The Road to Berlin (172 page)

Lelyushenko, D.D., ‘Pered nam Berlin!’,
VIZ
, 1970 (6), pp. 65–71. (A ‘stripped-down’ operational narrative, dates and timings for 4th Tank operations 16–24 April.)

5th Guards Mechanized Corps/4th Guards Tank Army

(1st Ukrainian Front)

Ryazanskii, Maj.-Gen. A.P.,
V ogne tankovykh srazhenii
(Moscow: Nauka 1975), ch. 6, Berlin operation, pp. 162–82: 5th Guards Mech. Corps/4th Guards Tank Army, 1st Ukrainian Front, concentrated at 0600 hours 14 April, reinforcements of 1,000 men, 30 T-34s, 11
SU
-122
SP
guns, 15
SU
-76
SP
guns, bringing 5th Mech. up to 12,135 men, 64 T-34s, 51
APC
s, 35 armoured cars, 22
SU
-122s, 30
SU
-76s, 32 76mm guns, 27 57mm guns, 51 120mm mortars, 43 heavy
MG
s, 126 light
MG
s, 8,765 rifles and machine carbines (p. 165); 5 Mech. Corps in 2nd echelon of 4th Tank Army, use of smokescreens on the Neisse, crossing of Neisse by 5th Mech. at 2000 hours 16 April, both tank armies (3rd and 4th Guards) swinging north-westwards on Stalin’s orders, 5th Mech. to force Spree, covering Lelyushenko’s left flank also holding off German attempts to break through to Berlin. (A highly detailed day-to-day narrative, certainly one of the best histories of Soviet tank/mechanized formations.)

5th Guards Army (1st Ukrainian Front)

Zhadov, Army General A.S.,
Chetyre goda voiny
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1978), pp. 255–80, 5th Guards Army, 1st Ukrainian Front, operating with first echelon on line of main thrust, 2nd Polish Army on left flank to drive on ‘Dresden axis’, short time in which to regroup 5th Guards, characteristics of Neisse defensive line, 5th Guards operating with three corps (32nd, 33rd and 34th Corps, each with three divisions) also one tank corps (4th Guards Tank), tank strength/SP guns amounted to 110, planning to force Neisse, Koniev as commander and front-line leader, praise for Petrov (recently displaced as 4th Ukrainian Front commander) as Chief of Staff—Koniev suggested this appointment—successful assault crossing of Neisse by 5th Guards, 17 April to force Spree with Poluboyarov’s 4th Tank Corps, Stalin 18 April decision to exploit success of 13th Army but this meant neutralizing German forces at Spremberg, Koniev at 5th Guards 19 April orders all-out attack on Spremberg group, 20–22 April 5th Guards assault on ‘Spremberg group’, 22 April orders for 5th Guards to strike for the river Elbe on the Torgau sector, lead elements on the Elbe 23 April but reported no American troops in sight. (Although published in the
Voennye Memuary
series, this is a serious, detailed operational narrative, the only ‘personal touch’ being the pen-portraits of various Soviet commanders.)

28th Army (1st Ukrainian Front)

Luchinskii, A., ‘Na Berlin!’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), pp. 81–91. (28th Army operations, Berlin.)

2nd Belorussian Front (Rokossovskii)

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
A Soldier’s Duty
. See ‘The Oder–Elbe’, pp. 314–31: regrouping completed by 17 April plus mobile formations and Vershinin’s 4th Air Army, enemy defences on the Oder, positions of Third
Panzer
Army, enemy concentrating on very sector where Rokossovskii planned to attack, 19 April report to Stalin that 2nd Belorussian Front ready to attack, April 20 three armies’ assault crossing of West Oder, success on Batov’s sector (65th Army), serious concern over 49th Army operations, problems caused by flooding of river valley, 25 April enemy defences broken and move to envelop main body of Third
Panzer
.

Rokossovskii, K.K., ‘Severnee Berlina’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), pp. 36–41 (2nd Belorussian Front operations).

