The Road to Berlin (173 page)

Bokov, Lt.-Gen. F., ‘Pyataya udarnaya armiya v boyakh za Berlin’,
VIZ
, 1970 (6), pp. 54–64. (Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army, Berlin operations).

Bondar, Colonel M., ‘K reikhstagu!’,
VIZ
, 1966 (1), pp. 57–61. (Bondar adjutant to commander 79th Rifle Corps; preparations to storm the
Reichstag.)

Koniev, I.S.,
Year of Victory
, pp. 132–90, assault crossing of Teltow Canal, Lelyushenko’s 4th Guards Tank Army advance on Potsdam outflanking Berlin from south-west, Luchinskii with 28th Army driving on Berlin, need to speed advance on Barut, arrival of three corps on the Elbe, German counter-attack with ‘Görlitz group’, unfavourable situation on the ‘Dresden axis’, here heavy pressure on 48th Corps/ 52nd Army and 2nd Polish Army, German thrust on Spremberg checked, role of V.I. Kostylëv (Chief of Operations Administration, 1st Ukrainian Front), German preparations to attack
from the west
(Wenck’s Twelfth Army), need to work out details of link-up on the Elbe with US troops, rather unenthusiastic pen-portrait of Petrov, forcing of Teltow Canal, German counter-attacks on Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank), Wenck’s first panzer attacks 24 April, refusal to allow Gluzdovskii active operations against Breslau, Koniev’s decision not to storm Breslau, operations in southern sector of Berlin, 25 April ‘psychological turning point’ for Wenck due to massed Soviet air attacks
(note:
in the Russian edition Koniev described Wenck’s attacks with the phrase
‘nastupali prosto dlya otvoda glaz’
, literally ‘making the whole thing a blind’ or pulling the wool over someone’s eyes), failure of German attempts to cut 1st Ukrainian Front in half, new demarcation line with 1st Belorussian Front and redeployment of Rybalko’s corps, 1330 hrs 25 April at Strela on the Elbe contact with 69th US Infantry Division, also contact at Torgau, difficulties of dealing with fortified bunkers in Berlin, 800 Soviet tanks and
SP
guns lost fighting in city limits (p. 177), Wenck fighting only ‘according to protocol’ while Busse’s Ninth Army ‘fought bravely, to the death’, telephone call from Stalin/
Stavka
—
‘Who, do you think, will be taking Prague
’ (p. 187)—Koniev’s reply that it would evidently have to be taken by 1st Ukrainian Front, meanwhile new demarcation line between 1st Ukrainian Front and 1st Belorussian Front effective 2400 hrs 28 April (this necessitated further withdrawal by 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Army units), fighting for Wannsee island, 30 April position of German forces in Berlin ‘hopeless’.

Lelyushenko, D., ‘Pered nam Berlin!’,
VIZ
, 1970 (6), pp. 68–72 (4th Guards Tank Army operations). See also
Moskva–Stalingrad–Berlin–Praga
, ch. 8).

Luchinskii, General A., ‘Na Berlin!,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), pp. 81–91 (28th Army operations, Luchinskii army commander).

Neustroyev, S.A., ‘Shturm Reikhstaga’,
VIZ
, 1960 (5), pp. 42–51. (Preparations for storming
Reichstag
, 150th and 171st Rifle Divisions’ operations.)

Neustroyev, Lt.-Col. S.A.,
Put’ k Reikhstagu
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1961). See under ‘Boevoe sorevnovanie’, fresh operational orders to 150th Rifle Division, 26 April—to force Verbindungskanal, presentation of Red Banner No. 5 for planting on
Reichstag
, Colonel Zinchenko’s decisions, Neustroyev’s battalion driving to Moabit prison, orders to advance along line of the Spree, pp. 52–6; see also ‘Forsirovanie Shpree’, reinforcement by corps commander, 500 men left in Neustroyev’s battalion, Neustroyev ordered to force Spree, fighting to enlarge bridgehead, elimination of German resistance in ‘Himmler’s house’, pp. 57–63.

