The Road to Berlin (150 page)

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Vospominaniya o Belorusskoi operatsii’, in Samsonov,
Osvobozhdenie Belorussii
, pp. 40–65. Genesis of
Bagration
plan and entire summer offensive, consultations with Antonov, detailed planning with 3rd Belorussian Front, planning with 1st Baltic Front (Bagramyan), meeting with Stalin and Antonov 17 June, Zhukov’s request for postponement of offensive.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya …
, vol. 2, pp. 238–52. Hands over command of 1st Ukrainian Front to Koniev, Stalin instructs Antonov to prepare plan for summer offensive (end April), mid-May in Moscow with Vasilevskii, 20 May review of offensive plans with Stalin, Vasilevskii and Antonov assigned co-ordinating mission with 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, dismisses Rokossovskii’s version of ‘two main blows’ from 1st Belorussian Front as unfounded (p. 246), Front assignments, logistical/supply problems, key role of 1st Belorussian Front, Zhukov’s supervision of 1st Belorussian planning/preparations, planning of air operations. (See also
Memoirs
, translation, pp. 517–29.)

Operation
‘Bagration’
/Belorussia pp.
215
–
231

Allen, W.E.D., and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns of 1944–1945
, Ch. V, ‘The Russian Summer Offensive’, 23 June–end of August, pp. 104–63. (Derived largely from Soviet wartime communiqués—operational narrative, with special reference to terrain features.)

Armstrong, John A. (ed.),
Soviet Partisans in World War II
, ch. IX, the Polotsk lowland, pp. 544–6: operations of the Kaminsky Brigade, Soviet orders to partisan brigades in Ushachi area, German operations
Frühlingsfest
and
Regenschauer
, partisan losses estimated at 7,000 dead, mass demolitions by partisans, paralysis of German rail system.

Carell, Paul,
Scorched Earth
(Hitler’s War on Russia, vol. 2), pt 8, ‘The Cannae of Army Group Centre’,—deployment (German expectation of an attack in Galicia), attack (Bobruisk, Vitebsk), breakthrough (the gigantic pocket), pp. 479–510.

Gackenholz, Hermann,
The Collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944, loc. cit
. See section ‘Battle of White Russia’, opened by extensive partisan actions, Soviet deployment opposite Fourth Army, Ninth Army, Third
Panzer
Army, new Soviet tactics surprise German command, also brigading of Soviet armour; ‘Destruction of the German Front’, penetration at Vitebsk, Busch refuses to allow withdrawal to Dnieper, conference June 24 at Army Group Centre
HQ
in Minsk, Zeitzlev (CGS) present, discussion of danger to Third
Panzer
Army, 24 June ‘last chance of saving Army Group Centre by “changing its battle instructions” ’ (p. 368), Zeitzler fails to persuade Hitler for withdrawal, ‘Fortress Vitebsk’ a trap for Third
Panzer
, Hitler refuses permission for Fourth Army to withdraw to Dnieper line, 1st Belorussian Front assault on Ninth Army June 24, Army Group Centre
HQ
June 25 report to OKH request to abandon Vitebsk and withdrawal to Dnieper, Hitler again refused, Hitler insists on holding Vitebsk, June 26 danger of double envelopment of Army Group, Busch’s personal visit to Hitler, Army Group still bound by restrictive orders, desperate situation of Ninth Army by June 27, Hitler’s operational order No. 8 did nothing to change orders or properly estimate situation; ‘The Russian Drive in Depth’, Soviet plans to exploit success at Minsk, mass of Ninth Army encircled at Bobruisk, communications with Army Group North cut, Model assumes command of Army Group Centre, Hitler agrees to all measures proposed by Model (June 28–29), pp. 364–76.

Heidkämper, Otto,
Witebsk. Kampf und Untergang der 3 Panzerarmee
, ch. XXI, Soviet summer offensive 1944, Soviet assault on Third
Panzer
Army, first battles NW Vitebsk, break-out, withdrawal actions, pp. 144–62.

