The Road to Berlin (170 page)

Sandalov, Col.-Gen. L.M., ‘Cherez Karpaty v Pragu’, in Samsonov (ed.), 9
maya 1945 goda
, pp. 704–17. Summoned from 2nd Baltic Front to Moscow, informed by Antonov—Chief of the General Staff—that he was now chief of staff to 4th Ukrainian Front, Yeremenko to be Front commander, Antonov’s comments on failure of 4th Ukrainian Front operations in March, visits to Front armies with Yeremenko, reports to the General Staff, Svoboda with Czechoslovak Corps appointed Defence Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, 60th Army transferred from 1st Ukrainian Front and finally moved into position with 4th Ukrainian Front.

Yeremenko, A.I.,
Gody vozmezdiya
. See pp. 510–36, operations M-Ostrava, failure of March offensive, slow pace of advance, Yeremenko assumes command 4th Ukrainian Front, planning for powerful offensive blow, inspection visit to 38th Army (Moskalenko), 27 March inspection visit to 1st Guards Army, visit to 1st Czechoslovak Corps, Stalin’s insistence that M-Ostrava industrial region must be taken without further delay, Yeremenko’s request to delay offensive due to shortage of ammunition categorically refused.

See also:

Holub, Ota,
Československé tanky a tankisté
(Prague: Naše Vojsko 1980),
passim
. (Czechoslovak tanks and tank troops.)

Tvaružek, Břetislav,
Operační cíl Ostrava
(Ostrava: Profil 1973), 229 pp. (Ostrava operation, narrative and analysis based on Czechoslovak and Soviet materials.)

(iii)
Vienna–Bratislava

Ivanov, Army General S., ‘Na venskom napravlenii’,
VIZ
, 1969 (6), pp. 23–38. Crisp but informative summary of Vienna operation, beginning with general review of situation, Timoshenko
(Stavka
‘co-ordinator’) agreement to mount main attack with 3rd Ukrainian Front as opposed to original intention to use 2nd Ukrainian Front, Stalin’s agreement,
Stavka
directive 9 March, Tolbukhin’s operational planning, breaching of enemy defences and opening of drive on Vienna, request to
Stavka
for transfer of 6th Guards Tank Army to 3rd Ukrainian Front approved by Stalin (6th Guards Tank Army at that time with strength of 286 tanks and
SP
guns)
Stavka
directive 1 April on capture of Vienna and advance line to be reached by 12–15 April, 2nd Ukrainian Front drive to cut German lines of communication to the north-west, to speed final assault on Vienna staff officers assigned to units and sub-units, important roles in Front operational work by Lt.-Gen. A.P. Tarasov and Maj.-Gen. A.S. Rogov, head of Front intelligence.

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
Marshal Tolbukhin
. See ‘Na venskom napravlenii’, the Vienna operation, pp. 235–49: Tolbukhin’s operational plan (using 9th and 4th Guards Army), failure to complete encirclement of Sixth
SS Panzer
cause for concern to
Stavka
, approach to Vienna and flanking movements to cut German escape routes, Tolbukhin’s orders for night and day operations, Vienna cleared April 13, further advance in direction of Graz.

Malakhov, M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie Vengrii i vostochnoi Austrii
, pp. 234–80, Soviet planning for Vienna operation, preparations, drive on Vienna by 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, assault on Vienna, April 5–13. (Very detailed operational narrative.)

Malinovskii, R.Ya. (ed.),
Budapest Vena Praga
, ch. 5, Vienna operation, pp. 229–88: mid-March 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts drive in two directions—Vienna and Bratislava—Vienna operation opened in wake of Balaton defensive fighting, preliminary planning for Vienna attack begun with small group of hand-picked officers in mid-February (three days after fall of Budapest), 46th Army heavily reinforced (12 divisions, 165 tanks and
SP
guns), 7th Guards Army to break defences on the river Hron, followed by thrust on Bratislava with 53rd Army, Tolbukhin’s decision to use 9th and 4th Guards Army, detailed planning for artillery support, first stage of operation 16–25 March, second stage lasted 26 March-4 April, sudden transfer of 6th Guards Tank Army to 3rd Ukrainian Front after discussion with Stalin, breaking of German defences between the Danube and lake Balaton, 46th Army (2nd Ukrainian Front) and right wing 3rd Ukrainian Front in pursuit of German forces, left-flank offensive 3rd Ukrainian Front opened 29 March,
Stavka
plan to complete capture Vienna with right flank 3rd Ukrainian Front with 7th Guards Army striking for Brno, fighting at approaches to Vienna 5 April, assault opened at 0700 hours 6 April, street fighting 8 April, meanwhile 46th Army had crossed Danube in area of Bratislava (April 2), Vienna cleared by noon 13 April, 3rd Ukrainian Front opens drive towards Graz, revised
Stavka
directive 13 April to 3rd Ukrainian Front.

Zavizion, G.T. and Kornyushin, P.A.,
I na Tikhom Okeane
… (6th Guards Tank Army). See ch. 7, Vienna operation, pp. 172–83:
Stavka
instructions, 6th Guards Tank Army regrouped, German resistance with
SS
divisions at approaches to Austria, 5th Guards Tank Corps driving on Wiener Neustadt, 9th Guards Mech. Corps approaching river Leithe, brigade strength in 6th Guards Tank Army dropping to 7–10 tanks, drive on Vienna, heavy fighting at approaches to Austrian capital, Kravchenko’s decision to outflank and attack from west and south-west approved by Timoshenko, low strength in tanks (46th Guards Tank Brigade had only 13 tanks,
SP
regiment only 4–5 guns), German links to the west and north-west cut, street fighting until 13 April, Vienna cleared at 1400 hours 13 April.

Ot volzhskikh stepei
… (4th Guards Army). See under ‘Na Venu!’, the assault on Vienna, pp. 204–22.

Air operations

17-ya vozdushnaya …
(17th Air Army). Ch. 6, 17th Air Army and Vienna operations, pp. 236–41: 24,100 sorties, 148 air combats, 155 enemy aircraft shot down, 5,023 tons of bombs dropped on rail links, 7,276 rockets fired, 2 million rounds of ammunition for aircraft cannon/machine-guns fired off.

Breaking into Berlin, 16–23 April pp.
552
–
568

Churchill, Winston S.,
The Second World War
, vol. 6:
Triumph and Tragedy
, bk II, ch. XXX, ‘The Final Advance’ (especially Churchill–Eden, 19 April, Anglo–American forces ‘not immediately in a position’ to fight their way into Berlin),
passim
.

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
. See under ‘Endkampf. Hitler Goes to Ground’, pp. 786–7: Mr Irving emphasizes Hitler’s Order of 30 March 1945, on the occasion of his demand for fanatical resistance from Army Group Vistula (and Heinrici himself), ordering also the construction of a main battleline
(Hauptkampflinie: HKL)
2–4 miles behind the existing front line, with Heinrici falling back on this second line once the Soviet assault opened. See also the important footnote to p. 794, intimating that for all the second
HKL
, Heinrici had decided that in the event of the collapse of the Oder Front, he would abandon Berlin without a fight (having already tried at this juncture to move his
HQ
behind Berlin, a move frustrated by Hitler himself).

In
Inside the Third Reich
, Speer himself records a conference on 15 April with Reymann and Heinrici; Heinrici did much to countermand orders for the mass demolition of bridges in the city, asserting privately to Speer that ‘there will not be any battle for Berlin’, Berlin would be taken ‘at least without much resistance’ (see pt 3, ch. 31, ‘The Thirteenth Hour’).

Kuby, Erich,
The Russians and Berlin, 1945, passim
.

Ryan, Cornelius,
The Last Battle
, ch. 6, ‘The Decision’, see p. 261 (‘We’re not going to Berlin, Sid …’, General Simpson to Brigadier-General Hinds).

Seaton, Albert,
Stalin as Warlord
(London: Batsford 1976). See ch. 11 on 1945, especially pp. 245–55 on Stalin’s handling of the final phase of the war in Europe.