Pyatkov, V.K.
et al., Tret’ya udarnaya
(3rd Shock), ch. 5, under ‘Reshayushchii shturm’, pp. 212–21, opening of third stage of Berlin operations 26 April, plan to split up Berlin garrison, Soviet offensive renewed with heavy air support, 3rd Shock to drive south-eastwards on to Tiergarten and effect junction with 8th Guards Army, 79th Rifle Corps clearing of Moabit and drive to the Spree, 29 April opening action in battle for the
Reichstag
, capture assigned to 79th Rifle Corps, Samsonov (380th Rifle Regiment/171st Rifle Division) and Neustroyev (1st Battalion/756th Rifle Regiment with 150th Rifle Division) closing on
Reichstag
.

Rokossovskii, K.K., ‘Severnee Berlina’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), pp. 36–41. (2nd Belorussian Front operations: successful conclusion to task of isolating Third
Panzer
Army from main body of German forces in Berlin.)

Ryazanskii, A.P.,
V ogne tankovykh srazhenii
(5th Guards Mech. Corps), pp. 182–93, estimate of threat from Wenck, German plan to link up with Ninth Army encircled north-east of Barut, Soviet defensive measures, fighting for Treuenbrietzen, three divisions from Wenck’s Twelfth Army attack 25 April, fresh German attacks in direction of Beelitz, Lelyushenko’s orders to prevent break-out of German Ninth Army to the west.

Shatilov, Col.-Gen. V.M.,
Znamya nad Reikhstagom
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM), 2nd edn 1970). See under ‘Shturm reikhstaga’, pp. 291–304: Shatilov, commander 150th Rifle Division, capture of ‘Himmler’s house’, crossing of the Spree, Zinchenko’s report on Neustroyev’s deployment, last reserves committed in fighting for ‘Himmler’s house’, company strength down to 30–40 men, final preparations for storming of
Reichstag
.

Surchenko, Maj.-Gen. A., ‘Na poslednem NP marshala K.K. Rokossovskovo’,
VIZ
, 1972 (5), pp. 61–5 (2nd Belorussian Front operations—Surchenko deputy chief/ operations, 2nd Belorussian Front).

Zhadov, A.S.,
Chetyre goda voiny
(5th Guards Army), pp. 279–93, lead elements on the Elbe, 23 April, contact with Americans 25 April at Strela (north-west of Riesa) 1330 hrs—173rd Guards Rifle Regiment/58th Guards Rifle Division link with recon. group US 69th Infantry Division, one hour later Soviet–American contact at Torgau, formal linking up at 1100 hrs 26 April, this recognized in Stalin’s Order of the Day No. 346, Zhadov’s exchanges with General Hodges and thanks for US Dodge and Studebaker trucks and US jeeps, Soviet decorations for US officers including Jnr Lt. William Robertson (awarded Order of Alexander Nevskii), pp. 279–93.

Zinchenko, Colonel F., ‘Znamya Pobedy nad Reikhstagom’,
VIZ
, 1980 (4), pp. 53–9, and (5), pp. 58–64. (Storming of
Reichstag:
756th Rifle Regiment/150th Rifle Division.)

In at the death: the Berlin capitulation pp.
589
–
604

The bulk of this section is based on extensive exchanges with Marshal V.I. Chuikov (commander 8th Guards Army in 1945) and Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii (deputy commander, 1st Belorussian Front). Marshal Sokolovskii, in particular, filled in a number of details pertaining to the talks at 8th Guards Army
HQ
, not least his impressions of Krebs and Weidling. Krebs had been formerly German military attaché in Moscow before the war and had a good command of Russian; according to Marshal Sokolovskii Krebs had begun to drink heavily in 1944 but he was completely sober throughout the talks. Weidling struck Sokolovskii as a reasonable person, convinced that further resistance was senseless but carrying out his orders to fight on.

I have taken the text of the Chuikov–Sokolovskii–Krebs talks from the stenographic record (notebook) made available to me in Moscow; other versions (e.g. Vsevolod Vishnevskii,
Sobranie sochinenii. Dnevniki voennykh let 1943–1945
, Tom 4. Moscow: Khudozh. Lit. 1958, pp. 869–905) are perhaps more elaborate, but using ‘raw text’ perforce introduces some ungainliness. Finally, I had the benefit of Marshal Chuikov’s own comments and commentary on these exchanges, not least his personal impressions and reactions.

Official histories

IVOVSS
, 5. See pt 1, ch. 7 (3–4): encirclement and capture of Berlin, pp. 263–90. See also ch. 9 (1) on frustration of German moves for a separate peace, pp. 332ff.

