Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (157 page)

95.
Li Hou,
Bainian quru shide zhongjie
, p. 198.

96.
Roberti,
The Fall of Hong Kong
, pp. 280–291; ibid., pp. 166–207.

97.
Qichen Qian,
Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy
, foreword by Ezra Vogel (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 254–255.

98.
Xu, “Selections from Serialized Memoirs,”
Lianhebao
, September 3, 1993, translated in JPRS-CAR, 94-015, March 8, 1994.

99.
DXPNP-2
, January 18, 1990.

100.
Qian,
Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy
, pp. 257–260; Li Hou,
Bainian quru shide zhongjie
, pp. 205–207.

101.
For Patten's account, see Chris Patten,
East and West: China, Power, and the Future of Asia
(New York: Times Books, 1998).

102.
Qian,
Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy
, p. 279.

103.
DXPNP-2
, November 28, 1978. For works on Tibet during this period, I have found to be most useful the following books: Melvyn C. Goldstein,
The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho,
Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects
(Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004); Dan Zeng, ed.,
Dangdai Xizang jianshi
(A Simple History of Contemporary Tibet) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1996); and Tsering Shakya,
The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). I am indebted to Melvyn Goldstein for many discussions in which he selflessly tried to educate a China specialist about matters on Tibet. See also Chen Weiren, “Hu Yaobang yu Xizang” (Hu Yaobang and Tibet), in Su Shaozhi, Chen Yizi, and Gao Wenqian, eds.,
Renmin zhong de Hu Yaobang
(Hu Yaobang in the Hearts of the People) (Carle Place, N.Y.: Mingjing chubanshe, 2006), pp. 166–185; Wang Lixiong,
Tianzang: Xizang de mingyun
(Sky Burial: The Fate of Tibet) (Mississauga, Ont.: Mingjing chubanshe, 2006); Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer, eds.,
Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and a Disputed Region
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2006); and Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner, eds.,
Resistance and Reform in Tibet
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). A letter from the Dalai Lama to Deng and Jiang Zemin on September 11, 1992, summarizing his views on relations with China since 1979, is contained in Andy Zhang,
Hu Jintao: Facing China's Challenges Ahead
(San Jose, Calif.: Writer's Club Press, 2002), appendix
5, pp. 133–148. For an account of Western images of Tibet, see Orville Schell,
Virtual Tibet: Searching for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

104.
Melvyn C. Goldstein,
The History of Modern Tibet
, vol. 2:
The Calm before the Storm, 1951–1955
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 98–99.

105.
Dan Zeng,
Dangdai Xizang jianshi
, pp. 132–146.

106.
John Kenneth Knaus, one of the CIA officials, describes the program in
Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival
(New York: PublicAffairs, 1999).

107.
DXPNP-2
, December 1–5, 1975, September 27, 1977.

108.
Ibid., March 12, 1979.

109.
Ibid., March 17, 1979.

110.
Memcon, Summary of the Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 8/27/79, vertical file, China, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta.

111.
Zheng Zhongbing, ed.,
Hu Yaobang nianpu changbian
(Materials for a Chronological Record of Hu Yaobang's Life), 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi, 2005), May 21, 22, 1980, 1:482–483.

112.
Shakya,
The Dragon in the Land of Snows
, p. 126.

113.
Deng Liqun,
Shierge chunqiu, 1975–1987: Deng Liqun zishu
(Twelve Springs and Autumns, 1975–1987: Deng Liqun's Autobiography) (Hong Kong: Bozhi chubanshe, 2006), pp. 207–208.

114.
Goldstein,
The Snow Lion and the Dragon
, p. 67.

115.
Ibid., pp. 69–71.

116.
Xiaojiang Hu and Miguel A. Salazar, “Market Formation and Transformation: Private Business in Lhasa,” in Sautman and Dreyer,
Contemporary Tibet
, pp. 166–190; June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet under the People's Republic of China,” in Sautman and Dreyer,
Contemporary Tibet
, pp. 128–151; also Xiaojiang Hu, “The Little Shops of Lhasa, Tibet: Migrant Businesses and the Formation of Markets in a Transitional Economy,” Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 2003.

18. The Military

1.
I am grateful for the advice of specialists on the Chinese military: Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko, John Corbett, Andrew Erickson, David Finklestein, Taylor Fravel, Paul Godwin, the late Ellis Joffe, John Lewis, Nan Li, David Shambaugh, Eden Woon, Larry Wortzel, and Xue Litai. For a general overview of the Chinese military, see James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang,
The People's Liberation Army as Organization
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2002). For a broad perspective
on Chinese strategic thinking, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis,
Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2000). For a general account of Chinese defense in the 1980s, see Paul H. B. Godwin, ed.,
The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983). For general works on the Chinese military, see David Shambaugh,
Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and Andrew Scobell,
China's Use of Military Force beyond the Great Wall and the Long March
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

2.
DXPNP-2
, July 23, 1977; Zhi Shaozeng and Lei Yuanshen, “Zhongyang junshi weiyuanhui (Central Military Commission),” in Zhongguo junshi baike quanshu bianshen weiyuanhui (Editorial Review Board for the Chinese Military Encyclopedia), ed.,
Zhongguo junshi baike quanshu
(China Military Encyclopedia), vol. 3 (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1997).

