The Road to Berlin (169 page)

Batov, General P.I.,
Operatsiya ‘Oder’
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1965) (65th Army operations, April–May 1945). See pp. 13–26, on the regrouping of 2nd Belorussian Front, first movements with 49th and 70th Armies followed by 65th Army. (Monograph treatment, using Soviet military archives.)

Katukov, M.E.,
Na ostrie glavnovo udara
(2nd edn), pp. 388–92, 1st Guards Tank Army duly returned to 1st Belorussian Front (from 2nd Belorussian Front), reinforcements and replacements (Yushchuk’s 11th Tank Corps assigned to 1st Guards Tank, bringing total tank/
SP
-gun strength to 854), special maps of Berlin supplied to topographic section of Front staff, Front command/staff exercise April 5, study of German strength/order of battle, Front directive issued to 1st Guards Tank April 12, tank army to be committed behind 8th Guards Army, with subsequent movement to the south-west and outflank city from the south, daily rate of advance fixed at 35–37 kms—was Zhukov’s decision to throw two tank armies against an unsuppressed defence correct?

Koniev, I.S.,
Year of Victory
(Moscow). See ‘The Berlin Operation’, pp. 79–91, meeting in
Stavka
April 1, Shtemenko report on plans of US–British command to capture Berlin, main Allied attack to come from north of the Ruhr, Stalin—‘Well, then, who is going to take Berlin …’—need for Koniev to regroup, report to
Stavka
April 3 on operational plans, Stalin offers 28th and 31st Armies as reinforcement, 1st Ukrainian Front offensive plan (and directive), Stalin pencils in boundary line between 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Front, the line cut short at Lübben, text of
Stavka
directive April 3, Koniev’s Front plan with special instruction to 3rd Guards Tank Army—’… to bear in mind the possibility of attacking Berlin from the south with a reinforced tank corps …’—planned employment of tank armies, air support and role of air in laying down extensive smokescreens.

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
A Soldier’s Duty
. See under ‘The Oder–Elbe’, pp. 314–18, problems of regrouping 2nd Belorussian Front along Stettin–Rostock axis, movement begun April 4–5, march plans, briefing at
Stavka
on role of 2nd Belorussian Front in Berlin operation, four-day delay for Rokossovskii (attack timed for April 20), unfavourable terrain for operations (East and West Oder), troops deploying into position by April 13.

Shtemenko, S.M., ‘Na poslednikh rubezhakh v Evrope’,
VIZ
, 1971 (4), pp. 63–7. (Emphasizes German attempts to come to a separate understanding with the Anglo–Americans, also Soviet concern at reports of the ‘Alpine Redoubt’—the Nazi government literally shifting itself closer to the Anglo–American armies—while these rumours of a separate agreement were also designed to sow dissension; Stalin April 17 instructed Zhukov to ignore Hitler’s ‘web’—spider’s web,
pautina
—spun about Berlin, a web to be cut by Soviet forces taking Berlin. ‘We can do it, we must do it.’) Shtemenko’s argument is that Soviet policy prevented severe inter-allied dissension, while Stalin’s solution was the speedy capture of Berlin by the Red Army.

Vorob’ev, F.D.
el al., Poslednii shturm
(1975 edn), ch. 2, on planning meetings, 1–2 April,
Stavka
decisions (and directives 2–3 April), main axes of attack delineated,
Stavka
ruling on artillery densities, reinforcement for 1st Belorussian Front, role of 1st Ukrainian Front and assignment for 2nd Belorussian Front, pp. 44–9; decisions of Front commands and operational assignments to armies, pp. 49–66 (note observation, p. 50, defending Zhukov’s decision to use 1st Guards Tank Army in an outflanking move to the south of Berlin rather than operating to the north with 2nd Guards Tank Army, a decision approved by Stalin himself; this account rejects criticism of Zhukov by some Soviet specialists—redeploying 1st Guards Tank did not appreciably weaken the force assigned to the northern outflanking movements, for this force proved to be adequate to its task without 1st Guards Tank). It is worth noting that precisely this observation, even to the same phraseology, is made by Lt.-Gen. V. Poznyak in ‘Zavershayushchie udary po vragu’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), p. 29.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniiya …
, vol. 2, pp. 323–30, Berlin operation, Stalin on
vot Cherchill, Stavka
directive for 1st Belorussian Front operations, problem with enforced delay in opening 2nd Belorussian Front offensive (leaving Zhukov with bare right flank), 2nd Belorussian Front operations to north would only bear upon the enemy by April 23–24, 1st Belorussian Front staff/command exercises April 5–7, plan to use searchlights, decision to deploy 1st Guards Tank Army ‘directly behind’ 8th Guards Army, Stalin advised, ‘Do as you think fit, you can see better on the spot’.

