The Road to Berlin (143 page)

Moskalenko, K.S. (ed.),
Bitva na Kurskoi duge
(Moscow: Nauka 1975). This is an extremely detailed and informative compendium, though little remarked as yet. See General E.E. Mal’tsev on the work of military soviets/Front, pp. 37–47; General S.P. Ivanov on the work of the Voronezh Front staff, pp. 58–64; Lt.-Gen. (Artillery) M.D. Sidorov on the massing of artillery and the manoeuvres of artillery anti-tank reserves in the defensive phase, pp. 96–104; and Colonel G.A. Koltunov on special features of the Soviet defensive at Kursk, pp. 112–21.

Parotkin, Maj.-Gen. I.V,
Kurskaya bitva
(Moscow: Nauka 1970). See translation,
The Battle of Kursk
(Moscow: Progress Pub. 1974), for memoir accounts: Zhukov, pp. 33–47 (defensive operations); Vasilevskii on strategic planning, pp. 59–74; Rokossovskii (Central Front), pp. 77–90; Col.-Gen. Fomin on artillery, pp. 196–205; Lt.-Gen. Antipenko on logistics, pp. 236–48 (ammunition expenditure, defensive battle, p. 245).

Peresypkin, Marshal (Signal Troops) I., ‘Organizatsiya svyazi’,
VIZ
, 1973 (7), pp. 51–61. Signals/communications systems, General Staff and Front staffs, army staffs and independent tank/mechanized formations, Kursk battle.

Rotmistrov, P., ‘Bronetankovye i mekhanizirovannye voiska v bitve pod Kurskom’,
VIZ
, 1970 (1), pp. 12–22. Critique of employment of Soviet armoured/mobile formations in defensive and offensive phases, Kursk.

Rudenko, Air Marshal S.I.,
Krylya pobedy
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1976) pp. 156–80. Operations 16th Air Army in support of Central Front, struggle for air superiority, Zhukov proposes fighter reinforcement for 16th Air 7 July, planning for Soviet counter-blow.

Ryazanskii, Maj.-Gen. A.P.,
V ogne tankovykh srazhenii
(Moscow: Nauka 1975) pp. 60–84, 5th Guards Mechanized Corps operations with 5th Guards Tank Army, Kursk, defensive operations. Highly detailed account of 5th Corps training, deployment, operations.

Solov’ev, B.G.,
Vermakht na puti k gibeli
, pp. 103–25, Soviet defensive operations, Kursk, 5–12 July, narrative and analysis closely linked with footnoted commentary on German (and other) versions.

Tsukanov, Colonel F., ‘Manevr silami i sredstvami Voronezhskovo fronta v oboronitel’noi operatsii pod Kurskom‘,
VIZ
, 1963 (6), pp. 35–42. Informative study of redeployment and manoeuvre, Voronezh Front (tables and diagrams).

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
(2nd edn), pp. 340–44. On Stalin’s uneasiness, expectation of German offensive 26 May, Vatutin continues to urge Soviet offensive action, Stalin advises Vatutin to prepare offensive not later than first week in July, night of 2 July General Staff receives intelligence information that German attack timed for
not later than 6 July
, draft
Stavka
instruction to Front commands, Vasilevskii to Voronezh Front, German reconnaissance, offensive opens, first defensive phase.

Vysotskii, F.I.
et al., Gvardeiskaya tankovaya
, pp. 25–40, 2nd Guards Tank Army, in reserve Central Front, reinforced with 3rd Tank Corps, planning for tank army counter-blow, operations 6 July, Rokossovskii orders 2nd Tank Army on to defensive.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya
, vol. 2, pp. 163–78, on defensive operations. (See translation,
The Battle of Kursk.)

