The Road to Berlin (161 page)

GMD

FHO
(Chef), Reports:
Wichtigste Feindfeststellungen
(Nov.–Dec. 44), Front movements, assessments. T-78/R466, 6445345–407.

FHO
(I), Teil A.
Zusammenstellung… abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage (1942–1944)
. Intelligence appreciations: see No. 3508/44, 7.10.44, Feindbeurteilung (build-up of Soviet reserves, Stalin’s need to destroy Ostheer, to do this quickly to establish Soviet power ahead of Anglo–American advances); No. 3697/44, 19.10.44, situation report on Bulgaria/Bulgarian forces; No. 4012/44, 10.11.44, Beurteilung (assessment of Soviet operational planning and intentions), see also Anlage 1, on operations 3rd Ukrainian Front, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts; No. 4142/44, 11.11.44, Kurze Beurteilung (Army Group South, Hungary); No. 4404/44, 5.12.44, Zusammenfassende Auswertung … (evaluation of Soviet planning based on PW interrogation, also ‘secret intelligence’; a precise and highly accurate review of Soviet plans and intentions, with detailed observations on Front plans/assignments); No. 4640/44, 22.12.44, adjustments to previous estimate of Soviet operational plans/intentions. (These are quite remarkable assessments, which closely follow the Soviet operational planning process and adjustments to the Soviet master plan.) T-78/R466, 6446197–230.

FHO
(IIa). Reports:
Frontaufklärungmeldungen
…. (daily intelligence summaries, tactical-operational intelligence, Nov.–Dec. 44). T-78/R466, 6445718–871.

FHO
(IIc). Tables/diagrams:
Gliederung des sow. russ. Feldheeres
, Order-of-battle tables/Red Army: Front composition, with Tank armies, indep. Tank, Mech., Cav. Corps (for period Oct.–Dec. 44). T-78/R493, 6480686–710.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 4, pt 2, pp. 499–504, summary of the results of the Soviet summer-autumn offensive campaign.

Rokossovskii, K.K., A
Soldier’s Duty
(Moscow: Progress Pub. translation from
Soldatskii dolg)
, see ‘Inside Germany’, Rokossovskii appointed commander 2nd Belorussian Front by Stalin Nov. 12, took over from G.F. Zakharov, to
Stavka
and personal briefing by Stalin, axis of advance in NW direction but not to be concerned with ‘E Prussian grouping’ which would be dealt with by 3rd Belorussian Front, emphasis on co-ordination with Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front, Stalin insisted that 2nd Belorussian Front
not
a secondary sector, 2nd Belorussian Front also assigned 2nd Shock Army, Grishin’s 49th Army and Volskii’s 5th Guards Tank Army, pp. 265–9.

Shtemenko, S.M.,
The Soviet General Staff at War 1941–1945
, pp. 296–306, on Soviet planning, end 1944, estimate of results of summer/autumn offensive, depletion of Soviet forces, review of operational opportunities-heavy enemy defences in Kurland, less favourable for Germans in E Prussia, stiff resistance expected on Warsaw/Poznan/Silesian axes, much greater success for capture of Budapest, approaches to Vienna—necessity for Soviet regrouping, need to choose ‘most promising lines of advance’, beginning Nov.
Stavka
survey of situation 2nd, 1st Belorussian Fronts and 1st Ukrainian Front, absence of necessary Soviet superiority, decision to turn to defensive (Antonov’s insistent point),
Stavka
directive Nov. 4, final Soviet campaign to be carried out in
two
stages, October plan merely an outline, beginning Nov. work on more specific lines, discussion between Antonov, Shtemenko, Gryzlov and Lomov, Soviet design to put pressure on E Prussia and Hungary, this proved by further concentration of German forces (uncovering ‘the Berlin sector’), General Staff decision to ‘punch through’ the weak centre towards Berlin, question of
Front
assignments, no special conference for Front commanders but each Front commander summoned separately early Nov., provisional timing fixed for 20 Jan. 1945, Stalin’s decision to appoint Zhukov commander of the armies to take Berlin, co-ordination of all four Fronts committed to ‘the Berlin axis’ assigned to Stalin by Stalin himself, Vasilevskii thus left in charge of only 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, General Staff view of 1st Ukrainian Front operations, to outflank Silesia from NE and N, aim to preserve Silesian industrial resources, Zhukov in Moscow, Nov. 27, proposed attack towards Lodz and on to Poznan, Stalin’s agreement with this revised plan, Koniev given Breslau as his main objective (as opposed to Kalisz), main operational plan outlined by end Nov. finally confirmed end Dec. (See original Soviet text,
General’nyi shtab v gody voiny
, pp. 303–16.)

