The Road to Berlin (162 page)

Pushkash, A.I.,
Vengrii v VMV
. See ch. 11 on Szeged–Debreczen political assemblies, composition of various party groups, planning for provisional national assembly and provisional government, pp. 476–8; see also M.M. Minasyan,
op cit
., pp. 370–75.

Minasyan, M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie
…
(1967)
, ch. 4(5), Budapest operations, Dec. 44–Feb. 45, pp. 343–70; note also reference to Soviet strength Dec. 44 (39 Rifle Divs, 14 Rumanian divs, Soviet divisional strength varied from 3,500 to 4,500, with 11 divisions deploying 5,000–5,500 men, only two divs. having 6,000 men, see p. 345); also
General Staff criticism
of handling of operations in Buda, p. 368.

Samsonov, A.M. (ed.),
Osvobozhdenie Vengrii ot fashizma
(Moscow: Nauka 1965). (Collected memoirs). See Malinovskii, pp. 19–24 (Budapest); M.V. Zakharov on Budapest, pp. 29–39; V.A. Sudets, 17th Air Army operations, pp. 54–90; I.T. Shlemin, 46th Army operations, pp. 102–15; on Red Army truce negotiator Ostapenko, pp. 193–5.

Tarasov, S.P.,
Boi u ozera Balaton
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1959).

Tolubko, V.F. and Baryshev, N.I.,
Na yuzhnom flange
, pp. 361–76, 4th Guards Mech. Corps operations on right-flank 2nd Ukrainian Front (Dec. 44–Feb. 45)—strength beg. Jan. 45 reduced to 5,200 men, 14 tanks, 96 guns and mortars (p. 368).

Varaki, Colonel P., ‘Nekotorye voprosy boevovo primeneniya 6-i gvardeiskoi tankovoi armii v Budapeshtskoi operatsii’,
VIZ
, 1973 (12), pp. 64–9. (Analysis of 6th Guards Tank Army operations, Budapest, Dec. 44.)

Vorontsov, T.F.
et al., Ot volzhskikh stepei do avstriiskikh Alp
. (Moscow: Voenizdat 1971). (Combat record 4th Guards Army.) See 4th Guards/Budapest operation, commitment to outer encirclement, pp. 136–82. (Note: G.F. Zakharov, 4th Guards commander.)

Zakharov, M.V. (ed.),
Osvobozhdenie
… (1970). See pp. 335–99, Budapest operation Dec. 44–Feb. 45.

Zheltov, Col.-Gen. A., ‘Osvobozhdenie Vengrii’,
VIZ
, 1974 (10), pp. 43–50. (General survey, Soviet operations, Hungary.)

Zavizion, G.T. and Kornyushin, P.A.,
I na Tikhom Okeane
… (6th Guards Tank). See ch. VI, 6th Guards Tank operations Komarno, 26 Jan. 44 drawn into reserve, Feb. 21 tank/
SP
gun strength built up to 224, pp. 125–50 (cf.
VIZ
, 1973 (12),
loc. cit.)
.

Planning/preparation Vistula–Oder operation pp.
447
–
455

Diplomatic correspondence

Perepiska
… ,
vol. 1
. No. 383, Churchill–Stalin, 6 Jan. 45, enquiry about possible Soviet offensive in the East, pp. 348–49; No. 384, Stalin–Churchill, Jan. 7, Soviet offensive not later than second half of Jan., p. 349; No. 385, Churchill–Stalin, Jan. 9, acknowledgement, p. 350.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, pp. 32–6, strategic planning, Soviet intention to attack along entire front along four axes (coastal-Baltic, Berlin, Prague, Vienna), Front assignments for Jan. 45 offensive (involving 33 rifle armies, 5 tank and 7 air armies, 10 tank/mech./cav. corps, also Baltic Fleet units), tank armies to penetrate to depth of 400–450 kms, Soviet estimates of German strength and deployments, Soviet superiority on given sectors, co-ordination of Allied operations, impact of German offensive in the Ardennes.
Note, p. 27, on Soviet strength, Jan. 45:
55 rifle armies, 6 tank and 13 air armies on Soviet–German front, with about 500 rifle divisions. Total manpower: 7,109,000 (577,000 in
Stavka
reserve), 488 divisions (including airborne deployed), 34 tank/mech. corps, 155 aviation divisions, 115,100 guns/mortars, 15,100 tanks/
SP
guns, 15,815 aircraft. See also on the
Soviet armed forces 1945
, pp. 39–46.