65th Army (2nd Belorussian Front)

Batov, P.I.,
Operatsiya ‘Oder’
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1965), ch. III, pp. 28–78, preparations for Oder operation, April 1945; ch. IV, pp. 79–104, first stage of operations West Oder, offensive opened 20 April with 4th Air Army in support, bridgehead on West Oder, poor reconnaissance by 70th and 49th Army, premature report of success to
Stavka
(p. 91), 1st Guards (Don) Tank Corps crossed West Oder 23 April at 0430 hours, greater success for 70th Army though 49th Army still stuck, enemy defensive system breached and movement into ‘operational depth’, Rokossovskii’s orders for rapid offensive action with 65th and 70th Army operating with locked flanks on axis of Berlin motor highway, timed for 25 April. (Detailed, day-by-day account, based on Soviet military archives.)

Air operations

Collective authorship,
16-ya vozdushnaya
(16th Air Army), ch. V, Berlin operations, pp. 321–62:
Stavka
reinforcement for 16th Air, strength 28 aviation divisions and 7 independent air regiments, 3,033 aircraft (repaired/renovated), 2,738 crews with operational experience—most powerful air formation ever assembled in Great Patriotic War—Novikov himself co-ordinating operations of 4th Air (2nd Belorussian Front), 2nd Air (1st Ukrainian Front) plus 800 aircraft (Long-Range Aviation/18th Air Army) and 300 Polish aircraft—7,500 combat aircraft in all—planning for air support for ground operations, sortie rates during attack on Seelow Heights, Luftwaffe resistance and sortie rates, 19 April 16th Air flew 4,398 sorties (236 reconnaissance missions), 20 April 4,054 sorties, 16th Air 22 April assigned to support left-flank armies and assist encirclement operation Frankfurt am Oder, ground-attack aviation in small groups supporting fighting inside city. (Detailed narrative, treating each air division of 16th Air Army.)

Rudenko, S.I.,
Kryl’ya pobecty
. See ‘Smerch nad logovom’, pp. 325–51, air operations/Berlin: planning of air support, deployment of air/Küstrin, co-ordination of four air armies, problem of encountering Allied aircraft (long-range radar observation to monitor Allied air), control of radio traffic, organization to control fighter operations, role of Polish air force units, Novikov issues final orders, 0607 hours 16 April 743 Bombers for 42 minutes bombed German positions, 2,192 sorties by 1300 hours, in air combat Soviet losses 87, German losses 165 aircraft, by 2100 hours 16th Air Army 5,424 sorties (8,300 planned), 18th Air 766, 4th Air 440 sorties, 1,500 tons of bombs dropped (p. 342), 18–19 April maximum effort to support ground operations, organization of air support for dose-quarter street fighting in Berlin.

Krzemiński, Czeslaw,
Lotnictwo polskie w operacji Berlińskiej
(Warsaw: MON 1970). Polish air force operations, Berlin.

Logistics/‘rear services’

Antipenko, N.A.,
Na glavnom napravlenii
(2nd edn). See ‘Tyl v Berlinskoi operatsii’, pp. 220–48: 25 road bridges over Oder (1,671,188 lorry movements, 600,000 people on foot—many Russian and Polish repatriates), rail links for 1st Belorussian Front, enormous demand for artillery ammunition—14,000 guns and mortars on 1st Belorussian Front—plan to expend 1,147,659 artillery rounds on first day of operations, 49,490 multiple-rocket rounds all requiring 2,382 wagon-loads, only ‘fills’ for fuel and food actually met but this
not
the case with ammunition, 6,000 waggon-loads of ammunition delivered to 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front after April 16, coping with Soviet losses—300,000 killed and wounded, loss of 21,000 horses, 200,000 tons of ammunition fired off, 150,000 tons of fuel consumed, 300,000 tons of food and fodder,
5th Shock Army and 8th Guards Army lose 25 per cent of their men
, other armies had average of 2–3,000 wounded, quantities of German weapons captured (table, p. 247).

Closing in for the kill pp.
568
–
589

Note:
In addition to official operational narratives and Soviet memoir material, I have drawn extensively for detail from interviews with Marshal Sokolovskii, Marshal Chuikov, Marshal Koniev, Marshal Rokossovskii, General Yushchuk (11th Tank Corps), Colonel K.Ya. Samsonov (in 1945 Senior Lieutenant, commander 1st Battalion, 380th Rifle Regiment/171st Rifle Division,
Reichstag
fighting with battalions under Neustroyev and Davydov from 150th Rifle Division), also numerous eye-witness’ accounts.