Kursk/Prokhorovka and Soviet riposte pp.
105
–
113

German documentation

KTB/OKW
, III/2, Lagebericht WFSt, entries 11–19 July (1943): 19 July ‘Offensive erscheint die weitere Durchführung von “Zitadelle”
nicht mehr möglich
…’, pp. 769–804.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 3, (i) pp. 272–5, German failure to break through to Oboyan, thrust against Prokhorovka on narrow front, Voronezh Front plan—approved by
Stavka
—to mount powerful counterblow with 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Army 12 July, plan frustrated by German forces cutting links between Soviet armies, Soviet bombing attack on II
SS Panzer
Corps, Prokhorovka tank battle, T-34s fight at close range, German losses 350 tanks and 10,000 men, heavy fighting south of Prokhorovka against
Abteilung Kempf
, Soviet 69th Army goes over to defensive, 6th Guards Army and 1st Tank develop offensive along Oboyan-Belgorod motor-road southwards,
Stavka
18 July orders 53rd, 47th, 4th Guards Army (Steppe Front) into action, German miscalculation that Soviet armies would need more time to recover.

(ii) pp. 276–81,
Orel offensive:
11th Guards Army,
Stavka
plan to attack against Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov, Bryansk and left-flank Western Front to attack 12 July, four attacks aimed at Orel, assault groups formed in 11th Guards Army, 250 tanks attached, 7 engineer battalions to clear minefields (lifted 42,000 mines), 1lth Guards Army penetrated up to 70 km by July 19, 4th Tank Army, 11th Army (Fedyuninskii) and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps committed, 11th Army only committed piecemeal due to logistics problems, 4th Tank Army offensive on Bolkhov halted.

IVMV
, 17, (i) pp. 152–6. Midnight 9 July Steppe MD activated as Steppe Front, Koniev to assign 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd Army to Belgorod-Kharkov axis with 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army to Voronezh Front, Prokhorovka tank battle, German withdrawal begun, summary of results of Kursk defensive battle—heaviest attacks against Central Front but this already reinforced with an artillery corps, Voronezh Front by comparison had 2,740
less
guns and mortars, use of strategic reserve (at Prokhorovka) halted German attack but weakened subsequent Soviet pursuit.

(ii) pp. 159–62. Soviet offensive aimed at Orel opened July 12 with 11th Guards and 61st Army (Belov) with 1st Air Army (M.M. Gromov) in support, Soviet concentration for Orel attack with left-flank Western Front, Bryansk and Central Fronts amounted to 1,286,000 men, 2,400 tanks, 21,000 guns and mortars, 3,000 aircraft, Bryansk Front operations slowed by German resistance, 15 July right-flank armies Central Front opened their offensive, though these armies (48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank) much weakened in defensive fighting on northern face Kursk salient, 18 July
Stavka
committed Badanov’s 4th Tank Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, though much delay and difficulty in committing strategic reserve.

Bagramyan, I.Kh.,
Tak my shli k pobede
, pp. 196–237, reinforced reconnaissance (9–10 July), ADD bombing raids night July 11, Soviet surprise offensive 11 July, assault on Second
Panzer
Army, 50th Army offensive held up (July 13), conversation with Stalin (evening 14 July) reserves promised, threat to flank and rear of Second
Panzer
and Ninth Army, argument with Front commander Sokolovskii over commitment of 4th Tank Army, transfer of 1lth Guards Army to Bryansk Front (29 July).

Bagramyan, I.Kh., ‘Flangovyi udar 11-i gvardeiskoi armii’,
VIZ
, 1963 (7), pp. 83–95.

Collective authorship,
Sovetskie tankovye voiska 1941–1945
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1973), pp. 131–43, role of Soviet
tank armies
in Soviet counter-offensive, beginning with Orel operation (12 July–18 August).
(Note:
the most comprehensive and indispensable work on Soviet tank operations is Army General A.I. Radzievskii,
Tankovyi udar
, Moscow: Voenizdat 1977, 271 pp. with maps, tables, diagrams.)