(iv)
Troop transfers to the Far East

See
Finale
(Moscow: Progress Pub. 1972—translation
of Final. Istoriko-memuarnyi ocherk
…, ed. Marshal M.V. Zakharov, Moscow: Nauka 1969), pp. 69–70, the planning phase,
Stavka
decision March 1945 to supply new T-34 tanks to one tank battalion in each tank brigade in Far East and Transbaikal Military Districts (Fronts), old tanks left as a reserve for brigade commanders, new tanks also supplied to 1st Tank Regiments of 61st and 111th Tank Divisions (Transbaikal)—670 T-34s assigned to Far Eastern theatre, consideration of further troop deployments in order to ensure rapid defeat of the Kwantung Army.

See also S.M. Shtemenko,
The Soviet General Staff at War
(Moscow: Progress Pub. 1970), pp. 324–7, estimates for reinforcement and logistical requirements in Far East completed beginning October 1944, terms of the Yalta agreement on Soviet entry into war against Japan, denunciation of Neutrality Pact 5 April 1945, this ‘serious warning went unheeded’ by the Japanese,
Stavka
decision not to break up existing command in the Far East, former Karelian Front command to be transferred—assigned to Meretskov, ‘the wily man from Yaroslavl’ as Stalin called him, recalled experience of Meretskov in fighting through forest and fortified areas.

Further to the Yalta agreement and Soviet participation in the war against Japan, in particular Stalin’s views on informing Chiang Kai-shek on this matter, see, under
Diplomatic correspondence/diplomatic history
, ‘Hurley–Stalin talk, 15 April 1945’ in
Notes to pp. 552–568
, below.

Königsberg-Ostrava-Vienna pp.
542
–
552

(i)
Köhigsberg/‘Samland’

Bagramyan, I.Kh.,
Tak shli my k pobede
. See ch. 10, on Operation
Samland
, pp. 509–88. (Detailed memoir/analysis of the organization and execution of the Königsberg assault.)

Bagramyan, I.Kh., ‘Shturm Kenigsberg’,
VIZ
, 1976 (8), pp. 56–64 and (9), pp. 47–57.

Collective authorship,
Shturm Kenigsberga
(Kaliningrad: Kalingradskoe Izd. 1966), 254 pp. (Collected memoir accounts). See Bagramyan on
Samland
, pp. 65–74; Khryukin, pp. 74–82; also Lyudnikov, pp. 55–65.

Collective authorship,
Shturm Kenigsberga
(Kaliningrad, 1973), 384 pp. See accounts by Vasilevskii, Bagramyan, Khlebnikov (on artillery), pp. 53–116; also Galitskii (11th Guards Army), pp. 121–9.

Galitskii, K.N.,
V boyakh za Vostochnuyu Prussiyu
(11th Guards Army), ch. 9, 11th Guards preparation for assault on Köningsberg, army/corps decisions, special operational deployments, pp. 343–66; ch. 11, 11th Guards in storming Königsberg, night April 11, drawn into Front reserve, pp. 385–436; ch. 12, destruction of German Samland group, capture of Pillau, pp. 437–55. (Extremely detailed, day-by-day operational narrative.)

Lyudnikov, Col.-Gen. I.I.,
Doroga dlinoyu v zhizn
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1969). See ‘Shturm Kenigsberga’, pp. 155–64. (39th Army, Königsberg assault.)

Novikov, Air Chief Marshal A., ‘Sovetskaya aviatsiya v boyakh za Kenigsberg’,
VIZ
, 1968 (9), pp. 71–81. (Soviet air operations; need to master techniques of saturation bombing of major city.)

Popov, Lt.-Gen. (Artillery) S.E.,
Na ognevykh rubezhakh
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1971). (3rd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division/Supreme Command Reserve.) See under ‘Shturm’, artillery in the Königsberg assault, pp. 152–67.

Vasilevskii, A.M.,
Delo vsei zhizni
(2nd edn). On the Königsberg assault, offensive against German Samland group, pp. 503–10.

