The Road to Berlin (147 page)

Polish Government (London): documents

Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations 1939–1945
, vol. 2 (1943–5) (General Sikorski Historical Institute). See doc. no. 55, Mikolajczyk (22.11) on impending Teheran conference and Polish question (pp. 90–93); Teheran conversations and Poland, docs. no. 58–60 (pp. 96–100); see also doc. no. 65, London Polish government memorandum on situation in Poland and early entry of Soviet troops, 16.12.43 (pp. 106–12).

Polish materials

Kowalski, W.T.,
Wielka koalicja 1941–1945
, vol. 1: 1941–1943 (Warsaw: MON 1973), ch. VIII, ‘Kair–Teheran–Kair’, on the Teheran conference, pp. 639–715. (A very comprehensive analysis, as lively as it is sardonic in many places.)

On the Polish
Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN)
, see A. Przygoński, Z
zagadnień strategii frontu narodowego PPR
, ch. 5, on the creation of the
KRN
, arguing that the
KRN
‘Manifesto’ was drafted before Teheran, even before the Moscow conference, pp. 195–212 (especially note to pp. 209–10).

The ‘Zhitomir attack’, Nikopol and Krivoi Rog (January 1944) pp.
163
–
167

GMDs

FH0 Beurteilung der Feindlage
… Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung (4.42–12.44), intelligence reports, information from Soviet PWs: see Nr 3102/43 (4.12.43) on location of reported
eight
Soviet tank armies (7th Tank Army in Far East, 6th and 8th Tank Armies forming up), also reports to 30.3.44. T-78/R498, 6485801–828. See also the diagrammatic maps on projected Soviet offensive operations (all Fronts, up to 29.3.44), plus statistical presentation of comparative Soviet–German strength (12.43–2.44): R497, 6485587–602, with duplicates.

FHO Feindkräfteberechnung
. Daily statistical presentation of location of Soviet forces (German front, Caucasus, Iran, Far East) for period January–March 1944. T-78/ R483, 6468469–8587.

Soviet materials

Babadzhanyan, A. and Kravchenko, I., ‘1-ya tankovaya armiya v Zhitomirsko–Berdichevskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1972 (9), pp. 21–31, 1st Guards Tank Army operations, December 1943–January 1944.

Belkin, Colonel I.M.,
13-ya Armiya v Lutsko–Rovenskoi operatsii 1944 g
. (Moscow: Voenizdat 1960). (Detailed monograph 13th Army operations, Lutsk/Rovno, January/February 1944.) (See also Grylev,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 79–89.) Pukhov commanded 13 th Army.

Biryuzov, S.S.,
Surovye gody
, pp. 236–40, fate of generals Khomenko and Bobkov (artillery commander, 44th Army). General Bobkov was killed outright by German shellfire, Khomenko died without regaining consciousness (both officers having lost their way). German troops confined the corpses in a weapons packing case, from which they were recovered finally by the Red Army and returned to Melitopol for a military funeral.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 34–44, Zhitomir–Berdichev operation (1st Ukrainian Front). Also
Dnepr. Karpaty
… , pp. 36–47.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 89–102, Nikopol–Krivoi Rog operation (3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts). Also
Dnepr. Karpaty
… , pp. 102–22.

Koltunov, Colonel G., ‘Udar voisk 1-vo Ukrainskovo fronta na zhitomirskom napravlenii zimoi 1943/44 goda’,
VIZ
, 1967 (2), pp. 12–23.

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Osvobozhdenie Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy’,
VIZ
, 1971 (1), pp. 59–73: acting as
Stavka
representative with 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for the drive into the western Ukraine, Vasilevskii here supplies a terse operational narrative, replete with
Stavka
directives, personal reports to Stalin, Front directives—Vasilevskii report to Stalin (29.12.43), pp. 61–3; Stalin to Vasilevskii (30.12.43), p. 63; (operational orders for 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts), operational plans submitted by Zhukov and Vatutin, pp. 63–4;
Stavka
directive to Zhukov (12.1.44), pp. 64–5; the Korsun encirclement,
Stavka
directive 12.2.44 to Zhukov, p. 66; the drive on Nikopol, Vasilevskii’s report to Stalin 6.2.44, p. 68; Stalin’s directive to Vasilevskii, Malinovskii (3rd Ukrainian Front) No. 220019 7.2.44, p. 69; Vasilevskii’s operational order to 4th Ukrainian Front 8.2.44, p. 70 (also to 3rd Ukrainian Front), p. 71. Results of the successful Nikopol–Krivoi Rog operation.
(Delo vsei zhizni, op. cit
., pp. 380–96 is essentially a narrative but the detailed operational-documentary material presented here in
VIZ
has been removed.)

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya …
, vol. 2, pp. 202–35. Fighting for the Ukraine, liberation of Kiev, GHQ conference (December 1943), Stalin’s comment on Teheran (p. 211), Stalin’s work pattern and lifestyle, agreement to execute encirclement operations (p. 213), preparation of Zhitomir–Berdichev operation (1st Ukrainian Front) and advance to southern Bug, Koniev and Kirovograd operation, trapping of German Korsun–Shevchenkovskii forces, Zhukov report to Stalin 9 February (pp. 224–5), Stalin’s directive on command of encirclement operation 12 February (p. 229), 1st Ukrainian Front ignored in saluting Korsun success,
Stavka
planning for operations 1st, 2nd, 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, death of Vatutin and Zhukov assumes command 1st Ukrainian Front (p. 233), attempted encirclement of First
Panzer
Army but Soviet forces short of men, guns and ammunition. (See here translation,
Memoirs
, ch. XVI.)

Soviet offensive operations, Leningrad, NW theatre pp.
167
–
176

German materials

OKH/Gen. Std. H.:
Op. Abt./IN., Army Group North: Hitler’s signal (6.2.44), ‘Ich sehe bei der H.Gr. Nord im Augenblick die grösste Gefahr bei Narwa’, Army Group North ‘Beurteilung der Lage’ (Rpt Ia, Nr 38/44, 1.3.44), Dönitz on naval tasks/Baltic. T-78/R337, 6292849–947 (Hitler’s signal, 6292905–910).

FHO
(I/N)
Beurteilung der Feindlage vor den finnischen Fronten
… 15.12.1943 bis 20.3.1944 (Nr 935/44 g. Kdos): 22.3.1944 (Finnish fronts). T-78/R466, 6446414–423.

FHO
. Anlagen to Rpt No. 500/44. Organization, strength Finnish army, air force, navy, also war economy: 12.43–2.44. T-78/R483, 6468104–214.

OKH/Allgemeines Heeresamt: Abwicklungsstab
. Report on destruction of 9
Luftwaffe–Felddivision
, eliminated January–February 1944 in Soviet operations from Oranienburg pocket. T-78/R139, 6068273–282.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 1, pp. 29–53, Soviet offensive operations, Leningrad/Novgorod (January–February 1944).

IVMV
, 8, pp. 112–20, Soviet offensive operations in North-West and West theatres, weakened position of Army Group North but powerful defensive positions, Soviet Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts to attack from north and north-east towards Luga to encircle German 18th Army, Soviet strength 716,000 men, 12,165 guns/mortars, 1,132 tanks and
SP
guns; pp. 121–7, Soviet offensive, 14–15 January 1945, 2nd Shock Army attacking 14 January, 42nd Army (Maslennikov) 15 January, capture of Novgorod 20 January, Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts 30 January closing on German defence line on Luga, 18th Army pulled back west and south-west to avoid encirclement.

Fedyuninskii, I.I.,
Podnyatye po trevoge
(2nd edn), ch. VIII, ‘Snova pod Leningradom’, 2nd Shock Army operations, Leningrad, January 1944, advance to river Luga end January, ordered to close on Narva, pp. 166–184.

Inozemtsev, Lt.-Col. I., ‘Deistviya aviatsii po razgromu gruppy armii “Sever”’,
VIZ
, 1974 (1), pp. 37–43. (Soviet air operations against Army Group North, January–February 1944.)

Kazakov, General M., ‘Velikaya pobeda pod Leningradom’,
VIZ
, 1964 (1), pp. 3–15.

Korovnikov, Col.-Gen. I.T.,
Novgorodsko–Luzhskaya operatsiya. Nastuplenie voisk 59-i armii …
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960). Detailed monograph, operations 59th Army, January–February 1944.

Petrov, Yu.R,
Partizanskoe dvizhenie Leningradskoi oblasti 1941–1944
, pp. 338–432, the partisan offensive in the Leningrad region. (A detailed analysis, utilizing both Soviet and non-Soviet sources.)

Platonov, S.P. (ed.),
Bitva za Leningrad
, pp. 331–80, ending of the blockade, clearing Leningrad
oblast
(January–February 1944): opening of Soviet offensive (14 January), 2nd Shock Army operations, Volkhov Front operations on Novgorod–Luga axis (14–20 January), 8th and 54th Army operations, developments of Soviet offensive end January 1944. (An operational narrative making extensive use of Soviet military records.)

Rakitskii, Colonel A., ‘Udar pod Leningradom’,
VIZ
, 1974 (1), pp. 26–36 (2nd Shock Army operations, January 1944, with critical comments on 2nd Shock performance due to prolonged period in defence).

‘42-ya Armiya v boyakh za Leningrad’,
Istoricheskii Arkiv
, 1959, no. 2, pp. 68–88. (War Diary, 42nd Army: see under offensive operations, January 1944, Maslennikov’s analysis of reasons for heavy losses, lack of success, 109th and 86th RDs.)

The Korsun–Shevchenkovskii salient pp.
176
–
179

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 1, pp. 58–69, Soviet encirclement operation, Korsun–Shevchenkovskii.

Grylev, A.N.,
Za Dneprom
, pp. 53–79, Korsun–Shevchenkovskii encirclement. Also
Dnepr. Karpaty …
, pp. 55–91, Korsun operation (see table of Soviet–German strength, p. 61, also explanatory footnote p. 67, on external encirclement line 1st Ukrainian Front).

Koniev, I.S., ‘Korsun–Shevchenkovskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (2), pp. 49–65. (The Korsun encirclement, promotion of Koniev and Rotmistrov.)

Koniev, I.S.,
Zapiski Komanduyushchevo frontom
, pp. 94–143, Korsun encirclement: essentially as in the
VIZ
article, but much more detail, Stalin’s disquiet at German breakthrough (12 February) and call to Koniev (p. 120), Koniev reassures Stalin that encirclement will hold, rejects idea of taking command of all Soviet forces (including 27th Army) on encirclement fronts, Stalin’s rebuke to Zhukov 12 February that orders disregarded (pp. 121–2), Stalin’s directive (12 February) that Koniev assume overall command (p. 122), repulse of German break-out, discovery of General Stemmerman’s body, Stalin’s order of the day to Koniev (p. 136), Koniev and Rotmistrov appointed Marshals.

Krainyukov, Col.-Gen. K.V.,
Oruzhie osobovo roda
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1977), pt 2, operations in the western Ukraine, see Krainyukov’s account of Vatutin’s death, pp. 156–60. (An earlier version appeared in the magazine
Ogonëk.)

Sukhovershko, G.V. (ed director),
Geroi-osvoboditeli Cherkasshchiny
(Dnepropetrovsk: Promin, 2nd edn 1980). See ‘Podvigi Korsun–Shevchenkovskoi bitvy’, pp. 232–78.

Zavizion, Maj.-Gen. (Tank Troops) G.T. and Kornyushin, Colonel P.A.,
I na Tikhom Okeane …
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1967), pp. 13–29, 6th Tank Army committed/Korsun–Shevchenkovskii encirclement.

From the Dnieper to the Dniester pp.
176
–
182

German materials

KTB/OKW
, IV/1 : 3. Abschnitt. ‘Der Fall “Margarethe”’ (Besetzung Ungarns): I. Teil, A, B, pp. 180–210, also II, implementation of “Margarethe”, pp. 210–37 (and ‘… weitere Behandlung der ungar. Wehrmacht, pp. 240–43). 6 Abschnitt, ‘Der südöstliche Kriegsschauplatz’ II Teil, Anhänge (3) Rumänian, pp. 758–75 “Margarethe—II”, operational plan/occupation of Rumania (also Briefwechsel Hitler–Antonescu, pp. 769–74). Also
KTB/OKW
, IV/2: 9. Abschnitt, ‘Der Finnische Kriegsschauplatz’ (1) and (2) ‘Finnlands Verhandlungen mit der Sowjet-Union …’, pp. 1917–21.