to Tolbukhin’s decision on the ‘Kitskan Bridgehead’.

Cupsa, Colonel I.
et al,, Vklad Rumynii v razgrom fashistskoi Gennanii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1959). (Soviet translation of
Contributia Romîniel la rãzboiul antihitlerist
, Bucharest, 1958). Pt 1, pp. 42–7, planning for a national rising, Communist Party planning, note to p. 45 on two possible courses of action (to attack the Germans, or to link up with the Red Army and then initiate actions against the Germans).

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
Marshal Tolbukhin
, pp. 137–59. See ‘Udar s Dnestra’, planning for Jassy–Kishinev operation, decision for ‘Kitskan bridgehead’,
Stavka
order/directive, assignments to Front armies.

Malinovskii, Marshal SU R.Ya.,
Yassko–Kishinevskie Kanny
(Moscow: Nauka 1964) (a collective work, bearing Malinovskii’s name), pp. 45–82, planning the operation, German command deliberately misled over weakness’ of 2nd Ukrainian Front (
Stavka
forbade heavy counter-blows in May–June to confirm this impression), German strength and defences,
Stavka
instruction to prepare offensive July 44, Tolbukhin and the ‘Kitskan bridgehead’,
Stavka
meeting, Tolbukhin gets more tanks (elements of 7th Mech. Corps), delineation of Front assignments Aug. 2, offensive provisionally timed for Aug. 20, Front planning/command appointments, Tolbukhin’s liaison with Black Sea Fleet commander F.S. Oktyabrskii, role of Danube Flotilla. (I have made extensive use of this work, largely because of its detail; I had occasion to discuss this book at length with one of the authors.)

Matsulenko, Colonel V.A.,
Udar s dnestrovskovo platsdarma
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1961). (Operations of 37th Army, 3rd Ukrainian Front). Ch. 2, pp. 23–86, command decisions, operational planning 37th Army. (Immensely detailed monograph, utilizing largely Soviet military archives.)

Minasyan, M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie narodov Yugo–vostochnoi Evropy
, pp. 108–28, planning/preparation Jassy–Kishinev operation, German strength and deployment, Soviet strength (87 rifle divs., 1 tank army, 2 air armies),
Stavka
meeting July 31, political aim to take Rumania out of the war, Stalin’s insistence on a rapid breakthrough, Front planning/military measures, Front planning/political to use recruits from freshly liberated areas (400,000 men brought into the two Fronts).