The Road to Berlin (167 page)

Vysotskii, F.I.
et al., Gvardeiskaya tankovaya
(2nd Guards Tank Army), pp. 169–81, E Pomeranian operation, failure of attempt to rush Altdam, 2nd Guards Tank regrouped to the south.

Yakubov, Colonel V., ‘Vostochno–Pomeranskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1975 (3), pp. 11–18. E Pomerania operation: originally a single Front operation involving only 2nd Belorussian Front, German counterblow Feb. 16 with ten divisions on right flank 1st Belorussian Front, more powerful German blow in the offing,
Stavka
directive Feb. 17 for operations 1st and 2nd Belorussian Front,
Stavka
assignments, concentric attacks by two Fronts,
Stavka
attention to main attack of 2nd Belorussian Front—on Waldenberg–Keslin axis—19th Army drawn from
Stavka
reserve for 2nd Belorussian Front operations, 2nd Belorussian Front operations opened Feb. 24, Kozlov’s 19th Army cleared way for 3rd Guards Tank Corps, 1st Belorussian Front attack at 0845 hrs March 1, Zhukov committed tank armies same afternoon, revised
Stavka
instructions March 5, German forces completely split, storming of Gdansk and Gdynia end March.

Zavyalov, A.S. and Kalyadin, T.E.,
Vostochno–Pomeranskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya sovetskikh voisk
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960). Ch. 1: situation on the right flank of the Front, 10 Feb. 1945, pp. 13–16; ch. 2,
Stavka
and command decisions, pp. 20–44; ch. 3, 2nd Belorussian Front operations, storming of Elbing, right-flank operations 1st Belorussian Front Feb. 10–18, pp. 59–86; ch. 3, splitting German forces,
Stavka
directives to 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, pp. 94–6; Front command decisions, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, right-flank operations 1st Belorussian Front Feb. 24–March 5, pp. 94–155. (Detailed monograph, planning/execution E Pomerania operation, based largely on Soviet military archives.)

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya
… , 2, pp. 315–17. March 7–8, visit to Stalin in Moscow, Stalin far from well, Zhukov’s question about Stalin’s son Yakov (PW in Germany), Stalin on the Yalta conference, question of ‘control mechanism’ in Germany, lack of agreement over Polish government, Zhukov to review calculations for the Berlin operation.

Polish materials

Dolata, B.,
Wyzwolenie Polski 1944–1945
, pt II, ch III, operations in Pomerania, (2nd Belorussian Front and 1st Polish Armoured Brigade), Köslin (Koszalin) operation, liberation of Gdynia and Gdansk, Szczezin, also 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Polish Army operations, Stargard, Polish drive to the Baltic, fighting for Kolobrzeg (Kolberg), pp. 246–84; ch. IV, operations in Silesia (Feb.–Mar.), Lower Silesia operations, Upper Silesia, battle for Ratibor, pp. 285–327.

Jadziak, E.,
Wyzwolenie Pomorza. Dzialania 1 Armii WP w operacji pomorskiej Armii Radzieckiej
(6 III-7 IV, 1945), 354 pp. (Extremely detailed study under auspices of Polish General Staff Academy, operations 1st Polish Army East Pomerania.)

‘Regrettable apprehension and mistrust’ pp.
526
–
529

Churchill, Winston S.,
The Second World War
, vol. VI, ch. XXV, on the Polish dispute and the aftermath of the Yalta conference; ch. XXVI, on Soviet suspicions over negotiations for the surrender of Kesselring’s forces; ch. XXVII, ‘Western strategic divergences’, implications and criticism of Eisenhower’s cable to Stalin on Allied military intentions.

Deane, John R.,
The Strange Alliance
, pp. 157–8, on Eisenhower’s cable to Stalin and Stalin’s response.

Ehrmann, John,
Grand Strategy
, vol. VI (London: HMSO 1956), p. 132, text of Eisenhower cable to Stalin.

Eisenhower, General Dwight D.,
Crusade in Europe
(New York: Doubleday 1948). On the decision to attack towards Dresden rather than Berlin, difficulties (and the proximity of the Red Army) which made a thrust on Berlin ‘more than unwise, it was stupid’, p. 396.

Diplomatic correspondence

Perepiska
… , vol. 2. No. 280, Roosevelt–Stalin, March 25, on Molotov’s absence at San Francisco Conference, p. 210; No. 281, Roosevelt–Stalin, March 25, on misunderstanding over proposed German surrender in Italy, pp. 211–12; No. 282, Stalin–Roosevelt, March 27, Gromyko to replace Molotov at San Francisco, p. 213; No. 283, Stalin–Roosevelt, March 29, on proposed German surrender in Italy, circumstances ‘engender distrust’, pp. 213–15; No. 284, Roosevelt–Stalin, April 1, on Yalta agreements and the Polish question, pp. 215–18; No. 285, Roosevelt–Stalin, April 1, ‘regrettable apprehension and mistrust’ induced over meetings for German surrender in Italy—but
no
negotiations, pp. 218–20; No. 286, Stalin–Roosevelt, April 3, ‘negotiations’ are taking place over German surrender in Italy, pp. 220–21.

Also vol. 1: No. 416, Churchill–Stalin, April 1, ‘spirit of Yalta’ not maintained in Moscow discussions (over Poland), Churchill’s support for Soviet cause, pp. 365–7; No. 417, Churchill–Stalin, April 5, no negotiations over German surrender in Italy, pp. 368–70.

Diplomatic history

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, III. See ch. XLV, pp. 490–519, the Moscow Commission, Molotov’s attitude and refusal to accept Anglo–American view of Yalta communiqué, Churchill’s proposal for message to Stalin; communications to Molotov, March 19; messages from Churchill and Roosevelt to Stalin, pp. 490–519. Also vol. V, ch. LXVII, (iii), pp. 374–87, German approaches for surrender in Italy, Soviet misunderstandings, Anglo–American exchanges with Stalin.

Soviet materials

Vorob’ev, F.D.
et al., Poslednii shturm
, pp. 43–5, General Staff revisions to Berlin attack plan completed end March, Zhukov March 28 presentation of Plans A and B (Plan A envisaging attack from the Küstrin bridgehead, Plan B to develop operations to seize new bridgehead south of Schwedt, also to expand Frankfurt bridgehead), March 31 General Staff conference with Zhukov and Koniev, problem of boundary between 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front, April 1
Stavka
session, Stalin’s insistence on capture of Berlin in shortest possible time—offensive to begin April 16, to last 12–15 days.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya
… , vol. 2, ch. 21, the Berlin operation, pp. 318–25: British harbouring ideas of taking Berlin first (in spite of Yalta decisions on Soviet zone, west of Berlin), Eisenhower on April 7 intimated that capture of Berlin still a possibility after the fall of Leipzig, at the end of March Stalin had received information from Eisenhower on his plan ‘to come out to the agreed line on the Berlin axis’, Stalin’s recognition of Nazi attempts to arrange a separate peace in the west and cease fighting in the west to allow Anglo–American forces into Berlin, Stalin’s commendation of Eisenhower and his plan, Zhukov in Moscow March 29 with 1st Belorussian Front operational plan for Berlin, Stalin–Zhukov talk and Stalin’s review of German forces on Berlin axis, 1st Belorussian Front able to take offensive in two weeks, 2nd Belorussian Front (Rokossovskii) inevitably delayed in joining 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front, Stalin’s suspicion of Churchill, ‘proof’ of dealings between Nazis and ‘British government circles’, Koniev at
Stavka
March 31, Antonov’s report on proposed Berlin operation to
Stavka
April 1, Stalin’s alteration of boundary line between 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front—ran only as far as Lübben—decision to open operations on April 16 (2nd Belorussian Front to join offensive April 20).

8 NO TIME TO DIE: APRIL–MAY 1945

There is now a voluminous literature on the last days of the Third
Reich
and the final, massive assault on Berlin, not to mention the import of the Western decision to halt on the line of the river Elbe—‘We’re not going to Berlin, Sid’ (General Simpson to the commander 2nd US Armoured Division). I must acknowledge at once my extreme indebtedness to these publications, duly listed below, with special reference to my access to the material amassed by the late Cornelius Ryan, while my account of Soviet operations has been largely compiled from my own transcripts of interviews with Red Army officers and men, including several Marshals of the Soviet Union. In addition, I worked on materials from the Soviet military archives, particularly
Stavka
directives (2–23 April 1945) and directives to Fronts and armies; the stipulation was that I might have full and unrestricted use of the papers but not to photocopy them, for which reason I copied them by hand into my ‘Moscow notebooks’ and translated them at a later date. Thus, it will be seen that there are discrepancies between subsequent ‘official translations’ of the Chuikov–Krebs conversations, but the version reproduced here was taken from the original diary (and the original diarist). Finally, in delineating Soviet materials relating to the assault on Berlin—
poslednii shturm
—I decided to present this by following the fortunes of each Front (1st Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian, 2nd Belorussian) and the particular formations involved (for example, the four tank armies), and then moving down to units, those involved in the final phases of the fighting in Berlin and the assault on the
Reichstag
.

(i) Gar Alperovitz,
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam
(New York: Vintage Books 1967, esp. ch. II, ‘Strategy of a Delayed Showdown’); Lev Bezymenski,
The Death of Adolf Hitler
(unknown documents from Soviet Archives; London: Michael Joseph 1968; translated from German, original Soviet material); Willi A. Boelcke (ed.),
Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Hitler–Speer conferences); General Theodor Busse, ‘Die letzte Schlacht der 9 Armee’,
Wehrwissen-schaftliche Rundschau
, 1955, No. 4; Marshal SU V.I. Chuikov,
The End of the Third Reich
, chs. XIII–XVII, assault on Berlin; Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War
, vol. VI:
Triumph and Tragedy
, chs. XXVIII–XXXII, Roosevelt’s death, growing friction with Russia, final advance, German surrender; Department of the Army (US),
German Defense Tactics against Russian Break-Throughs
, Pamphlet No. 20-233, October 1951 (historical study); Admiral Karl Doenitz,
Memoirs
(Cleveland: World Pub. Co. 1958); Dieter Dreetz, Hans Höhn, ‘Die Zerstörung Berlins war von der Wehrmachtführung einkalkuliert’ (Documents),
Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte
(E Berlin, 1965), No. 2 (see pp. 177–94, with map);
Hitler-Dokumente:
‘Hitlers letzte Lagebesprechung’, see
Der Spiegel
, 10 Jan. 1966, pp. 30–46; David Irving,
Hitler’s War
, pt 6,
‘Endkampf;’
Paul Kecskemeti,
Strategic Surrender. The Politics of Victory and Defeat
(Stanford UP 1958; see pt 2, ch. 5); Erich Kuby,
The Russians and Berlin 1945
(trans. Arnold J. Pomerans; London: Heinemann 1968); Franz Kurowsky,
Armee Wenck. Die 12 Armee zwischen Elbe und Oder
(Neckargemsünd: 1967); Wojtech Mastny,
Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism 1941–1945
(New York: Columbia UP 1979; a major work of analysis and comprehensive review of Soviet strategy and tactics); Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery,
Normandy to the Baltic
(BAOR Printing Service 1946; also Hutchinson, London), and
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
(London: Collins 1958); Samuel Eliot Morison,
Strategy and Compromise
(Boston: Little, Brown 1958); P.U. O’Donnell,
Die Katakombe (April 1945)
(Stuttgart: DVA 1975); Forrest C. Pogue, see ‘Decision to halt on the Elbe’ in
Command Decisions
(ed. Kent R. Greenfield; Washington: Govt. Printing Office 1960); Edward J. Rozek,
Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland
(ch. 7, 3–4, attempts to implement Yalta decisions, liquidation of the Polish Government); Cornelius Ryan,
The Last Battle
(London: Collins 1966) (I worked closely with Mr Ryan on this book and had the significant benefit of inspecting his voluminous holdings on Berlin); Albert Seaton,
The Russo–German War 1941–45
, ch. 34, the storming of Berlin; V. Sevrule (ed.),
How Wars End. Eye-Witness Accounts of the Fall of Berlin
(Moscow: Progress Pub. 1969) (Soviet translation; Marshal Koniev on the Berlin operation, V. Vishnevskii on Berlin surrender, Roman Karmen ‘Doctor Goebbels on the phone’); General S.M. Shtemenko,
The Last Six Months. Russia’s Final Battles …
(trans. Guy Daniels; London: Wm. Kimber 1978; a useful translation but with certain imprecisions which demand care in using this volume); Jean Edward Smith,
The Defense of Berlin
(Johns Hopkins/OUP 1963; see esp. ch. 3, the military decision to halt at the Elbe); Albert Speer,
Inside the Third Reich
(New York: Macmillan 1970) (orig. German,
Erinnerungen
, 1969), ch. 32, ‘Annihilation’; General John Strawson,
The Battle for Berlin
(New York: Scribners 1974); Hans Georg Studnitz,
Als Berlin brannte
(Stuttgart, 1963); John Toland,
The Last 100 Days
(New York: Random House 1966); Nikolai Tolstoy,
Victims of Yalta
, see esp. ch. 4, British and American agreement at Yalta, agreement on PWs, predominance of British view (with no provision concerning the return/forced repatriation of unwilling citizens of the USSR)—see also further on the fate of
Vlasov
and the
Vlasov
movement
(this is a truly appalling story of inertia, incompetence and insensitivity to basic rights, with the burden of responsibility falling in disgraceful fashion on British diplomats and administrators, not excluding some illustrious personages); H.R. Trevor-Roper (Intro.),
Hitler’s War Directives 1939–1945
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson 1964), see under
1945;
H.R. Trevor-Roper,
The Last Days of Hitler
(London: Macmillan 1947, and subsequent editions); Walter Warlimont,
Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939–45
, pt VI, ‘Death-throes’; General H. Weidling, ‘Der Endkampf in Berlin’,
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
, 1962, nos. 1–3.