3.
SWDXP-2
, p. 74.

4.
DXPJW
, 3:62–69, August 23, 1977;
LZQ
, pp. 417–419.

5.
DXPJW
, 3:53–72, August 23, 1977.

6.
See Ellis Joffe,
The Chinese Army after Mao
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Harlan W. Jencks,
From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982).

7.
See Liu Huaqing,
Liu Huaqing huiyilu
(Reminiscences of Liu Huaqing) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004).

8.
SWDXP-2
, pp. 75–78.

9.
Ibid., p. 73.

10.
DXPJW
, 3:95, March 20, 1978.

11.
Ibid., 3:144–149, January 2, 1979.

12.
Compiled from Ji You,
The Armed Forces of China
(London: I.B. Taurus, 1999);
http://www.chinatoday.com/arm/index.htm
, accessed September 30, 2010; “The ‘Inside Story’ on the Reduction in the Size of the PLA,”
Wen Wei Po
(Hong Kong), April 29, 1987; Ellis Joffe, “Radical Reforms Underway,”
Financial Times
, December 9, 1985; John D. Friske, ed.,
China Facts and Figures Annual, vol. 17 (1993)
(Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1993), p. 61.

13.
Harlan W. Jencks, “China's ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment,”
Asian Survey
20, no. 10 (October 1980): 965–989. For the Vietnamese view of the war, see Henry J. Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds.,
Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 217–240; Edward C. O'Dowd, ed., “People's Liberation Army Documents on the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 1979 (I),”
Chinese Law and Government
42, no. 5 (September–October 2009): 3–100; and Edward C. O'Dowd, ed., “People's
Liberation Army Documents on the Third Indochina Conflict, 1979 (II),”
Chinese Law and Government
42, no. 6 (November–December 2009): 3–116. For an analysis of the political views about the war, see Scobell,
China's Use of Military Force
, pp. 119–143.

14.
Edward C. O'Dowd, “The Last Maoist War: Chinese Cadres and Conscripts in the Third Indochina War, 1978–1981,” Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1994, p. 132.

15.
In his speech at the conclusion of the war, Deng said the issue they had been most concerned about in planning the war was the possible Soviet reaction, but they judged the chances of Soviet entry to be very slight. See “Deng Xiaoping zai Zhong-Yue bianjing zuozhan qingkuang baogao huishang de jianghua” (Deng Xiaoping's Speech at the Meeting to Report on the Situation on the Sino-Vietnamese Border), March 16, 1979, unpublished speech available in the Fairbank Collection, Fung Library, Harvard University.

16.
John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue,
Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 127–133.

17.
Xiaoming Zhang, “Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to Go to War with Vietnam,”
Journal of Cold War Studies
12, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 3–29.

18.
O'Dowd, “The Last Maoist War,” pp. 99, 106–109, 171.

19.
Ibid. For an overview of the war, see Edward C. O'Dowd and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The 1979 Chinese Campaign in Vietnam: Lessons Learned,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds.,
The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75
(Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), pp. 353–378.

20.
Communication from Mark Mohr, October 2007, then a State Department official and the only one present with Mansfield during the meeting except for the Chinese ambassador Huang Hua and the interpreter Ji Chaozhu.

21.
Lewis and Xue,
Imagined Enemies
, p. 127.

22.
DXPNP-2
, late December 1978, January 2, 1979.

23.
Michael Leifer, “Kampuchia, 1979: From Dry Season to Dry Season,”
Asian Survey
20, no. 1 (January 1980): 33–41.

24.
King Chen, “China's War against Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis,” occasional paper, University of Maryland School of Law, 1983, pp. 1–33; Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China.”

25.
Elizabeth Wishnick,
Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 63.

26.
Xiaoming Zhang, “China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,”
The China Quarterly
, no. 184 (December 2005): 866–867.

27.
Kenny, “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” p. 228; O'Dowd, “The Last Maoist War,” pp. 114–132.

28.
O'Dowd, “The Last Maoist War,” pp. 165–166. The weaknesses are also detailed in Lewis and Xue,
Imagined Enemies
, pp. 132–133; Zhang, “China's 1979 War with Vietnam,” pp. 869–874.

29.
Interviews in Beijing, Fall 2006.

30.
I am indebted to Michael Lampton who was in China at the time and made these observations.

31.
Kuan Yew Lee,
From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000
(New York: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 669–670.

32.
James C. Mulvenon,
Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 53. Defense expenditures increased roughly 10 percent each year. But in 1979, because of the attack on Vietnam, they increased by 55.9 billion yuan, approximately 40 billion yuan more per year than average, which was then about one-quarter of the total military budget. In 1978, defense expenditures were 167.8 billion yuan; in 1979, 222.7 billion yuan; and in 1980, 193.3 billion yuan. Additional costs of the Vietnam War were borne by the southern provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Data are from the June 21, 1979 Report on the Final State Accounts for 1978 and the Draft State Budget for 1979 by Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu at the Second Session of the 5th National People's Congress, available in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,”
The China Quarterly
, no. 79 (September 1979): 661–663, and the August 30, 1980, Report on Financial Work by Finance Minister Wang Bingqian to the Third Session of the 5th National People's Congress, available in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,”
The China Quarterly
, no. 84 (December 1980): 799–802.