The Road to Berlin (145 page)

Soviet drive to the Dnieper
(Central, Voronezh, Steppe, SW and S Fronts)

See composite study G. Utkin,
Shturm ‘Vostochnovo vala’
. Osvobozhdenie levoberezhnoi Ukrainy i forsirovanie Dnepra (Moscow: Voenizdat 1967). Central Front operations, assault crossing of Dnieper, completion of Chernigovsk-Pripyat operation, pp. 27–76; Voronezh Front offensive, forcing of Dnieper south of Kiev, crossing north of Kiev, pp. 84–175; Steppe Front operations, establishment of bridgehead SW Kremenchug, 37th Army operations SE Kremenchug, offensive on Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog, pp. 197–233, operations SW and S Fronts, liberation of Donbas, pp. 242–70; SW Front operations/Zaporozhe, fighting for Dnepropetrovsk, pp. 278–310; S Front operations, fall of Melitopol, destruction of German forces, pp. 320–48. (This is a highly detailed, day-by-day operational narrative based largely on Soviet military archives.)

Airborne operations: Kanev, September-October 1943

Lisov, Lt.-Gen. I.I.,
Desantniki
(Vozdushnye desanty) (Moscow: Voenizdat 1968), ch. 6, ‘Na pravom beregu Dnepra’, pp. 153–78, planning, organization of airborne assault, airborne drop, ground action.

Sofronov, G.P.,
Vozdushnye desanty vo vtoroi mirovoi voine
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1962), pp. 27–36.

Sukhorukhov, D.S. (C-in-C/Soviet Airborne Troops)
et al., Sovetskie vozdushno-desantnye
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1980). pp. 194–209, airborne forces and Dnieper battle.

Diplomatic complexities and complications pp.
129
–
135

Fischer, Alexander,
Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg …
, ch. 2 (c), ‘Die Bewegung “Freies Deutschland”; pp. 53–9 (with extensive notes and references, pp. 186–90). See also:

Zur Geschichte der deutschen antifaschistischen Widerstandsbewegung 1933 bis 1945. Materialien: Berichte und Dokumente
(E. Berlin Min. Nat. Verteidigung 1957). See under ‘Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland” ’, pp. 213–76; also facsimiles, ‘Das Freie Wort (10.7.43)’, p. 257; also ‘Freies Deutschland’, 24 November, 27 December 1943, p. 273– ‘1944. Beginn einer neuen Epoche’ (editorial); also ‘Manifest des Nationalkomitees “Freies Deutschland” an die Wehrmacht und an das deutsche Volk’, pp. 233–6; Gründung des ‘Bundes deutscher Offiziere’ (September 1943), p. 245. (For a
Soviet
appraisal of the German anti-Fascist movement, including BDO, see Maj.-Gen. M. Burtsev,
VIZ
, 1969 (10), pp. 41–9.)

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
, pp. 565–77, Hitler’s strategic thinking, ‘feelers to Stalin’, Hitler’s confidence in the future, recognized difficulties in Allied coalition, ‘internal collapse among, our enemies’, also Stalin’s commanding position (and Hitler’s preference for possible dealing with him). (There may be some point in recording a contemporary rumour that Berlin in 1943 contemplated the possible exchange of Stalin’s son (a Red Army major, captured in 1941) for Field-Marshal von Paulus.)

Werth, Alexander,
Russia at War
, ch. 12, ‘The “Free German Committee” ’, pp. 732–7, which proved to be of ‘small practical importance’ (along with BDO) but which Alexander Werth saw as a form of Soviet ‘insurance’.

German materials

OKW/WFSt: V0 Ag. Ausland

German–Japanese exchanges:
Geheime Reichssache, Hitler’s démarché and that of Ribbentrop, October 1943, German criticism of Soviet troop transfers from Far East to European theatre, German pressure on Japan to maintain ‘military threat’ against USSR; also 2.11.43 WFSt/Ic report on transfer of Soviet Far East forces, Japanese report (30.10.43) pointing out—correctly—that fewer troops moved westwards in 1943. T-82/R90, 246961–966, 970, 971–973.

