The Road to Berlin (171 page)

IVMV
, 10, pt 1, pp. 314–25, preparations for the Soviet assault on Berlin.

Vorob’ev, F.D.
et al., Poslednii shturm (Berlinskaya operatsiya 1945 g.)
(2nd edn). (This must be accounted the Soviet ‘standard work’ on the Berlin operation and is extremely detailed.) See ch. 3, the preparation of the operation—artillery, air defence, air, combat engineers, Dnieper flotilla preparations, command/control, logistics/supply, ‘political preparation’, pp. 67–110; ch. 4, breaking the German defences, 1st Belorussian Front 16–21 April, 1st Ukrainian Front 16–18 April, pp. 127–84; ch. 5, encirclement and splitting of German forces in Berlin, 1st Ukrainian Front operations 19–25 April, the Dresden axis 19–25 April, 1st Belorussian Front operations to encircle the Berlin and Frankfurt–Guben groups 22–25 April, pp. 185–246; ch. 7, destruction of the Frankfurt–Guben group, pp. 271–303; ch. 8, the storming of Berlin, characteristics of the defensive system in Berlin, situation on 26 April, storming the
Reichstag
, fall of Berlin, the destruction of Third
Panzer
Army, pp. 304–89.

Samsonov, A.M. (ed.), 9
maya 1945 goda
. In this major collection of memoir material, see especially G.K. Zhukov (the Berlin operation), pp. 66–121; K.K. Rokossovskii (2nd Belorussian Front operations), pp. 161–82; A.A. Novikov (Soviet aviation in the Königsberg and Berlin operations), pp. 273–325; A.A. Radzievskii (2nd Guards Tank Army operations), pp. 685–702; N.A. Antipenko (Logistics/‘Rear Services’, Berlin operation), pp. 722–50.

1st Belorussian Front (Zhukov)

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya …
, vol. 2, ch. 21, the Berlin operation, pp. 338–47: Zhukov at Chuikov’s
HQ
(8th Guards), artillery preparation at 0500 hours, 140 searchlights switched on, stiff German resistance Seelow Heights, German defences ‘basically intact’, 1500 hours call to Stalin who reported Koniev making good progress, further call to Stalin in evening, Stalin’s rebuke about Zhukov’s commitment of 1st Guards Tank Army on 8th Guards sector, Zhukov promises breaching of Seelow defences by 17 April, Stalin proposes to use Koniev’s tank armies to drive on Berlin from the south,
Stavka
directive 18 April to Koniev and Rokossovskii, Zhukov accepts blame for initial failure but also implicates army commanders and their artillery preparation, Zhukov’s retrospective views on how the Berlin operation might have been carried through differently (pp. 344–5) but Stalin required attack across a broad front, Koniev encounters heavier resistance at Zossen signals Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank Army) to speed up (text, pp. 345–6), April 21 breakthrough to suburbs of Berlin, 61st Army and 1st Polish Army pushing on to the Elbe, April 23–24 1st Belorussian Front armies pushing into centre of Berlin while 3rd Guards Tank Army (1st Ukrainian Front) fighting in southern suburbs of Berlin.

Note on Zhukov’s use of massed searchlights: in 1916 General Kuropatkin, who had scarcely distinguished himself in the Russo–Japanese war, was given command of a Grenadier corps and proposed using searchlights to mount a night attack. The calamitous result was merely to silhouette Russian troops in their own beams, the corps losing 8,000 men in one night.

Note also criticism of Zhukov’s decision on employment
of
1st Guards Tank Army (a criticism voiced at the time by Stalin): in
IVOVSS
, 5, p. 258, it was argued that Zhukov’s decision weakened the northerly attack by 1st Belorussian Front: with reinforcement to the left flank, 1st Belorussian Front might well have taken Berlin singlehanded, but Zhukov counters this by referring to Stalin’s decision for ‘a blow on a broad front’. Arguably Zhukov had no intention of leaving the ‘southern route’ open to Koniev, but the gamble did not quite come off. The late Marshal Babadzhanyan in
Dorogi pobedy
(p. 270) indirectly criticizes Zhukov’s use of 1st Guards Tank Army, but Katukov in
Na ostrie glavnovo udara
in spite of mild criticism concludes that in the event Zhukov’s decision was justified.