Hesse, Erich,
Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941–1944
, ch. 13, under ‘Säuberungsunternehmen der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Jahre 1944’, anti-partisan operations ‘Regenschauer’, ‘Komoran’, pp. 242–4.

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo-German War
, ch. 26, Belorussia and East Poland, pp. 432–42: Soviet strength/deployment, preparations for
Bagration
, opening of Soviet offensive, encirclement at Vitebsk, attempted German break-out, disappearance of German 53rd Corps, encirclement of Bobruisk, reshuffling of German command, Model replaces Busch (but Model retains command of Army Group North Ukraine), desperate commitment of small German reserves, 5th Guards Tank Army crosses Berezina, drive on Minsk.

GMD

RSHA (Reichssicherheitsamt):
Amt IV.
Funkspiele:
German intelligence deception, exchanges of German agents with ‘Centre’ (Moscow), queries from ‘Centre’ on German order of battle/troop movements: signals for May–June/44 (21 pp.). T-78/R488, 6473443–66.

FHO
(IIc), Feindkräfteberechnung: tables, daily estimates Soviet forces on European (Soviet–German) front, Soviet reserves, Caucasus, Finland, Far East: 2 January–23 August 1944. T-78/R483, 6468345–580.

FHO
(I). Teil A.
Zusammenstellung der in der zeit von April 1942–Dezember 1944
…
abgefassten Beurteilungen
… No. 1794/44: Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage der Heeresgruppe, Mitte vom 2.6.44 (T-78/R466, 6446155); No. 1931/44: Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. (See final note on Finland/Finnish front) T-78/R466, 6446158–167. See also Kurze Beurteilung 14.6.44 (No. 1951/44), 6446168–69.

FHO
(I). Teil A.
Zusammenstellung … abgefassten Beurteilung der Feindlage
. Rpt No. 2096/44 27.6: early success in Soviet breakthrough as much as a surprise for the Soviet as for the German command; Nr 2163/44 2.7: transfer of Rotmistrov’s 5 th Guards Tank Army to Belorussian Front most likely, but this still leaves adequate Soviet armoured strength against Army Group South Ukraine for offensive into Rumania. T-78/R466, 6446170–174.

OKH/Allgemeines Heeresamt: Abwicklungsstab
. Reports on German units destroyed in Soviet summer offensive, 1944: units of Heeresgruppe Mitte, 4th Army and 9th Army. T-78/R139, from 6068417 to 6068999.

OKH/Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung
. Map collection: Der grosse Durchbruch bei Hgr. Mitte (21.6–10.8.44). Soviet breakthrough, Army Group Centre. T-78/R136, 6065394–5436.

Soviet materials

Wartime press

Sovinformbyuro
. See Vol. 7 (June–Dec. 44): Moscow, 1945. communiqués
(operativnaya svodka)
, from 23.6 to 30.6, pp. 1–21; the same, 1.7 to 15.7, pp. 22–47.

SWN
(date/number of issue)

Stalin: Order(s) of the Day.

To Bagramyan, Chernyakhovskii, 28 June, No. 895.

To Rokossovskii, 28 June, No. 905.

To Zakharov (2 BF), Rokossovskii, 30 June, No. 897.

To Meretskov and Rokossovskii (Karelian Front), 1 July, No. 898.

To Chernyakhovskii, 3 July, No. 899.

To Chernyakhovskii and Rokossovskii (cutting German links from Minsk to Vilno and Lida): 4 July, No. 900.

To the same, 5 July, No. 901.

To Bagramyan, 6 July, No. 902.

To Chernyakhovskii, 7 July, No. 903.

To Rokossovskii (capture of Kovel), 8 July, No. 904.

(Cf.
SWN
, 21 July 1944, No. 915. Account by Lt.-Gen. E. Hofmeister, captured commander of XLI
Panzer
Corps.)

Soviet official histories/statistics

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 168–86, encirclement of German forces at Vitebsk/Bobruisk, threat to and encirclement of Fourth Army.

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 48–55, destruction of Army Group Centre. Brief operational narrative based on Soviet military archives.

