The Road to Berlin (165 page)

Woodward, Sir L.
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, III, ch. XL(V), the Polish question at the Yalta Conference, pp. 252–73. Also vol. V (HMSO 1976), in collaboration with M.E. Lambert, ch. LXV, discussions on World Security Organization and treatment of Germany/Yalta conference; proposals for three-power conference, Soviet–American agreement on the Far East, Declaration on Liberated Europe and discussion thereof; issue of dismemberment of Germany, inclusion of France in occupation of Germany, German reparations; discussions on World organization, voting procedures/Security Council, separate membership for Ukraine and Belorussia, Prime Minister’s report (Feb. 19) to War Cabinet on Conference, pp. 261–300.

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, pp. 124–38, Crimean conference, (account stressing effectiveness of wartime collaboration and positive role of Crimean conference).

IVMV
, 10, pt 1, pp. 127–38, pre-conference political and military scene, plans for final defeat of Germany and Japan, policies for the postwar world. (Allied ‘goodwill’ overcame sharp differences to produce agreement.)

Israelyan, V.L.,
Diplomaticheskaya istoriya VOV
, pp. 279–99, Crimean conference.

Israelyan, V.L.,
Antigitlerovskaya koalitsiya 1941–1945
, pt 3, pp. 473–512, Crimean conference.

Batowski, Henryk,
Wojna a diplomacja
1945 (Poznan: Wyd. Poznańskie 1972), ch. 4, ‘Konferencja krymska’ (Yalta conference), pp. 59–85. (Uses a combination of Western and Soviet sources.)

Balaton operations, the end in Hungary pp.
508
–
517

Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, Paul,
The Russian Campaigns 1944–45
, ch. XII, end of the Danubian–Carpathian campaign, the ‘battle of Lake Balaton’, Soviet defensive operations and counter-blow, pp. 294–302. (Though placing special emphasis on the terrain factor, this account is far from accurate in dates and Soviet deployments.)

Seaton, Albert,
The Russo–German War
, pp. 554–7, on the German offensive, Balaton, Soviet and German strength, German Army Group ‘E’ attack across the Drava and Second
Panzer
Army (Angelis) attack south of Balaton, role of Nedelin’s artillery reserves (3rd Ukrainian Front), end of German resistance in Hungary, collapse of improvised defence on the line of the river Raab. (Though brief, this is an
excellently
balanced account.)

Werth, Alexander,
Russia at War
. See pt 8, ch. I, ‘Into Germany’, on Soviet behaviour in Germany coupled with Soviet propaganda—to call it a ‘tricky subject’ is a vast understatement; how difficult it was (and is) I discovered for myself in Moscow, though there is much documentary evidence (field tribunal/court-martial reports) that some control was exercised. The Soviet view was that rape on the part of the Germans in Russia was part of planned subjugation, but this was not so with Soviet troops, even if the second echelon behaved badly. In a huge army, such as the Red Army, inevitably ‘there were troubles, but we took measures’. (In looking at court-martial records, I noted that for a soldier to plead the loss of his family or destruction of his home was not admitted as mitigation. Example: a senior sergeant got drunk, broke into a flat, found the wardrobe filled with Ukrainian costumes, so that he shot the owner when he returned. The sergeant had lost his father and brother, his two sisters had been deported to Germany; three members of the German family had served in the Ukraine, the dead man had been a Party member. This was not regarded as mitigation, the Soviet sergeant was sentenced—amidst the protests of his men, who saw no reason in the punishment.) Like Alex Werth, I have read the wartime press and the Ehrenburg articles, with the
Krasnaya Zvezda
article of Feb. 9 cautioning against an excess of anti-German feeling and the
Pravda
article (April 14) officially disowning Ehrenburg’s ‘hate propaganda’ and his insinuations about the Allies; see Werth, pp. 963–9. See also under
GMD
.

