Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (43 page)

The Īlkhānids’ second attempt to scale the walls failed and in mid February they abandoned the site after hearing that a Mamluk relief force was on its way from Cairo. Baybars ordered repairs to be taken care of by his own troops.
⁹¹
The fortress was restored, weapon and food supplies were renewed and the garrison reinforced; thus the fortress was made ready for the next Īlkhānid assault.

The methods of siege warfare conducted under Hülegü’s command and those of his successor seem much the same. The main difference between the two sieges, separated by five years, was in the size of the army. During the first siege Hülegü arrived with the greater part of the Mongolian army. It seems likely that in December 1264 the force that besieged al-Bīra was substantially smaller. The Īlkhānid force that besieged al-Bīra in 1264–5 under Durbai’s command had only one
tümen
– 10,000 men, at the most. An Armenian force was supposed to join them, but when they heard that the Īlkhānids were retreating they decided to turn back,
⁹²
and thus never participated in the battle at all.
⁹³

The difference in the size of the armies is of considerable importance especially since both fortress and garrison had been strengthened and reinforcements could reach al-Bīra given a relatively short warning.

The third and fourth sieges of the fortresses occurred simultaneously in the winter of 671/1272 during Abagha’s reign (1265–82). While half the force marched towards
the other besieged al-Bīra. The Mamluks followed suit. The Syrian force led by Fakhr al-Dīn
and Alā’ al-Dīn al-Hājj was sent to al-Bīra while Baybars hurried to
. The Īlkhānid army that camped in front of al-Bīra was composed of 3,000 Mongols and approximately 3,000 Seljuks from Rum. Siege machines of different types were positioned at the foot of the fortress. According to
Baybars had promised the garrison at al-Bīra that reinforcement would arrive within a week. Nevertheless he added that if they were delayed the besieged may surrender and abandon the fortress.
⁹⁴
Thee was no need for this alternative plan, since the Īlkhānid army was defeated after engaging the Mamluk relief force in close combat, leaving behind its siege machines. Although we lack information concerning the number and type of siege machines we know the strength of the Īlkhānid force. The size of the army had dropped significantly, once again, and it numbered 6,000 men of whom only half were Mongolian. The siege of
, conducted simultaneously with that of al-Bīra, was carried out by an Īlkhānid army of a similar size. With the arrival of Baybars the siege was abandoned, and the Īlkhānids retreated to the eastern bank of the river where they built a fortified camp. This turned out to be a grave mistake, mainly due to the superior numbers of the Mamluk army. Baybars was determined to attack this Īlkhānid camp. The Mamluks began to cross the river; the Īlkhānids quickly discovered them and began to attack while the Mamluks were still crossing. If it was not for the numerical superiority of the Mamluk army, Baybars might have decided to retreat. The Īlkhānid army was defeated, suffering heavy losses.

The numbers of the lkhānid army, at this siege, have been estimated at three to six thousand.
⁹⁵
All four attempts to take
and al-Bīra with a relatively small force failed. This may have taught the Īlkhānids an important lesson, since future sieges were conducted with a considerably larger army.

The fifth attempt to take al-Bīra dates to the winter of 674/1275. The Īlkhānid army led by Abtai numbered 30,000 men; half are said to have been Seljuks and soldiers recruited from the nearby cities of what is today modern Iraq. The siege units must have been well manned and organized, as we are informed that 70 siege engines were built. Yūnīnī mentions only 23 Frankish siege machines, while Ibn al-Furāt states there were only 11. Although the army was considerably larger, the number of siege machines possibly higher than ever before, and the Mamluk army was delayed, the Īlkhānid force lifted the siege within nine days. The garrison at al-Bīra stood fast and managed to hold their ground without reinforcement.
⁹⁶
The fierce cold and signs of treason in the Seljuk force are among the main reasons given for the Īlkhānid failure. The siege machines were set on fire and the army retreated.
⁹⁷

After the fifth Īlkhānid rout a noticeable change occurred in their strategy. From this point on invasion routes bypassed the two Mamluk fortresses on the Euphrates. In addition, once the Īlkhānid forces entered Syria they maneuvered around the strongholds and fortified cities of Aleppo, Hama and Homs, making great efforts to avoid siege warfare. The routes they chose speak for themselves and are a quiet recognition of the limitations and flaws of their siege units. Whether because their siege technology and methods ceased to advance or because they were less experienced and numerically fewer than Hülegü’s siege contingents, there was a clear attempt to move the fighting to the battlefield and lure the Mamluks into close combat.

The bypassing routes

The first attempt to take roads that bypassed
and al-Bīra was made towards the end of Abagha’s reign. In Jumda II 679/October 1280 the Īlkhānid force invaded Syria from the north (see
Map 2.2
), and took
, Darbassāk and Baghrās from the Mamluks.
⁹⁸
The two latter fortresses guard the Belen mountain pass that commands the main road crossing Amanus range and running down to Syria. Meanwhile a second part of the Īlkhānid army moved from the east. A third section joined them and they all gathered at Aleppo. The local population and the Mamluk garrison at Aleppo fled. This may allow us to assume that the Mamluk fortresses mentioned above were also abandoned a short time before the arrival of the Īlkhānid army. The flight of the Mamluk garrisons and the city population cleared the way for the Īlkhānid army and if it did encounter any resistance this was nominal.