‘Hitlers letzte Lagebesprechung’ (Lagebesprechungen am 23., 25., and 27 April 1945),
Der Spiegel
, 10 Jan. 1966, pp. 32–46.

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
. See under ‘Endkampf’, pp. 807–8: for admirable explanation and documentation of Hitler’s plan to lure Soviet armies into a spectacular trap—Lorenz notes on Hitler conference 3 pm 23 April, Hitler’s fury at apparent disappearance of LVI
Panzer
Corps (Weidling), announcement that ‘the Führer is in Berlin …’, plan to use Wenck’s Twelfth Army to link up with Busse’s Ninth Army (taking German forces away from the Elbe and Muhlde fronts facing the Americans), link up south of Berlin followed by attack northwards to Potsdam and Berlin; Wenck to aim for the autobahn at Ferch (near Potsdam), while XLI
Panzer
Corps (under Holste) would be brought back across the Elbe and attack between Spandau and Oranienburg—
SS
General Steiner to hand over two divisions (25th
Panzer–Grenadier
and 7th
Panzer)
to Holste.

Kuby, Erich,
The Russians and Berlin 1945
. See ch. 9, ‘Chronology of the End (20–30 April 1945)’, pp. 92–161.

KTB/GMD

KTB/OKW
, IV/2. See under ‘KTB des Führungsstabs Nord (A) … 1. KTB, geführt von Major I.G. Joachim Schultz (20 April bis 16. Mai)’; esp. entry 29 April, 2300 hrs, Jodl–Hitler, 2330 hrs situation of Twelfth Army, impossibility of attack towards Berlin, threat to flanks and rear from US forces, pp. 1465–6.

FHO
(I). ‘Wesentliche Merkmale des Feinbildes Ostfront 1945’ (for April 1945). T-78/R492, 6479415–552.

FHO
(I).
Lagebericht Ost:
see No. 1414 (29 April 1945) to No. 1408 (23 April)—reverse order. T-78/R473, 6455134–157.

Soviet materials

Official history/Weidling documentation

Vorob’ev, F.D.
et al., Poslednii shturm
(2nd edn). See ch. 5, encirclement of German forces in Berlin, 19–25 April: 1st Ukrainian Front operations to encircle Berlin forces and ‘Frankfurt–Guben group’, pp. 185–220; also operations on ‘Dresden axis’, pp. 221–2; ch. 7, destruction of German ‘Frankfurt–Guben group’ (26 April–1 May), operations on ‘Görlitz axis’, pp. 278–302; also ch. 8, storming of Berlin, operational situation 26 April, fighting in central sectors of the city, preparations for storming of
Reichstag
, pp. 318–45.

General Weidling
. See ‘Agoniya fashistskoi kliki v Berline. (Iz vospominaniya generala Veidlinga)’,
VIZ
, 1960 (10), pp. 88–90, also (11), pp. 83–92. (General Weidling on the final stages of the defence of Berlin; see also ‘Der Endkampf in Berlin’,
Wehrwiss. Rundschau
, 1962, Nos. 1–3,
loc. cit.)

Operational narratives/memoir material

Antonov, V.S.,
Put’ k Berlinu
(301st Rifle Division, 5th Shock Army). See ‘Shturm zdaniya gestapo’, attack on Gestapo
HQ
, pp. 327–31.

Babadzhanyan, A.Kh.
et al., Lyuki otkryli v Berline
(1st Guards Tank Army). See ‘Shturm Berlina’, pp. 317–24, situation 24 April, difficulties of tank army operations in street fighting, ‘assault groups’ (and sub-groups) with rifle and tank companies (4–6 tanks), battery of
SP
guns (2–4 guns), battery of 76mm guns,
MG
, engineer and anti-tank sections, 45-minute artillery bombardment 25 April, forcing of Teltow canal, Soviet aviation now unable to carry out massed attacks as operational area shrank, fighting in city centre 28 April, shortage of infantry to complete elimination of small enemy groups in city buildings and apartments, 29 April 1st Guards Tank ordered to co-operate with 8th Guards Army to clear Tiergarten also to link up with 3rd Shock and 2nd Guards Tank Army operating to the north and north-west.