FHO: Intelligence appreciations

Teil A: Zusammenstellung … (FHO
, Nr 1000/45g Kdos). Rpt No. 80/43, 17.10.43, major study comparing German and Soviet strength; Rpt No. 87/43, 9.11.43, appreciation of Soviet order of battle and intentions (360 RDs, 83 tank formations at brigade strength deployed, 159 RDs and 192 brigade-strength tank formations in reserve); Rpt No. 3102/43 on ‘Feindliche Kräftelage’ (order of battle) dated 4.12.43. T-78/R466, 6446031–045, 6052–58 and 6060–65, respectively.

FHO (IIa): Fernost 1.4.43
. Report on Soviet Far Eastern forces, troop transfers to the European war theatre, Soviet commands/order of battle, Far East. T-78/R486, 6470809–842. Cf. for
complete Soviet data
on wartime troop transfer from the Far East, S. Isayev, ‘Vklad voisk Dalnevo Vostoka v razgrom nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov’,
VIZ
, 1979 (8), pp. 73–7: a total of
39 divisions
were moved to the European theatre 1941–5 (the highest number, 30, in the period 21.6.41–18.11.42), with
21 brigades
(with
14 artillery brigades
, the highest single number, moved westwards in the period 19.11.42–31.12.43).

Diplomatic documents/diplomatic memoirs/materials

Gromyko, A.A. (Editorial chief),
Moskovskaya konferentsiya ministrov inostrannykh del SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (19–30 obtyabrya 1943 g.)
. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Politizdat 1978). Soviet protocols and stenographic record of the Moscow conference, pts II and III; for agenda, pt III, doc. no. 57, pp. 273–4 (also note 35, pp. 386–7, for projected Soviet agenda).

Wartime press

SWN
. No. 691, 18 October 1943, ‘The Moscow Conference’ (from
Izvestiya)
—‘the problem of the resolute shortening of the war … is inseparably bound up with the problem of opening the Second Front in Western Europe’. No. 709, 8 November 1943, Report by J.V. Stalin. Also, award of Order of Suvorov to Marshal Stalin (6 November).

Avon (Anthony Eden, Earl of),
The Eden Memoirs
, vol. 2:
The Reckoning
(London: Cassell 1965), bk 3, ‘A Russian fortnight’ (the Moscow conference), pp. 407–21.

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, pp. 581–93, Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow (19–30 October 1943), Foreign Office proposals for agenda and Soviet proposals (September 29), Soviet concern for ‘war-shortening measures’, ‘urgent measures taken in 1943’ by British and Americans to secure invasion of Europe plus Red Army operations would lead to German collapse, War Cabinet discussion of agenda, Moscow Conference to prepare way for Teheran conference, Soviet military questions answered (October 20), exposition of difficulties in organizing cross-Channel attack (shipping, US reinforcement), General Ismay on German air fighter force, Eden unable to answer about possible postponement of invasion, possible entry of Turkey into war, Russian claims to Italian fleet, proposal for European Advisory Commission by Eden generally accepted, Soviet reservations about handling of Italian armistice, question of treatment of Germany.

Israelyan, V.L. and Kutakov, L.N.,
Diplomatiya agressorov
(Moscow: Nauka 1967), ch. 8, ‘the crisis in the Fascist bloc’, pp. 262–91, military-diplomatic repercussions of German defeats in the east, the Italian surrender.

Israelyan, V.L.,
Antigitlerovskaya koalitsiya 1941–1945
(Moscow: Mezh. Otnosheniya 1964), ch. 14, pp. 301–21, problems of postwar reconstruction and the Moscow Conference. (See also,
Diplomaticheskaya istoriya VoV 1941–1945 gg
. (Moscow: Institut. Mezh. Otnoshenii 1959), ch. III (11), Moscow Conference, pp. 176–84.)

Kulish, V.M.,
Raskrytaya taina
. Predystoriya vtorovo fronta v Evrope (Moscow: Nauka 1965), pp. 379–89, the Moscow Conference and the issue of the Second Front.