Smith, Jean Edward,
The Defense of Berlin, op. cit
. See ch. 3, ‘The Military Decision to Halt at the Elbe’, pp. 34–53 (A detailed analysis with detailed supporting evidence).

Trevor-Roper, H.R. (ed.),
Hitler’s War Directives 1939–1945
, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1964). (Orig.
Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung …
, ed. W. Hubatsch): under
1945
, Hitler’s Order of the Day to Soldiers of the Eastern Front (dated 15 April).

Diplomatic correspondence/diplomatic history

Perepiska
… , vol. 2. No. 291, Stalin–Truman, 13 April, sympathy on death of President Roosevelt, p. 229; No. 293, Truman (and Churchill)–Stalin, 18 April, on the Polish question and the Warsaw government, pp. 230–32; No. 295, Truman–Stalin, on Allied–Soviet link-up, 21 April, pp. 232–3.

Perepiska …
, vol. 1. No. 436, Churchill–Stalin, 22 April, on Mikolajczyk statement and acceptance of Curzon line, p. 380; No. 439, Stalin–Churchill, 24 April, Soviet response on Poland to joint Anglo–American message 18 April, pp. 390–92.

Harriman, W. Averell and Abel, Elie,
Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–46
(London: Hutchinson 1976), pp. 445–6, April 15 meeting—Stalin, Molotov, Harriman, Hurley—Stalin’s accusations of conspiracy with anti-Communist Polish underground, rebuttal of these charges, Stalin’s agreement to send Molotov to United States.

Hurley–Stalin talk, 15 April 1945:
Yalta agreement and Nationalist China. General Hurley first visited Moscow in November 1942, when he found Stalin both direct in statement and accommodating about information. In August 1944 Hurley was again in Moscow, seeking clarification of the Soviet attitude to China, whereupon Molotov disclaimed any ulterior Soviet interest in the Chinese Communists. On the night of 15 April, in the company of Averell Harriman and Molotov, Hurley talked with Stalin, when Stalin broached the matter of disclosing details of the Yalta agreement to Chiang Kai-shek; Stalin argued that he needed 2–3 months to build up Soviet forces in the Far East, though he would leave the timing of the disclosure in Chungking to Hurley. However, it was agreed that Hurley would wait on Stalin’s signal. (Yet with the Soviet termination of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, a plain signal had already been sent from Moscow.)

No small amount of controversy has centred on Hurley’s interpretation of Stalin’s attitude to American policy in China. Hurley himself evidently took Stalin’s statements at their face value, emphasizing Stalin’s support for the unification of military forces in China and Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership of the National Government—precisely the outline of American policy. Others were not so persuaded, including Ambassador Harriman himself.

See Herbert Feis,
The China Tangle
(Princeton UP/New York: Atheneum 1965), ch. 26, ‘The Soviet Side’, pp. 284–6; Tang Tsou,
America’s Failure in China 1941–50
, ch. VII(D), pp. 251–5, the Yalta agreement, Soviet intentions, Hurley’s report to the effect that Stalin would co-operate with the United States to obtain military unification in China, ‘unqualified’ agreement on the part of Stalin with American policy in China, correctness of Hurley’s view that Stalin did indeed pursue the military and political unification of China—but failure to realize that Stalin’s policy of co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek a tactical device.

For disclaimers of Hurley’s views on Soviet policy see George F. Kennan,
Memoirs 1925–1950
(Boston: Little, Brown 1967), pp. 236–9, repercussions of Yalta, Hurley’s summary of Molotov’s views on China (‘the so-called Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists …’), Hurley’s talk with Stalin, Hurley report could convey ‘serious misimpression’ about Soviet policy, Kennan–Harriman message on Soviet policy in China (as corrective to Hurley’s views, text p. 238).

Soviet materials

Official histories, general compilation, collected memoir material

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, pp. 255–80, preparation of the Soviet attack on Berlin, breakthrough on the Oder and the Neisse, encirclement of Berlin.