Vasilevskii, A.M., ‘Vostochno–Prusskaya operatsiya’,
VIZ
, 1969 (3), pp. 46–55. Planning documents for the reduction of Königsberg, German refusal to surrender, final Soviet assault.

(ii)
Ostrava–Prague

Collective authorship,
V srazbeniyakh za Pobedu
(38th Army combat history). See ch. 14, ‘Ostrava-Praga’, pp. 511–7, little progress with mid-March offensive, planning to outflank M-Ostrava from the north, fresh attack 24 March, 38th Army bridgehead on the Oder, stiffening of German resistance, Yeremenko orders defensive action 5 April in order to prepare fresh offensive.

Grechko, A.A.,
Cherez Karpaty
. See pp. 348–68, M-Ostrava operation, failure of February–March offensive operations (divisional strength in 38th Army down to 2,800–3,100 men), slow progress by 1st Guards Army in March offensive, Soviet attacks called off 17 March,
Stavka
criticism of 4th Ukrainian Front command for poor planning and execution of operation, German forces well aware of time and place of Soviet attack, also poor weather conditions, Petrov replaced as Front commander—but Grechko (p. 360) exonerates him from personal blame, pointing to shortages of men and munitions as the true cause of failure in March—progress by 38th Army and 1st Guards Army continued to be slow, revised
Stavka
directive 3 April to 4th Ukrainian Front, movement of 60th Army to 4th Ukrainian Front. (Detailed narrative based largely on Soviet military archives, emphasis on difficulties caused by well-organized German resistance and fighting in built-up areas.)

Koniev, I.S. (ed.),
Za osvobozhdenie Chekhoslovakii
, pp. 185–94, Ostrava operation, advance to Bratislava and Brno (4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts): 10 March offensive by 4th Ukrainian Front south of Zorau, impeded by bad weather, main burden borne by infantry, slow pace of advance, operation called off 17 March,
Stavka
criticism of 4th Ukrainian Front command, Petrov removed from command and replaced by Yeremenko (26 March), 60th Army (1st Ukrainian Front) engaged in battle for Ratibor linking up with 4th Ukrainian Front, 24 March 4th Ukrainian Front renewed offensive, 5 rifle corps with 38th Army mounting main attack, Czechoslovak Tank Brigade in action, 1st Guards Army to attack towards Friestadt, 18th Army to break enemy defence in valley of river Vag, Zorau stormed, slow progress late March towards Oder north-east of M-Ostrava, after 12 days’ heavy fighting still 20 miles from M-Ostrava, heavy German counter-attacks early April, more success for 2nd Ukrainian Front, fall of Banska Bystrica 25 March, lead elements only 20 miles from Bratislava end March, 1 April revised instructions from
Stavka
to 2nd Ukrainian Front, to drive north of Danube and capture Bratislava no later than 5–6 April, revised directive to 4th Ukrainian Front 3 April (p. 194), Soviet aim to encircle main body of German Army Group Centre in the Carpathians.

Moskalenko, K.S.,
Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii 1943–45
, bk 2. (This is an important, detailed and objective account by 38th Army commander of the failure of the March offensive.) See ch. 17, on M-Ostrava operation, pp. 568–77, heavy German resistance was coupled with poor Soviet planning, Moskalenko summoned to Front CP for discussion with Petrov and Lev Mekhlis, an ‘unofficial’ meeting where Petrov sought to determine reasons for failure, Moskalenko pointed to unfortunate choice of axis of main attack, Mekhlis took continuous notes at this ‘unofficial’ meeting, sent material as a telegram to Moscow, 16 March Moskalenko summoned to telephone to talk to Antonov in Moscow, Antonov on Stalin’s instructions enquired about Moskalenko’s views on the failure of the offensive, Antonov well informed about the ‘unofficial’ meeting with Petrov and Mekhlis, the problem of fixing favourable line of attack, Petrov telephone call shortly after to Moskalenko accepting idea of attacking from area of Zorau, further reinforcement for 38th Army,
text of Stavka signal
—
17.3.1945, personal to Petrov and Mekhlis
—reprimanding Petrov and citing Mekhlis’s evidence about poor planning (p. 570), arrival of Yeremenko and acceptance of idea of outflanking M-Ostrava from the north, improvement in work of Front command/administration, work on fresh operational plan.