Strel’nikov, V.S. and Cherepanov, N.M.,
Voina bez riska
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1965), pp. 57–76, Allied landings in Sicily; pp. 89–96, the Italian capitulation. (Soviet view of Mediterranean operations.)

The North Russian convoys/Soviet naval operations

Meister, J.,
Soviet Warships of the Second World War
(London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977). (Invaluable reference work on ship types and operational roles.)

Meister, J.,
Der Seekriege in osteuropäischen Gewässern
(Munich, 1958),
passim
.

Mitchell, Donald W.,
A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
(London: Deutsch 1974), pp. 422–34, WWII, Arctic and Pacific waters, Northern Fleet (and White Sea Flotilla) operations.

Ruge, Vice-Admiral Friederich,
The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941–1945
(Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1979). See ‘The Northern Theater’, pp. 135–72 (Soviet surface unit, submarine, naval air and MTB operations). The Soviet Russians as opponents at Sea: Analysis of German and Russian Naval operations in the Second World War (4 vols, Tambach Collection). Vice-Admiral Ruge headed German specialists compiling this study.

Schofield, Vice-Admiral B.B.,
The Russian Convoys
. Appendix I identifies 40 convoys to north Russia (1941–5), involving 811 ships (with 98 sunk).

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy
… , vol. II, pp. 564–74, ‘The question of the North Russian convoys’.

Achkasov, V.I. and Pavlovich, N.B.,
Sovetskoe voenno-morskoe iskusstvo v VOV
, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973. On Soviet ‘naval art’: see ch. 8 for naval operations and maritime communications, pp. 216–324.

Basov, A.V,
Flot v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941–1945
. Opyt operativno-strategicheskovo primeneniya (Moscow, Nauka, 1980). (Part of present special pleading for the vital role of Soviet sea power, this monograph examines Soviet wartime naval operations in an ‘operational-strategic’ context: on sea lines of communications and the northern convoys, pp. 193–200.)

Golovko, Admiral A.G.,
Vmeste s flotom
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1979), (2nd edn with foreword by Admiral Grishanov), pp. 174–6, Golovko’s exchanges with Stalin over convoys, Northern Fleet operations in the Kara Sea. See also,
With the Red Fleet. The War Memoirs of Admiral Arseni Golovko
(London: Putnam 1965), pp. 159–64 (translated from 1st edn).

Kolyshkin, Rear-Admiral I.,
Submarines in Arctic Waters
(Moscow: Progress Pub. 1966) (Soviet translation).

Kozlov, I.A. and Shlomin, VS.,
Severnyi flot
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1966). 2nd edn, Krasnoznamennyi Severnyi flot (1977). Somewhat flimsy history of Northern Fleet.

Vainer, B.A.,
Severnyi flot v VOV
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1964), pp. 307–19, securing the northern convoys.

Additional note on British intelligence, the Eastern Front
and prelude to ‘Zitadelle’, 1943

See F.H. Hinsley
et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War
(London: HMSO 1981), vol. 2, pp. 623–7: first intelligence of German preparations discovered by Whitehall in third week in March (from
Luftwaffe
ENIGMA), 16 April report to Churchill about possible attack on north face of Kursk salient (but doubt as to ground or air operation), end April decrypt of von Weichs’s appreciation of Soviet capabilities passed to Moscow, plus warning of German attack in near future, 3 May SIGINT note on 2 Pz. A in Orel area and 4 Pz. A at Kharkov, in June
Luftwaffe
ENIGMA disclosed movement of aircraft
from
Russia, propaganda ‘line’ that Hitler would postpone decisive offensive until 1944, Air Intelligence (AI) noted cessation of German preparatory bombing in Kursk sector, otherwise ‘intelligence gave no advance notice of the opening of the much-delayed German offensive’: Whitehall’s intelligence confined to
Luftwaffe
ENIGMA and reports of British Military Mission, only on 10 July clear from
Luftwaffe
ENIGMA that
Zitadelle
being carried through.