IVMV
, 10, pt 1, pp. 37–45, Soviet–German strength Jan. 45 (Soviet deployed forces— 10 Front commands, 2 Fleets, 3 Flotillas, 51 rifle armies, 6 tank, 10 air armies, 2 Air Defence/PVO Front commands: 473 divisions, 21 tank/12 mech. corps;
Stavka
reserve 2 Front administrations, 4 rifle and 2 air armies, 4 tank/mech. corps, 20 rifle divisions, p. 37), 72 per cent of Soviet manpower, 74 per cent artillery, 77 per cent tanks/
SP
guns, 65 per cent air strength deployed on Soviet–German front; analysis of German deployment, Allied operations in NW Europe and Italy; Soviet operational planning beginning Nov. 44,
Stavka
directives for E Prussian and Warsaw–Berlin operations issued 25 Nov.–3 Dec. 44, Soviet intention to divert German strength to the flanks with heavy deception measures to conceal offensive intentions at the centre of the Front, movement of Soviet reinforcements/replacements (483,000 men Nov.–Dec 44, 6,100 tanks), careful distribution of strategic reserves (11 rifle, 4 tank armies).

Blinov, Colonel S.I.,
Ot Visly do Odera
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1962), pp. 18–57 (both Army operations), operational planning/preparation Army commander Kurochkin’s assignments to formations, combat deployment, regrouping, logistics planning.

Chuikov, VI. Marshal Chuikov has produced several very different versions of the fortunes of 8th Guards Army 1944–45 and the road to Berlin, making it difficult to disentangle fact from contrived opinion.
Konets tret’evo reikha
began life in the journal
Oktyabr
(1964), followed by a first published version (1965), anti-Zhukov in almost all essentials; that first version was produced in English translation,
The End of the Third Reich
(London: MK 1967), followed by a second, less polemical version published in 1973 (Moscow: Sov. Rossiya), also in Belorussian and Ukrainian editions (Kiev: Politvidav Ukraini 1975). Now we have
Ot Stalingrada do Berlina
(1980), with the Zhukov vendetta erased and no denunciation of logistics failures (see note below on Soviet logistics; Antipenko,
Na glavnom napravlenii
had earlier refuted Chuikov’s charges). See
Ot Stalingrada
… , pp. 502–7, on preparations for Vistula–Oder.

Galitskii, General K.N.,
V boyakh za Vostochnuyu Prussiyu
(Moscow: Nauka 1970) (11th Guards Army operations). CK 5,
Stavka
concept of E Prussia operation, directive 3 Dec. 44, Chernyakhovskii’s operational decision, Front regrouping and deployment (pp. 196–7), 11th Guards Army planning, corps assignments, pp. 197–217. (Galitskii emphasizes that in later stages of the war Stalin allowed Front commanders rather more latitude in developing Front plans/operational decisions.)

Kharitonov, Colonel A.D.,
Gumbinnenskii proryv
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960) (28th Army, Gumbinnen operation). Ch. 2, decisions of 3rd Belorussian Front commander, 28th Army command decisions, corps commanders’ decisions, logistics, signals, regrouping, pp. 15–57.

Kir’yan, Colonel M.M.,
S Sandomirskovo platsdarma
(Moscow: Voenizdat 1960) (5th Guards Army operations). Ch. 2, Col.-Gen. Zhadov’s operational planning/decisions, planned use of armoured forces, logistics, signals, regrouping, pp. 26–94.

Koniev, I.S.,
Sorok pyatyi
(Moscow: Voenizdat (VM) 1966, also 1970 edn). See Progress Publishers (Moscow), translation,
Year of Victory
(1969). ‘From the Vistula to the Oder’, planning, Stalin’s inspection Nov. 44 of Koniev’s plan, emphasis on preserving Silesian region—‘Gold’—Antonov’s signals on alteration to timing (9 Jan. 45), camouflage and deception measures, pp. 5–16.

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
General Chernyakhovskii
, pp. 208–14. On planning E Prussian operation, General Staff view, Chernyakhovskii’s plan (see map, operational concept 3rd Belorussian Front, Tilsit-Insterburg operation, p. 212), assignments to Front armies.

Rokossovskii, K.K., A
Soldier’s Duty
(Moscow, 1970), pp. 268–75. On the planning/preparation 2nd Belorussian Front, assumption of command from G.F. Zakharov, composition Front forces, problem of Front co-ordination (problem also of Rokossovskii’s right flank), Front attack plan with left-flank forces, only formations transferred from
Stavka
reserve fully manned, operational assignments to armies, planning of artillery preparation.