‘Belorusskaya operatsiya v tsifrakh’,
VIZ
, 1964 (6), pp. 74–86.
Bagration
, tabulation of strength, listing of Front/army commanders.

Collected memoir accounts, Belorussian operations

(1)
Osvobozhdenie Belorussii
(ed. A.M. Samsanov).

See under:

Bagramyan, I.Kh., ‘Voiny-pribaltiitsy v srazheniyakh za Belorussiyu’, pp. 109–37.

Pokrovskii, A.P., ‘3-i Belorusskii Front v operatsii “Bagration” ’, pp. 184–218 (Pokrovskii was Chief of Staff, 3 BF).

Krylov, N.I., ‘Na glavnom napravlenii’, pp. 276–310 (Krylov commanded 5th Army).

Beloborodov, A.P., ‘Vitebskii “Kotel” ’, pp. 311–40.

Rotmistrov, P.A., ‘Udar nebyvaloi sily’, pp. 404–27 (commander 5th Guards Tank Army, assigned 3 BF area, committed on direct
Stavka
orders).

Pliev, I.A. ‘Na ostrie udara’, pp. 425–45 (commander, Cavalry-Mechanized Group, KMG).

Galitskii, K.N., ‘Gvardeitsy 11-i v boyakh za Belorussiyu’, pp. 446–93.

Note also: Appendix 1, complete Soviet order of battle, 23 June, pp. 741–7.

(2) Malanin, Colonel K.A. (ed.),
Polki idut na zapad
, (Moscow: Voenizdat 1964) (memoir material, Soviet Belorussian offensive).

See esp.: Rokossovskii, K.K., ‘Ot Gomelya do Bresta’, pp. 21–47.

Bagramyan, I.Kh., ‘Skvoz v’yugu ognevu’, pp. 48–71.

Beloborodov, A.P., ‘V raione Vitebska’, pp. 99–116.

Panov, M.F., ‘Tanki vkhodyat v proryv’, pp. 117–28 (commander 1st Independent Guards Don Tank Corps).

(3) ‘Velikaya pobeda v Belorussii’,
VIZ
, 1964 (6), pp. 3–35. Collection of personal accounts, Bagramyan, Rokossovskii, Pokrovskii, Rotmistrov, Vershinin (on 4th Air Army), Antipenko (logistics).

Antipenko, Lt.-Gen. N.A.,
Na glavnom napravlenii
(Moscow: Nauka, 2nd edn 1971), foreword by Marshal Zhukov. See ‘Osvobozhdenie Belorussii’, assignments as Chief Rear Services/1st Belorussian Front, organization and operation supply services, transport, medical units, repair services, pp. 127–59.

Batov, P.A., ‘65-ya armiya v boyakh za Belorussiyu’,
VIZ
, 1970 (9), pp. 65–72. Account by commander, 65th Army, first stages Soviet offensive.

Bychkov, L.N.,
Partizanskoe dvizhenie … 1941–1945
, pp. 349–61, Belorussian partisan operations, co-ordination with Red Army summer offensive, effect of German anti-partisan operations, growth in partisan strength.

Eliseyev, E.P.,
Na Belostokskom napravlenii
(Moskow: Nauka 1971), 229 pp.,
passim
. An immensely detailed monograph dealing with 2nd Belorussian Front operations, Zakharov’s command which carried through the Bialystok operation but suffered such heavy casualties that it could not conduct further operations; Zakharov was subsequently
demoted
to army commander. Tabulation of command appointments for 2 BF, also a comprehensive index.

(Further to
G.F. Zakharov
as a Front commander, see S.M. Shtemenko,
The Soviet General Staff at War
, pp. 244–6, with Shtemenko present at Zakharov’s first inspection and early command conference. Without having inspected the terrain, Zakharov queried the
Stavka
directive and at his command conference stated without ceremony that ‘I’m the one who does the talking here …’, finally trying to force the tactics he used in the Crimea on commanders facing the complex terrain of Belorussia—no one could just ‘dash into the enemy trenches’.)