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya …
, vol. 2, ch. 21, from the Vistula to the Oder, pp. 284–8: statement of German strength, Anglo–American strength in the west, Soviet strength (6 million men, 14,000 tanks/
SP
guns, 14,500 aircraft),
Stavka
planning with ‘Warsaw–Berlin axis’ main line of advance, Zhukov’s insistence that ‘the mission of Soviet troops to capture Berlin’ under Allied agreement, denunciation of Churchill’s ‘secret intentions’ which prompted ‘certain caution’ on the Soviet side (p. 286), Zhukov assigned to work on offensive plans late Oct.–early Nov. to open on the southern front in direction of Vienna, the serious problem of E Prussia (recalls his own plan submitted during summer offensive), Nov. 1–2 with Stalin, plan presented by Antonov but approved by Zhukov, Stalin again refused to reinforce 2nd Belorussian Front to knock out E Prussian concentration, further elaboration of plan, Nov. 15 Zhukov to Lublin, Nov. 16 appointed commander 1st Belorussian Front, assumed command Nov. 18,
Stavka
approved attack plan late Nov., provisional timing 15–20 Jan. 1945.

7 THE ASSAULT ON THE
REICH:
JANUARY–MARCH 1945

Budapest (i) December 1944–January 1945 pp.
431
–
443

(ii) 11 January–13 February 1945 pp.
443
–
447

Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns 1944–45
, pp. 230–53, the Budapest operation (Nov. 44–13 Feb. 45).

Irving, David,
Hitler’s War
. See Endkampf, ‘The Gamble’, on Hitler and the Ardennes attack, with the significant note (p. 748) that Guderian waited
until 14 January 1945
to ask Hitler to shift the main effort to the Eastern Front—not Dec. 1944 as Guderian himself has it. In view of Mr Irving’s attention to the documentary record, inspection at once scrupulous and rigorous, this revision must stand; see also the Hitler-Guderian exchange, 9 Jan. 1945, with Hitler refusing to countenance a planned withdrawal from the Vistula line on a given signal, also Hitler handing over only two divisions, pp. 752–3.

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, ch. 29, Soviet and German operations, Hungary/Budapest, pp. 497–501.

Warlimont, Walter,
Inside Hitler’s Headquarters
, pt VI, pp. 495–9, Hitler-Gen. Thomale talk Dec. 29–30, Guderian’s attempt to shift emphasis to Eastern Front, Hitler’s dismissal of Gehlen’s intelligence reports, Jodl retains and reinforces divisions in the West.

KTB/GMD

KTB/OKW
. See vol IV (pt 2), 1 Abschnitt, from Lagebuch/WFStab: Lagebuch 1–31.1, Lagebuch 1–28.2. See pp. 976–1134. (Situation reports, all fronts.)

OKH/Kriegsgesch. Abt
. Maps: Ungarn I. Teil. 11.1944. (Complete map display, Budapest operation, Hungary to March 1945.)
T-78/R136, 6065497–624
.

OKH/GenStdH/Op. Abt
. See Chefsache Anlagen zum
KTB/Op. Abt
. Hitler’s directives/instructions for operations Army Group South, Guderian’s corrections/corrected drafts, redeployment
SS
units, also intelligence report, evaluation 18.2.45 with maps (‘Gruppierung der Reserven’, also vermutliche Weiterführung der sowj. russ. Operationen’). T-78/R305, 6255785–8667 (Jan.–Feb.)
Note:
see also H. Guderian,
Panzer Leader
(London: Michael Joseph 1952).

OKH/GenStdH/Op. Abt
. KTB Anlagen: Hitler’s instructions and directives, operations in Hungary, fall of Budapest; see Op. Abt. Nr 2786/45, 17.2.45, Abschlussmeldung Budapest, also reporting German losses 12/44–2/45—1,111 officers, 32,997 men. T-78/R304, 6255440–612 (for Feb. 45).