Shtemenko, S.M., ‘Kak planirovalas poslednyaya kampaniya po razgromu gitlerovskoi Germanii’,
VIZ
, 1965 (5), see pp. 56–64, review of Soviet strategic/operational planning for January offensive.

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya
… , vol. 2, ch. 20, pp. 284–92, from the Vistula to the Oder, main strategic plan, the problem of E Prussia, difficulties of adequate tactical intelligence, war-game Jan. 4 to organize closer co-operation between bridgeheads, strategic objectives of 1st Belorussian Front, initially designated the ‘Warsaw-Poznan operation’, detailed operational plan with main attack from Magnuszew bridgehead.

Note on Soviet logistics, January 1945
. In the Magnuszew bridgehead, 10 Jan. 1945, ammunition stocks amounted to 2,479,800 artillery rounds and mines (2,132 railway-truck loads), 1,311,900 artillery rounds/mines in the Pulawy bridgehead; Front held 55,989 tons of fuel (1st Belorussian Front), 1st Ukrainian Front (Koniev) held 114,336 tons of ammunition, 57,215 tons of fuel/lubricants, 47,805 tons of food. See
IVOVSS
, 5, p. 64.

Malopolska, East Prussia, on to the Oder pp.
455
–
469

Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns 1944–45
, pp. 253–88, operations in Malopolska, E Prussia.

Philippi, A, and Heim, F.,
Der Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland
, I, ‘Feldzug d. Jahres 1945’, Soviet winter offensive, Soviet thrust into Silesia, isolation of German forces in E Prussia, pp. 274–7.

Schieder, Theodor (ed.),
Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa
. Band 1/2 (Herausg.: Bundesministerium fur Vertriebene n.d.).

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, pp. 530–39, Vistula to the Oder, German planning, deployments, expectations, Red Army launches ‘one of the greatest strategic operations of the war’, puzzle
of timing
(Jan. 12–14, p. 534), 1st Ukrainian Front breakthrough, Zhukov attack from Magnuszew bridgehead, Hitler’s fury over loss of Warsaw, Soviet drive into E Prussia, fall of Tannenberg, redesignation of German army groups (p. 539), appointment of Himmler to command. See also Dieckert, K., and Grossmann, H.,
Der Kampf um Ostpreussen
(Munich: Gräfe u. Unzer 1960); Kissel H.,
Der deutsche Volkssturm
(Frankfurt: Mitder 1962).

KTB/GMD

KTB/OKW
, IV/2. See 1 Abschnitt, Lagebuch (for January), from 12.1.45, pp. 1008ff; see also WFStab/KTB, summary of events, second half of January (Col. Meyer-Detring am 29.1, 19 Uhr), pp. 1052–6. Also Lagebuch, 24.1.45, ‘Die neugebildete Heeresgr. Weichsel, zu deren OB der Reichsführer SS ernannt worden ist, übernimmt den Abschnitt von Glogau bis Elbing …’, p. 1035.

OKH/GenStdH/Op. Abt
. KTB Anlagen: signals/instructions on Soviet offensive Vistula–Oder, filling out of fortresses Posen, Glogan, Zhukov Order of the Day (translated text—
Wir werden uns grausam rächen für alles
—6255627 frame). T-78/R304,6255440ff. Ref. also T-78/R477, documentary material on discipline/behaviour Soviet troops.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, ch. 2(3), Soviet operations in Poland, Jan. 45: narrative 1st Ukrainian Front operations, 1st Belorussian Front operations, liberation of Warsaw, revised
Stavka
directive Jan. 17 (p. 80), 1st Ukrainian Front operations Upper Silesia, drive to the Oder, pp. 69–82; ch. 3(2–3), E Prussia operation, weakness of poor co-ordination of Fronts (p. 99), Front command decisions (3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts), problem of reinforcements for Rokossovskii, pp. 97–104; offensive opened Jan. 13–14, German resistance, Jan. 19–26 splitting up of German defenders and isolation of E Prussia, conduct of Soviet troops (p. 113),
Stavka
directive Jan. 21 to 2nd Belorussian Front to strike to Deutsch–Eylau/Marienburg, Dyachenko’s thrust to Elbing (p. 115), break to the sea and Vistula, 3rd Belorussian Front destruction of German ‘Insterburg group’, closing on Königsberg, German counter-blow at 48th Army/2nd Belorussian Front Jan. 27, Soviet lack of supplies, pp. 97–122.