1st Guards Tank Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Babadzhanyan, A.Kh.
et al., Lyuki otkryli v Berline
(1st Guards Tank Army). See ‘Poslednie srazheniya’, pp. 301–17: Berlin operation, 1st Guards Tank with strength of 45,000 men, 709 tanks/
SP
guns, 700 guns, 44 MRLs, 0300 hours 16 April lead brigades at the Oder, rifle armies on the Seelow Heights unable to develop situation for favourable use of armour, success of Yushchuk’s 11th Tank Corps 17 April, capture of Seelow Heights—only 50 km to Berlin—renewed offensive with 8th Guards Army 18 April, revised operational orders for 1st Guards Tank, outflanking of Müncheberg, signal to 1st Guards Tank 2150 hours 20 April (complete
text
, p. 312) about breaking into Berlin in order to announce this to Stalin and the press, orders to force the Spree, Katukov’s orders 24 April, German resistance on the Spree. (Terse operational narrative in war-diary style, using mainly Soviet military archives.)

Katukov, M.E.,
Na ostrie glavnovo udara
(2nd edn), ch. 18, Berlin operation, pp. 393–409: 1st Guards Tank with 854 tanks and
SP
guns (with addition of 11th Tank Corps), operational orders received 12 April, to operate in 8th Guards Army sector, terrain inhibited deployment of main body of armour, 17 April breach of second defensive line, 17–18 April progress not more than
4 kilometres
, armour acting as infantry support, 20 April Zhukov’s signal (text, p. 401) 1st Guards Tank to break into Berlin not later than 0400 hours 21 April ‘at any price’, two brigades (1st and 44th) selected, 24 April 1st Guards Tank and 8th Guards cross the Spree, beginning of street fighting.

11th Guards Tank Corps / 1st Guards Tank Army

(1st Belorussian Front)

Babadzhanyan, A.Kh.,
Dorogoi pobedy
(2nd edn), ch. VIII, Berlin operation, pp. 268–73: 1st Guards Tank Corps/1st Guards Tank Army in Berlin assault, suspicious about existence of second German
HKL
(ignored by Front command), confusion on Seelow Heights, blame laid on tank troops at emergency conference with Telegin (political member, Front command), Gusakovskii’s 44th Tank Brigade and Fedorovich’s 27th Motor-Rifle Brigade reach the Berlin ringroad, 20 April Front signal to 1st Guards Tank Army to break into Berlin by 21 April—note that this text (p. 271) differs from that cited by Katukov in that
it adds
the phrase about the report to Stalin and the press announcement.

Getman, A.L.,
Tanki idut na Berlin
(11th Guards Tank Corps/1st Guards Tank Army), ch. 12, Berlin operation, pp. 327–42: corps with strength of 148 tanks and 58
SP
guns beginning Berlin operation, fighting on Seelow Heights, morning of 21 April fresh orders from Zhukov—1st Guards Tank Army to be the first to break into Berlin—brigades to be detached from corps to strike into Berlin, 44th Brigade pushed forward, first tanks in Berlin, Red banner hoisted 0800 hours 22 April, main body of 11th Guards Tank Corps by this time in eastern suburbs of Berlin.

11th Tank Corps/1st Guards Tank Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Yushchuk, I.I.,
Odinnadtsatyi tankovyi korpus …
, pt VI, Berlin operation, pp. 147–62: 11th Tank Corps to have support of 3rd Guards Ground-Attack Air Division, operational orders issued 14 April, lack of success in initial attack by 8th Guards Army and 11th Tank Corps, revised orders 17 April, operations with 35th Guards Rifle Corps, difficulties in attaining freedom of manoeuvre, 21 April two bodies of 11th Tank Corps linked up at Egersdorf and joint drive on Berlin, 22 April on eastern outskirts of Berlin, same day 11th Tank Corps subordinated to Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army on Zhukov’s orders, heavy street fighting.

2nd Guards Tank Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Vysotskii, F.I.
et al., Gvardeitskaya tankovaya
(2nd Guards Tank Army), ch. 7, Berlin operation, pp. 187–97: opening of Soviet attack, first echelon tank corps (2nd Guards Tank) committed in direction of Bernau, operating with 47th Army and 3rd Shock, assault on second line of defences, Krivoshein’s 1st Mech. Corps to force the Alte–Oder 17 April, fighting in third defensive zone, at 2000 hours 21 April 12th Guards Tank Corps fighting in Berlin suburb of Falkenberg, move to outflank left wing of the Berlin garrison.

