The Road to Berlin (154 page)

Shtemenko, General S.M.,
General’nyi shtab v gody voiny
(Bk 2) (Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1973), pp. 78–104, on the Warsaw axis, initial Soviet optimism about success near Warsaw, Rokossovskii and Zhukov fear powerful German blow at left flank 1 BF, no information on rising available to Soviet command or Soviet government, Rokossovskii received no reply to telegram to Bor-Komorowski, Churchill to Stalin, Stalin orders Zhukov, Rokossovskii and General Staff to report (Aug. 6: partial text, impossible to attack off the march, p. 87), draft operational plan (pp. 88–9)—impossible to launch full offensive before Aug. 25—Stalin–Mikolajczyk exchange, Stalin’s disclaimers to Churchill, 47th Army offensive Sept. 10 followed by 1st Polish Army, assault on Praga, Polish Army assault crossing of Vistula, General Staff sets up signals link with Bor-Komorowski, arrangements to drop supplies, 20 Sept. 7
AK
officers contact Red Army, one officer reports that Bor-Komorowski issued secret orders to ‘forcefully restrain’ those insurgents associated with the Lublin government, Polish Army bridgehead in serious state, Stalin’s agreement to put Polish army on defensive on Vistula
eastern
bank. (Highly personalized account, stressing Soviet plans to relieve Warsaw, some material from Rokossovskii memoirs.)

Select Polish materials

Bor-Komorowski, T.,
The Secret Army
(London: Gollancz 1950), 407 pp.,
passim
. On the Polish ‘Home Army’
(AK)
, the Underground and the Warsaw rising.

Garlinski, J.,
Poland, SOE and the Allies
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), pt IV, ‘Into the Abyss’, pp. 167–206, decision to launch rising, Polish efforts to secure Western aid, Soviet attitude, airlift problems, belated Soviet agreement. (Very critical of Polish planning in general and of Sosnkowski in particular; nor did the political situation justify improvisation.)

Bibliography

See
Polski czyn zbrojny w II wojnie światowej. Bibliografia wojny wyzwoleńczej narodu polskiego 1939–1945
(Warsaw: MON 1973), vol. VI, pt V, ‘Ruch oporu’, section 8, ‘Powstanie warszawskie’, with seven sub-sections dealing with general aspects, the insurrection itself, Allied aid/air drops, insurgent armament, conditions, German atrocities (pp. 646–79). (See also pt V, section 2, ‘Armia Krajowa’, including
Burza
(‘Tempest’), pp. 509–51.)

Bartelski, L.M.,
Mokotów 1944
(Warsaw: MON 1972) (English summary, pp. 701–2).

Karpinski, A.,
Pod Dȩblinem, Pulawy i Warka
(Warsaw: MON 1967) (1st Polish Army operations, Dȩblin, Pulawy and Magnuszew area, 18.7–12.9.44). See ch. II, situation on the ‘Warsaw axis’, 18.7–15.9 (pp. 18–56); also ch. III, 1st Army (Polish) operations, Dȩblin, Pulawy, 28.7–4.8 (pp. 60–80), assault crossing of the Vistula (pp. 80–121), operations in Magnuszew area (1st Tank Brigade), assault crossing of Vistula (pp. 199–232).

Kowalski, W.T.,
Wielka Koalicja 1941–1945
. Vol. 2:
Rok 1944
. See ch. IV,’ “Bagration” and the Polish question’, course of the Soviet offensive, Red Army–AK relations, draft Operation
Burza
and the hallucinations of a general-philosopher—
‘Plan “Burza” i majaczenia general-filozofa’
(pp. 252–4)—SOE and Poland, Mikolajczyk in Moscow, struggle to help Warsaw rising, Praga operation, Stalin’s assessments, Churchill’s manoeuvres, pp. 219–324.

Margules, J.,
Boje 1 Armii WP w obszarze Warszawy (sierpień-wrzesień 1944)
(Warsaw: MON 1967),
passim
. A massive monograph devoted to 1st Polish Army operations in context of Warsaw rising, with five appendices on military operations (pp. 315–27) and three documentary appendices (Polish—1st Polish Army documents,
AK
documents—Soviet documents and German documents, pp. 331–522): on the mystery surrounding Captain Kalugin, see pp. 238–9, with Przyoński’s assertion that
Kalugin
was not a ‘representative of the Soviet 1st Belorussian Front’ but a PW who had joined the Vlasov forces; Soviet sources remain silent on Kalugin. Also ‘Monter’s’ attempts to send emissaries to the Soviet command, pp. 239–41.

Rawski, T.
et al., Wojna wyzwoléncza
…
1939–1945
, pt V, Ch. XXX, ‘Powstanie warszawskie’, decision for rising, Polish plans, German plans, opposing strengths, first phase, defensive fighting in western sectors, German counter-blows, attacks along Vistula bank, capitulation, pp. 566–92. (Narrative and analysis based on memoirs, WIH—Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny—archives also citing H.v.Krannhals,
Der Warschauer Aufstand 1944
, Frankfurt, 1962.)

Sȩk-Malecki, J.,
Armia Ludowa w powstaniu warszawskim. Wspomnienia
(Warsaw: Iskry 1962). Under ‘Powstanie’, pp. 61ff., see footnote to p. 100 on
Captain Kalugin
, with reference (pp. 102–3) on article by Captain Ryszard Nazarewics (printed in
Rzeczpospolita
, Nr 217, 1946) to the effect that Kalugin had been in Poland since Dec. 1943 and was, in fact, an officer of the Vlasov army (ROA).

Táborsky, E., ‘Beneš and Stalin—Moscow, 1943 and 1945’,
Journal Central European Affairs
, XIII, July 1953, No. 2, pp. 169–70, on Red Army entry on to Czechoslovak territory. C-in-C of puppet Slovak Army, General Catloš proposed secret deal with Stalin for ‘Slovak political matters’ to be ‘solved in accordance with the interests of the USSR’, Colonel Pika informed secretly, protest by Beneš.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 313–32, beginning of Slovak rising, Soviet push into eastern Carpathians, course of Slovak rising and partisan operations (October–November 1944).

IVMV
, 9, pt 1, pp. 154–70, Slovak rising, Soviet operations in eastern Carpathians.

Collective authorship (joint Soviet–Czechoslovak work),
Na vechnye vremena. Na věčnéčasy
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1975), pp. 135–56, on the Slovak rising (utilizing largely Husak’s account, documentary collections and some archival material—
Vojenský bistorický archiv/VNA)
.

Grachev, Colonel S.I. (ed.),
Rozhdenie chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii
. See O. Janaček, ‘Sozdanie naterritorii SSSR 1-o chekhoslovatskovo armeiskovo korpusa’ (also ‘reactionary plans’ of ‘Czechkslovak émigré government’ to form ‘bourgeois army’ in Slovakia), pp. 198–241. Also ‘frustration of plans of Czechoslovak émigré government to wind up 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps’, pp. 242–73. (Cf. Shtemenko’s account of the Slovak rising.)

Grechko, Marshal SU A.A.,
Cherez Karpaty
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1970), pp. 78–239. Combined memoir-monograph (Grechko commanded 1st Guards Army), Soviet operations in Carpathians: operations 1st Guards Army, 18th Army, 4th Ukrainian Front; 38th Army, 1st Ukrainian Front, Sept.–Oct. 1944. Extensive use of Soviet military archives.

Grylev, Maj.-Gen. A. and Vyrodov, Colonel I., ‘Vernost internatsional’ nomu dolgu’,
VIZ
, 1968 (10), pp. 44–57. Soviet assistance to Slovak partisans, Soviet aid for Slovak rising (account based largely on Soviet archival materials).

Koniev, I.S. (ed.),
Za osvobozhdenie Chekboslovakii
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1965) (a collective work, with contributions/advice from senior Soviet commanders—M.V. Zakharov, Moskalenko, Lelyushenko, Sandalov, A.N. Asmolov and others). See pp. 104–9, aid to Slovak rising, advance into eastern Slovakia: beginning of Slovak rising, Golian’s agreement with London, partisan organization, threat of German occupation, Colonel A.N. Asmolov sent into Slovakia by Ukrainian partisans, German attacks on Slovak insurgents, capture of Banska Bystrica, Viest abandons further resistance, Golian and Viest made prisoner ultimately shot, results of Soviet campaign.

Note: A
singular feature of this study is the regular record of
Soviet casualties
. For 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts: 21,000 killed, 89,000 wounded (losses for 1st Ukrainian Front being 11,550 killed, 47,200 wounded); 1st Czechoslovak Corps: 844 killed, 4,068 wounded. (See p. 108.)
IVOVSS
, 4, p. 324, gives the figure of 6,500 for total casualties in 1st Czechoslovak Corps, while the detailed article in
VIZ
, 1968 (10), p. 52 (note 42) repeats the figures in
Za osvobozhdenie Chekhoslovakii
.

Moskalenko, K., ‘O Karpatsko–Duklinskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1965 (7), pp. 16–23. To demonstrate that this was a Front operation, not merely an army operation involving only 38th Army.

Moskalenko, K.,
Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii
, vol. 2, ch. 13, ‘V glub Karpat’, Sept. 2 Koniev orders 38th Army for Carpathian operation to assist Slovak insurgents, establishment of 4th Ukrainian Front (1st Guards Army, 18th Army, 8th Air Army), Koniev’s report to Stalin who demanded speedy breakthrough to insurgents (pp. 432–3), preparations/deployment 38th Army, German movement into Slovakia and attempt to build new front in S Carpathians, tragedy of East Slovak Corps, promotion of Svoboda, difficulties in 38th Army operations, pp. 428–62. Ch. 14, advance through Dukla pass, 38th Army operations in detail, pp. 463–90.

Nedorov, A.I.,
Natsiona’no-osvobodite’noe dvizhenie v Chekhoslovakii 1938–1945
(Moscow: Sots–Ekon. Lit. 1961). See pp. 254–92, on Slovak rising 1944, on partisan organization and Soviet assistance, German military moves, Soviet advance into Carpathians, political aspects of the rising. (Based on memoirs/accounts by Communist leadership, extensive use of Czechoslovak military archives.)

Proektor, Colonel A.M.,
Cherez duklinskii pereval
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960). (Monograph on Carpathian–Dukla operations Sept.–Nov. 1944.) See ch. 2, on planning of Soviet offensive, 38th Army preparations, pp. 39–78; ch. 3, operations 8–14 Sept., pp. 80–115; ch. 4, second stage 15–25 Sept., pp. 116–51.

Shtemenko, S.M.,
General’nyi shtab
… , bk 2, pp. 318–46, Shtemenko and General A.A. Gryzlov ordered by Stalin to work on plan to assist Slovak rising, difficulties in idea of dropping two Soviet divisions (only 170 transports available, would mean five/six trips), Antonov accepts idea of Slovakia becoming major
partisan
operational area, 53 Soviet ‘organizational groups’ for partisan warfare infiltrated into Slovakia, on Čatloš and Golian (pp. 327–9), unreal planning for rising, Stalin–Koniev (Sept. 1–2) on rising and Red Army operations, draft directive to Koniev (1st Ukrainian Front), Slovak Army divisions disarmed by Germans, heavier resistance to 38th Army, Baranov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps cut off (Sept. 14), Czechoslovak units in storming of Dukla pass Oct. 6, Czech government in London proposes dissolution of 1st Czechoslovak Corps, Stalin–Koniev on reinforcement for 1st Corps, Svoboda’s quest for volunteers to replenish Corps. (Some interesting material on Soviet planning but no documentation.)

Kožnar, Lt.-Col. V. (ed.),
Dukla v dokumentech
(Prague: Naše vojsko 1970). Collection of photostats of operational orders/materials/awards Dukla operation, 246 pp.

Svoboda, General Ludvik, Z
Buzuluku do Prahy
(Prague, 1967). Soviet translation (2nd edn), Moscow: Voenizdat 1969. See under ‘Korpus’, (3), Slovak rising, pp. 267–75, (4) briefing from Marshal Koniev, co-operation between 38th Army and Czechoslovak Corps, pp. 275–8, (6) launching of Dukla–Carpathian Sept. 8, pp. 281–95.

Soviet operations in the Baltic states pp.
307
–
326

OKH Kriegsgesch. Abt
. (Maps): Die Einkesselung der Hgr. Nord (10.7–14.8.44); Schlacht um Tuckum (15.8–27.8); Schlacht um Estland u. Absetzen Hgr. Nord (14.8–28.9.44). T-78/R136, 6065135–73, 6065175–86 and 6065187–206.

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 348–53, Soviet advance towards Riga, final stage of operations beg. Sept. 14, success of right-flank ‘shock group’ of 1st Baltic Front, threat to Army Group North, German counter-blows (Sept. 16–22), 3rd Baltic Front operations, 2nd Baltic Front thrust towards Riga, Leningrad Front drive into Estonia, operations of 8th Estonian Rifle Corps (see L.A. Pern), failure to isolate Army Group North completely, due to lack of power in initial attacks of 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts, German concentration in Riga area, revised Soviet planning for fresh attack.