NOTE: Behaviour of Red Army/occupied enemy territory: 1944–5
. See
FHO
(IIb), collection of materials: captured and translated Soviet orders, interrogation of Soviet PWs, disorder, indiscipline in Soviet rear in occupied areas (Koniev/Krainyukov orders), details of Soviet
strafbats
(penal battalions), military orders for treatment of German civilians/property (June 44–March/April 45). T-78/R488, 6474390–648.

FHO

Gehlen intelligence reports:
No. 4404/44 (5.12.44), No. 4640/44 (22.12.44). T-78/R466, 6446222–230 (cf. notes on GMD/Chapter 6, above).

Nr 81/45, ‘Beurteilung der Feindlage …’, Stand 5.1.45 (based on data from above reports), also maps, ‘… vermutliche Operationsrichtungen des Gegners 4.1.45’, ‘… Meldungen des geheim. Meldedienstes …’ (2.12.44–2.1.45). T-78/R503, no frame numbers.

Nr 26/45, ‘Gedanken zur Feindbeurteilung’ (Stand 2.2.45) (3 copies) (also maps). T-78/R496, 6484222–230.

Nr 1161/45, ‘Beurteilung …’ (Stand 25.2.45), based on Jan. data. Also Anlagen (on Soviet decisions/operations). T-78/R501, 6489736–744.

FHO
(IIa).
Sowjetruss. Wehrkraft
, dated 1.2.45: total 484 rifle divisions (397 deployed), 38 tank/mech. corps (33 deployed/immediate reserve), 155 indep. tank formations (79 deployed/immediate reserve), 7 cavalry corps. T-78/R489, 6475305.

FHO
(I/W). Lageberichte Ost: daily situation reports, Jan–Feb. 45. Lageberichte Januar 45, Februar 45. See T-78/R472, 6453856–6454660 and R473, 6454250–661.

Soviet materials

Biryukov, Lt.-Gen. N., ‘Na podstupakh k Budapeshtu’,
VIZ
, 1965 (3), pp. 87–94. (20th Guards Rifle Corps operations, Budapest, Dec. 44).

Collective authorship,
Ot Volgi do Pragi
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1966). (Combat record 7th Guards Army.) On Budapest operation (involving 30th Rifle Corps), see pp. 193–214.

Koniev, I.S. (ed.),
Za osvobozhdenie Chekhoslovakii
, pp. 139–76, operations of 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, western Carpathians Jan–Feb. 45, liberation of central Slovakia (Jan. 45), heavy resistance/heavy losses 53rd Army and 1st Cav.-Mech. Group (only 14 tanks left late Jan. 45, p. 155), Soviet defenders river Hron mid-Feb. severely pressed (divisions with only half manpower, companies down to 25–30 men, 4th Mech. Corps with only 20 tanks, p. 172).
Note on Soviet losses:
during Jan.–Feb. operations,
4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts
in W Carpathians, Soviet forces lost 16,000 killed in action, 50,000 wounded; 1st Czechoslovak Corps 209 men killed, 777 wounded (see pp. 173–4).

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
Marshal Tolbukhin
, pp. 207–22, on Budapest operations, Tolbukhin’s direction and decisions Dec. 44–Feb. 45.

Malakhov, M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie Vengrii
…, pp. 91–158, Budapest operations, repulse of German counter-blow (2–7 Jan.), 2nd Ukrainian Front thrust to Komarno (6–10 Jan.), second German attack (7–13 Jan.), repulse of third German counter-blow (18–27 Jan.), elimination of German break-out to Danube (27 Jan.–16 Feb.). (Virtually day-by-day operational narrative.)

Malinovskii, R.Ya. (ed.),
Budapesht Vena Praga
, pp. 97–172, Budapest operation, organization of ‘Budapest force’, command assigned to Managarov when Afonin wounded (p. 157), final assault opened Feb. 5. (for period Dec. 44–Feb. 45).

Managarov, I.M.,
V srazhenii za Khar’kov
, pp. 231–4, Managarov with 53rd Army, Budapest, in command special operational group 21 Jan. 45.