‘Commanders recall…
’/Kursk, I.M. Chistyakov (6th Guards Army), M.S. Shumilov (7th Guards Army), N.P. Pukhov (13th Army), K.S. Moskalenko (40th Army), P.A. Rotmistrov (5th Guards Tank Army), A.S. Zhadov (5th Guards Army),
VIZ
, 1963 (7), pp. 62–82.

Koltunov, G.A. and Solov’ev, B.G.,
Kurskaya bitva
, ch. 4, ‘Boevye deistviya na prokhorovskom napravlenii’, German attack on Prokhorovka, unable to make complete breakthrough (pp. 162–6): tank battle at Prokhorovka, counter-blow assigned to 5 th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Army, Rotmistrov deploys west and south-west Prokhorovka on a 15-km front, 18th, 29th, 2nd Guards Tank Corps in first echelon, 1,500 armoured vehicles (German and Soviet) in action (see note p. 174), 13–14 July final German attempt at breakthrough, Vasilevskii’s personal report to Stalin (p. 176), 16 July Vatutin orders Front forces on to the defensive, need to build up ammunition stocks, German withdrawal begun under cover of powerful rearguards, pp. 166–77.

Koniev, I.S.
Zapiski komanduyushchevo frontom
, pp. 16–20, transfer of 5th Guards Tank Army and 5 th Guards Army, Prokhorovka battle, Koniev fails to persuade
Stavka
to commit Steppe Front as
one strategic entity
, 30 July report to Zhukov on weakening of front due to transferring armies to Voronezh Front (pp. 19–20), Koniev’s observation that it would have been better to commit the Steppe Front
en masse
and ‘leap on the back’ of the retreating Germans.

Rotmistrov, P.A.,
Tankovoe srazhenie pod Prokhorovkoi
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960) 107 pp. The gigantic tank battle 11–12 July, Rotmistrov commanding 5th Guards Tank Army.

Rotmistrov, P.A. ‘Tankovoe srazhenie 12 iyulya‘ in V.S. Lokshin (ed.),
Na ognennoi duge
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1963), pp. 40–59 (tank battle at Prokhorovka).

Sandalov, Col.-Gen. L., ‘Bryanskii front v Orlovskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1963 (8), pp. 62–72. Bryansk Front and the
Orel operation
, Stalin’s instructions for use of 3rd Guards Tank Army 18 July (p. 70), Stalin’s displeasure at lack of success with tank army operations (p. 71).

Vasilevskii, A.,
Delo vsei zhizni
, pp. 344–5. Personal report to Stalin (document dated 14 July) on Prokhorovka tank battle: in Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army 29th Tank Corps lost 60 per cent of its tanks, 18th Tank Corps 30 per cent losses, 5th Mechanized Corps insignificant loss.

Vorozheikin, Maj.-Gen. (Air) A.V.,
Nad Kurskoi dugoi
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1962). Fighter-pilot memoir, Kursk air combat (squadron commander, 728th Fighter Regiment).

The Soviet autumn offensive drive to the Dnieper pp.
113
–
129

Armstrong, John A.,
Ukrainian Nationalism
(Columbia Univ. Press, 2nd edn 1963), pp. 130–65. Ukrainian resistance/partisan movement.

Philippi, A. and Heim, F.,
Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland …
, pt 2 (F. Heim), ‘Der Feldzug des Jahres 1943’, /III, ‘Die sowjetische Sommeroffensive im südlichen und mittleren Abschnitt … ’, pp. 212–23.

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo-German War
, ch. 23, ‘The Soviet 1943 Autumn Offensives’, pp. 369–91. (This is an excellent and truly comprehensive narrative and analysis, covering the full range of the Soviet offensive design and German reactions.)

German documentation

Gen. St. d. H.: Kräftegegenüberstellung 20.7.43

German strength: Ostfront

151 infantry divisions

 22 Panzer divisions

3,064,000 men

2,088 tanks

8,063 guns

Soviet strength: