The Road to Berlin (175 page)

Prague operation pp.
622
–
640

Grechko, A.A.,
Cherez Karpaty
, pp. 391–401, successful conclusion of Bratislava–Brno and Ostrava operations laid basis for thrust on Prague, Army Group Centre with three armies (Fourth and First
Panzer
, 17th Army) resisting 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, impact of the Prague rising 5 May,
Stavka
directive to 1st Ukrainian Front, command decisions of 2nd Ukrainian Front (Malinovskii), 4th Ukrainian Front concentrating forces to reduce Olomouc, mobile group set up in 60th Army (4th Ukrainian Front) and supervised by General G.F. Zakharov (deputy Front commander), mobile group also set up by 38th Army, 1st Guards Army established its own small mobile group (
SP
-gun regiment, motor-machine-gun battalion, anti-tank regiment), 4th Ukrainian Front snagged in battle for Olomouc, fall of Olomouc 8 May, Soviet advance 80–120km towards Prague 8 May, Soviet demand for surrender of German forces, 1st Ukrainian Front armour in Prague early hours 9 May, link up of 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts in Prague cut German escape routes to west and south-west, 10–11 May disarming and despatching German forces as prisoners. (Operational narrative, based largely on military archives.)

Koniev, I.S. (ed.),
Za osvobozhdenie Chekhoslovakii
, pp. 209–76, destruction of German forces in Czechoslovakia, liberation of Prague: situation of German forces beginning May 1945, secret German instructions to surrender in the west but to fight on in the east, German plans to hold western Czechoslovakia, Eisenhower’s signal 30 April about demarcation line, Soviet rejection of idea to adjust demarcation, Antonov’s signal 5 May reaffirming Soviet position, urgency of Soviet move into Czechoslovakia and reduction of German forces, preparation of the Prague uprising, first hours of the rising, German response, Czech General Pik at 1500 hrs 6 May requests Soviet help, Soviet operational planning for Prague operation (1st, 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts), this gave a front running from Potsdam to the Danube and involved 18 field armies, 3 tank armies, 3 air armies, 7 mobile/mechanized corps, 3 cavalry corps—153 rifle divisions, 24,500 guns/mortars, 2,100 tanks, 4,000 aircraft—also Czech, Polish and Rumanian units, German strength 62 divisions (16
Panzer
and motorized divisions), greatest strength deployed against 1st Ukrainian Front, in all some 900,000 men, 2,200 tanks, 1,000 aircraft, 28 April Stalin sounded out Koniev about Prague operation,
Stavka
directive 0130 hrs 1 May to 1st Belorussian Front to take up 1st Ukrainian Front positions south of Berlin no later than 4 May, 1940 hrs 2 May
Stavka
directive to 2nd Ukrainian Front (Malinovskii), Koniev’s operational directive issued 0110 hrs 4 May (1st Ukrainian Front) specifying three thrusts, Malinovskii’s orders to open offensive 7 May,
Stavka
dissatisfied with planning in 2nd Ukrainian Front which did not ensure high-speed operations hence transfer of 9th Guards Army to 2nd Ukrainian Front (specified in
Stavka
directive 0200 hrs 5 May), regrouping on 1st Ukrainian Front, news of Prague rising 5 May, opening 1st Ukrainian Front offensive 6 May and Koniev’s decision at 1000 hrs to commit main forces of his right flank, capitulation of German garrison at Breslau, 7 May 2nd Ukrainian Front opened offensive driving on Olomouc, German capitulation at 0241 hrs 7 May, Churchill’s signal to Eisenhower urging move on Prague, fall of Dresden, German surrender but continued resistance by Schörner’s Army Group Centre, 1800 hrs 8 May beginning of German withdrawal from Prague, 10th Guards Tank Corps (4th Guards Tank Army) closing on Prague, 1300 hrs 9 May 62nd Tank Brigade in south-east suburbs, 3rd Guards Tank Army also in Prague early hours 9 May, infantry units from 3rd Guards and 13th Army moving into Prague, link-up 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, 10 May V.N. Gordov (commander 3rd Guards Army) appointed military commandant of Prague, 10 May
Stavka
set new demarcation lines and assignments to take German forces encircled north-east of Prague prisoner and 2nd Ukrainian Front to continue movement to the west, Soviet forces on the demarcation line with British and US forces, Soviet forces took 859,400 prisoners (60 generals) with 41,000 prisoners in Breslau, Soviet losses in the Prague operation amounted to more than 8,000 killed and 28,000 wounded (for 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts). (A detailed and authoritative account, extensive use of Soviet military archives.)

Koniev, I.S.,
Year of Victory
, pp. 193–231, Nazi belief that Schörner could hold out for three weeks, Dönitz wanted withdrawal to south-west to surrender to Americans, idea of moving ‘Dönitz government’ to Prague, Eisenhower intimates that Allies ready to advance into Czechoslovakia (4 May), Koniev–Bradley exchange, Koniev requests that US forces do not ‘muddle things up’, in planning Prague operation need to break through Krusnehory Mountains, assault force—three field armies, two tank armies, two tank corps, five artillery divisions—organized on right flank 1st Ukrainian Front north-west of Dresden, aim to envelop Prague from west and south-west, secondary attack from Görlitz, also reduction of enemy forces at Dresden (assigned to 5th Guards Army), mobile/mechanized units to capture Prague by assault from column of march (ten corps—1,600 tanks committed), one and a half times regular fuel supply distributed, 2nd Air Army committed 1,900 aircraft to main assault and 355 to support secondary assault, 2nd Polish Army also committed to Prague operation,
Stavka
orders to launch operation 6 May (instead of 7 May), Prague rising had broken out 5 May, surrender of Breslau garrison to Gluzdovskii’s 6th Army at 1800 hrs 6 May (40,000 men surrendered), Koniev’s refusal to see General Nickhoff—did not deserve any special treatment—7 May 2nd Ukrainian and 4th Ukrainian Fronts resumed offensive and began their own advance on Prague, Yermakov’s 5th Guards Mech. Corps wiped out the staff of Schörner’s Army Group Centre at Zatec, Koniev’s call for unconditional surrender at 2000 hrs 8 May but operations to continue if no reply by 2300 hrs, capture of Dresden, Soviet breakthrough into Prague at 0300 hrs 9 May, mobile group from 4th Ukrainian Front also in Prague, capture of Vlasov, Vlasov brought to Koniev’s command post in Dresden—Vlasov taken prisoner by Captain M.I. Yakushev, commander of a motor-rifle battalion in 162nd Tank Brigade.

Lelyushenko, D.D.,
Moskva–Stalingrad–Berlin–Praga
. See ch. 9, Prague operation, pp. 344–65: 4th Guards Tank Army, 1st Ukrainian Front operational directive 1 May, instruction to take Prague on sixth day of operations, three attacks planned, 4th Guards Tank to operate with 13th Army (3rd Guards Tank with 3rd Guards Army), 2nd Air Army in support, readiness to launch operation on 6 May, strict instructions to advance with all speed especially during first two days of the operation and especially to 10th Guards Mech. Brigade’s (5th Guards Mech. Corps) attack on the staff of Army Group Centre trying to break out towards Pilsen, Schörner signal recording surprise at Soviet armoured thrust, approach to south-western suburbs of Prague, 0300 hrs 9 May 4th Guards Tank elements in centre of Prague and fighting in area of General Staff building, 0400 hrs main body of 4th Guards Tank in Prague with ten tank corps occupying the centre, 3rd Guards Tank also moving in from the north with infantry following breach enemy defences in mountainous terrain, also to operate at night and to have reserve fuel to hand, 0830 hrs 6 May offensive opened by lead battalions, 1030 hrs Lelyushenko requested permission from Koniev to commit his main force, news of rising in Prague, 4th Ukrainian Front also attacking from the east with 2nd Ukrainian Front moving up from the south-east, lead elements of 4th Guards Tank already in Czechoslovakia, 7 May 150–160km north-west of Prague with 13th Army following Soviet armour—but first unit to enter Prague was a tank from Fomichev’s 63rd Guards Tank Brigade/4th Guards Tank Army.

Lelyushenko, D.D., ‘Tanki speshat na pomoshch Prage’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), pp. 92–8. (4th Guards Tank Army operations, Prague.)

Malinovskii, R.Ya. (ed.),
Budapesht Vena Praga
, ch. 6, Prague operation, pp. 356–68: preparation of the Prague rising, first successes of the insurgents 5 May,
Stavka
directive to 2nd Ukrainian Front 2 May, 2nd Ukrainian Front command decision to drive on Prague from south of Brno with 7th Guards Army to link up with 6th Guards Army, transfer of Glagolev’s 9th Guards Army from 3rd Ukrainian Front to 2nd Ukrainian Front, 1st Ukrainian Front offensive opened 6 May followed by 2nd Ukrainian Front 7 May, 24th Guards Rifle Corps with 6th Guards Tank Army to reach Prague no later than 10 May (24th Corps assigned 1,200 lorries for high-speed movement), 4th Ukrainian Front capture of Olomouc with 60th Army, 8 May operations across 600km front and outflanking Army Group Centre from north-west and south-east, German withdrawal westwards, 1st Ukrainian Front armour in Prague, lead elements from 6th Guards Tank Army driving from Brno, between 1100 and 1800 hrs 9 May lead elements of 4th Ukrainian Front in eastern sector Prague, morning 10 May 38th Army mobile group in the city.

Moskalenko, K.S., ‘Prazhskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1975 (5), pp. 103–10 (operational narrative, Prague operation).

Moskalenko, K.S.,
Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii 1943–1945
, vol. 2. See ch. 18, 38th Army and Prague operation, pp. 591–607: clearing of Ostrava by 1st Guards and 18th Army, 60th and 38th Army moving southwards, threat to encircle First
Panzer
Army, the route to Olomouc and Prague,
Stavka
instruction to provide aid to Prague insurgents, operation to begin 6 May, no parachute troops available on 4th Ukrainian Front but Yeremenko ordered Moskalenko to organize a mobile group from 38th Army to drive on Prague, orders to 101st Rifle Corps, this mobile group detached from operations to capture Olomouc, signal about capitulation document at Reims, text communicated to German forces with instructions on surrender, morning 8 May three Soviet fronts driving on Prague mobile group sent on rapid thrust to Prague, 9 May lead element of 38th Army mobile group closing on Prague, contact with tanks of 4th Guards Tank Army, Army Group Centre encircled.

Nedorezov, A.I.,
Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Chekhoslovakii 1938–1945
(Moscow: Sotsekgiz 1961), ch. 5, pp. 307–65, Czechoslovak resistance movement Spring 1945, creation of National Front government and its programme, the Prague rising.

Ryazanskii, A.P.,
V ogne tankovykh srazhenii
(5th Guards Mech. Corps), ch. 7, Prague operation, pp. 205–16: German forces with strength of 900,000 men, 2,200 tanks, some 1,000 aircraft, three Soviet fronts with 1 million men, 23,000 guns/mortars, 1,800 tanks/
SP
guns, 4,000 aircraft; 4th Guards Tank Army to operate in area of 13th Army and on sixth day of operations to strike on Prague from the west and south-west, 3rd Guards Tank Army to operate with 3rd Guards Army and to strike Prague from north and north-east, news of Prague rising 5 May, 0530 hrs 6 May 4th Guards Tank Army opened offensive with lead battalions of 13th Army, capture of the staff of Army Group Centre, Schörner himself escaped, 0230 hrs 9 May lead elements 10th Guards Tank Corps in Prague, main body of 4th Guards Tank Army in the city at 0400 hrs, 3rd Guards Tank, 3rd Guards and 13th Army also closing on Prague, junction of forces from 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts thus completing encirclement of German forces.

Shtemenko, S.M.,
General’nyi shtab v gody voiny
, vol. 2. See ch. 12, Prague operation, German capitulation, pp. 413–30: Nazi manoeuvres to preserve their forces from total defeat on the Eastern Front, Nazi ‘political nets’ cast even wider in April, Hitler’s suicide 30 April, Stalin’s instruction that now time to strike for Prague, evening 30 April ordered
Stavka
directive to 2nd Ukrainian Front and Marshal Timoshenko
(Stavka
representative), operation to last two weeks in view of strength of Schörner’s Army Group Centre, 1 May orders to 1st Ukrainian Front to regroup, 1310 hrs 4 May
Stavka
directive for Prague operation, meeting between Koniev and Bradley, Prague rising at noon 5 May, broadcast appeals for help, Koniev’s attack advanced to 6 May on Stalin’s specific orders. Negotiations at Reims, pp. 430–34: Jodl only empowered to conclude an armistice, talks to 6 May with Jodl’s refusal to surrender German forces in the east, Eisenhower invitation to General Susloparov (chief of Soviet Military Mission), Eisenhower smilingly reports that Jodl offers to surrender to the Anglo–Americans but to carry on fighting in the east—‘What, General, do you say to that?’—but Eisenhower’s insistence on complete German surrender, text of surrender to be sent to Moscow with cessation of hostilities timed for 0001 hrs (Moscow time) 9 May, Susloparov without instructions and decided to sign instrument of surrender but with amendment that this did not preclude the signing of a further more complete document, document signed 0241 hrs 7 May 1945, Susloparov sent his report to Moscow only to have this cross with his belated instructions from Moscow—‘Do not sign
any
documents’. Stalin’s reaction, pp. 440–44: agreement at Reims not to be abrogated but must not be recognized, Stalin’s requirement that Zhukov find a building in Berlin for signing of unconditional surrender, Reims agreement to be regarded as a ‘preliminary surrender’, Zhukov to sign for USSR with Vyshinskii as his political deputy, Stalin personally telephoned Zhukov to inform him of this arrangement, directive then sent to all Fronts on surrender procedures
(text
, pp. 442–3) and signed 2235 hrs 7 May, preparations for Karlshorst surrender, Zhukov opened proceedings, Vyshinskii informed Susloparov that Stalin bore him no ill-will for his action in signing at Reims.