IVMV
, 10. See pt 1, ch. 11 (2–3): destruction of the German ‘Berlin group’, capture of Berlin, pp. 314–47. See also ch. 12 (1), on the frustration of (German) plans for a separate peace, pp. 356–64. In this latter connection see a recent publication by G.L. Rozanov,
Uzhe ne sekretno
(Moscow: Politizdat 1981), 224 pp., which outlines the manoeuvres by the Nazi government in the final stage of the war to split the Allied coalition and the response which these intrigues evoked in ‘anti-Soviet, anti-Communist circles’ in the West.

Vorob’ev, F.D.
et al., Poslednii shturm
(2nd edn), ch. 8, ‘Shturm reikhstaga’ (assault on the
Reichstag)
, pp. 340–51. See also:

(i)
Fall of Berlin
, pp. 351–71, operations to eliminate German forces, 47th Army operations south-west of Potsdam, 5th Shock Army 29 April pushing to the west, 8th Guards Army across Landwehr canal to south of Tiergarten, German plans for limited break-out, 2nd Guards Tank Army in heavy fighting in western part of Tiergarten, 30 April German forces holding north-eastern sectors of Berlin cut off from units holding Tiergarten, 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Army continued move to the north-west, 10th Guards Tank Corps fighting for Wannsee, 30 April German forces split into four isolated groups, 2330 hrs 30 April von Seifert approach to Soviet lines, Krebs to Chuikov 0330 hrs 1 May, Soviet conditions for capitulation, 0040 hrs 2 May radio signal to 79th Guards Rifle Division from LVI
Panzer
Corps requesting ceasefire and proposing meeting of emissaries 1250 hrs (night) on Potsdam bridge, 1st Belorussian Front command instruction to Weidling to lay down arms from 0700 hrs 2 May, Weidling surrendered personally 0600 hrs 2 May, mass German surrenders (1st Belorussian Front took 100,700 prisoners, 1st Ukrainian Front 34,000), further German attempts to break out of encirclement, checking break-out across Havel lasted until 5 May, column of 30,000 attempted break-out from Spandau.

(ii)
Destruction of 3rd Panzer Army (2nd Belorussian Front operations)
, pp. 379–88, 2nd Shock Army operations aimed at Anklam–Stralsund, 65th Army directed to Pasewalk/Demmin, 70th and 49th Army operating on north-west and westerly axes to reach Wismar, Schwerin—to link up with British Second Army—Third
Panzer
plans to hold Soviet forces as far east as possible, 27 April German defences on western bank of Oder pierced, Soviet breakthrough at Prentzlau threatened rear of Third
Panzer
, Soviet forces engaged in general pursuit after 27 April, 3 May lead elements 70th Army in contact east of Wismar with forward units British Second Army, 4 May main force 70th Army on demarcation line, final operation to take Rugen (108th Rifle Corps).

Documentary publication

‘Iz istorii kapitulyatsii vooruzhennykh sil fashistskoi Germanii’,
VIZ
, 1959 (5), pp. 78–95 (documents). (i) Record of conversations between General Krebs and General Weidling on capitulation of German troops in Berlin (signed Lt.-Col. Gladkii, Chief of Intelligence/Staff, 8th Guards Army), pp. 81–9. (ii) Interrogation of General Weidling by Maj.-Gen. Trusov, pp. 89–95.

Note:
Though the record of the Krebs–Weidling talks mentions (p. 85) a telephone link with the German lines, Marshal Sokolovskii insisted categorically that
no line
was laid and that here the
VIZ
version is incorrect—‘pure invention’, to quote the Marshal directly.

Protocol: Interrogation of Reichsmarshal H. Göring, 17 June 1945
. (‘Question: Is it true that Hitler had doubles
(dvoiniki)?
Answer: ‘Well, that’s what all the rumours are about. If you want my opinion, I would not be at all surprised if Hitler had a double. It would not be difficult to find a man like him. But if
I
had wanted a double, that would have been much more difficult.’)

‘Pomoshch Sovetskovo pravitel’stva i komandovaniya sovetskikh voisk nasileniyu Berlina v 1945’,
VIZ
, 1959 (8), pp. 76–99 (documents). (Establishment of military administration, Col.-Gen. Berzarin, 5th Shock Army commander, appointed city commandant; Berzarin died shortly after from injuries in a road accident, though rumour had it that he was ambushed by Germans.)