3rd Shock Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Pyatkov, V.K.
et al., Tret’ya udarnaya
(3rd Shock Army), ch. 5, Berlin operation, pp. 185–205: night 16 April attack with 20 searchlights to blind enemy, 9th Tank Corps committed to exploit success of Perevertkin’s 79th Rifle Corps, neighbouring 47th Army also enjoying success, attack renewed 18 April with 9th Tank Corps and elements 1st Mech. Corps (from 2nd Guards Tank Army), storming of Kunersdorf, possibility of break-out and manoeuvre to outflank enemy east of Pretzel, fresh orders from Zhukov evening 18 April, by evening 21 April 3rd Shock fighting in north-east suburbs of Berlin, Zhukov at this point ordered 3rd Shock to change direction of advance and thrust directly to the centre of the city (rather than outflanking to the north), Army commander V.I. Kuznetsov order to set up assault squads for street-fighting, 22–23 April 3rd Shock breached inner defence line of Berlin. (Much detail on performance of units and sub-units, also reference to Soviet military archives.)

8th Guards Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Chuikov, V.I.,
Ot Stalingrada do Berlina
, pt 4, storming of Berlin, pp. 576–98: 8th Guards Army and fighting for Seelow Heights, situation more favourable 20 April, 21 April 8th Guards breakthrough to Berlin ring-road, push through eastern suburbs, 1st Guards Tank embroiled in street fighting, forcing the Spree, 24 April 8th Guards linked up in Berlin with 1st Ukrainian Front.

1st Polish Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Sta̧por, Z.,
Bitwa o Berlin. Dzialania 1 Armii WP kwiecien-maj 1945
(Warsaw: MON 1973). (Detailed operational study, 1st Polish Army, Berlin operation.)

301st Rifle Division/5th Shock Army (1st Belorussian Front)

Antonov, Maj.-Gen. V.S.,
Put’ k Berlinu
(Moscow: Nauka 1975) (301st Rifle Division/5th Shock Army), ch. 5, battle for Berlin, pp. 272–307: assault on the Seelow Heights, heavy fighting 16 April, destruction of 18th
SS
Division, rifle divisions of 5th Shock with 2nd Guards Tank in support breaching third defensive zone, heavy German resistance 20 April, Zhukov changes axis of advance for 5th Shock with 3rd Shock beginning assault on northern suburbs, 8th Guards Army to assault southern reaches of city, 301st Division in Berlin fighting in Karlshorst, preparations for full assault.

1st Ukrainian Front (Koniev)

Koniev, I.S.,
Year of Victory
. See ‘The Berlin operation’, pp. 79–132: meeting with Stalin (‘Who is going to take Berlin … ?’), problem of boundary line between Fronts, Koniev with Pukhov’s 13th Army, German defences on the Neisse, tank armies (3rd and 4th Guards) cross the Neisse, Fourth
Panzer
split and isolated, full depth of German defences penetrated, reaching the river Spree, Rybalko’s tanks beyond the Spree, conversation with Stalin (p. 105) when Koniev resists idea of sending Zhukov’s troops through gap torn by 1st Ukrainian Front, Koniev’s Front directive 17 April (pp. 107–8), operations 18–20 April, dealing with ‘Cottbus group’, fresh orders to Zhadov’s 5th Army, Luchinskii’s 28th Army committed 20 April, clearing of the ‘Spremberg group’ by 5th Guards Army, break into Zossen, importance of operations 22 April, 0600 hours 23 April
Stavka
delineation of fresh demarcation between 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front.

4th Guards Tank Army (1st Ukrainian Front)

Lelyushenko, D.D.,
Moskva–Stalingrad–Berlin–Praga
(4th Guards Tank Army), ch. 8, Berlin operation/1st Ukrainian Front, pp. 311–30: replacements for losses among commanders before April offensive, Koniev’s very close attention to operational decisions, close co-operation and long-time friendship with Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank Army), no delay in committing armour into breaches in enemy defences— ‘the cardinal point’—problem of lack of infantry-support tanks in 5th Guards Army, solution to push forward reinforced lead elements of 4th Tank once 60-ton bridges laid over Neisse, Petrov alarmed at this solution which went ‘against the book’ and proposed holding armour back until both Neisse and Spree forced by 5th Guards infantry, 16 April 1300 hours 60-ton bridges laid over Neisse and two lead brigades (62nd Tank and 29th Motor-Rifle/10th Mech. Corps) across, 18 April forcing of the Spree and break-out, 20 April Koniev’s order to 4th and 3rd Tank armies—‘to break into Berlin during the night’—Zhukov on 21 April in eastern suburbs of Berlin, 4th Tank in south-western suburbs, morning of 23 April assault crossing of Teltow Canal, on the right 3rd Guards Tank Army fighting in southern suburbs of Berlin.