Note:
For Ehrenburg’s own version of this affair and the role of G.F. Aleksandrov
(Pravda
article), see his memoirs under ‘Lyudi, gody, zhizn’,
Novyi Mir
, 1963 (3), pp. 130–31, an exuberantly unrepentant piece. In
The Russians and Berlin 1945
(London: Heinemann 1968) Erich Kuby refers (p. 262) to his own discussion with Ehrenburg, who recognized that Stalin could well have wished to ‘steal a march’ on the Allies with his elaboration of policy towards Germany and the Germans, hence the abrupt high-level and widely publicized disowning of Ehrenburg; Germany was not ‘one vast gang’, indeed this contradicted Stalin’s maxim (uttered in 1942) that ‘Hitlers may come and go, but the German people remain.…’ Nevertheless, Ehrenburg felt that he had been made a scapegoat unnecessarily so. Aleksandrov did not reply to his letter of explanation; Soviet troops still feted him, bemused as they were by having to regard the butchers let loose in Russia as ‘unwitting and enslaved accomplices’ of Hitler.

GMD

GenStdH/Abt. FHO
. Folder, two sections, 75c, 75d: the first covers material on Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (Jan.–Mar. 45); the second, translations of Soviet press, including Ehrenburg material. T-78/R483, 6467342–7674.

Diplomatic correspondence

Perepiska
…, vol. 2, No. 288, Stalin–Roosevelt, on Gen. Marshall’s intelligence on German intentions (Feb.), incorrect information, failure to predict German attack in Balaton area, enclosed copy of General Antonov’s letter to General John R. Deane. Antonov-Deane information supplied by General Marshall ‘at variance with the actual course of events …’, 7 April 1945, pp. 223–5.

Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 5, pt 1, pp. 191–210, Balaton defensive operation, strength/deployment 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, planning to raise four Hungarian divisions to fight with Red Army, strength of German Army Group South,
Stavka
directive Feb. 17 prescribes March 15 for opening of fresh Soviet drive on Brno-Vienna, Timoshenko
Stavka
‘co-ordinator’, German plans for counter-blow Balaton area, 807 German tanks for main assault, mid-Feb.
Stavka
and Soviet Front commands without firm information on German plans, surprise blow against Shumilov’s 7th Guards Army (Hron bridgehead), Antonov–Marshall exchange, only after loss of Hron bridgehead Soviet command confirmed German plan to strike 3rd Ukrainian Front, 3rd Ukrainian Front strength 407,000 men, 6,890 guns/mortars, 407 tanks/
SP
guns, 965 aircraft (p. 195), Tolbukhin’s defensive measures, Soviet assistance to 1st Bulgarian Army, Nedelin’s use of artillery (3rd Ukrainian Front), AA guns finally brought into action against German tanks, Tolbukhin’s reserves near exhaustion but
Stavka
refused to permit commitment of 9th Guards Army since German attack running out of power,
Stavka
directive March 9 redefining assignments 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts for drive on Vienna, co-ordination with Yugoslav units, Soviet counter-offensive March 16 with 9th and 4th Guards Army against heavy German resistance, 6th Guards Tank Army committed March 19, failure to complete encirclement of Sixth
SS Panzer
Army (lack of ammunition, slow progress of Soviet assault force, shortage of infantry support tanks, delay in committing 6th Guards Tank Army principal Soviet shortcomings here).

IVMV
, 10, pt 1, pp. 176–93,
Stavka
directive Feb. 17 for the Bratislava–Brno and the Vienna operation, unreliability of Anglo–American intelligence, German attack Feb. 17 on 7th Guards Army—a mistake, according to
IVMV
, since it cost the Germans the element of surprise and helped to disclose their operational intentions in Hungary, despite other efforts at camouflage and deception (p. 178)—Soviet defensive planning and measures, Tolbukhin’s deployment and difficulties with supply of fuel and ammunition, 14 March final German attack with last reserve 6th
Panzer
Division, turn to defensive March 15, superiority of the flexibility and manoeuvrability of Soviet reserves amply demonstrated, extensive use of minefields (German losses here 130 tanks/assault guns), Soviet counter-blow and pursuit,
Stavka
directive March 9, Tolbukhin’s assault force consisted of 18 rifle divisions, 3,900 guns, 197 tanks/
SP
guns, Sixth
SS Panzer
encircled but not annihilated, final clearing of Hungarian territory (Soviet casualties—killed in action—set at more than 140,000 officers and men in the course of Red Army operations in Hungary). (Much less informative version than
IVOVSS
, 5, eschewing both amplification and criticism of Soviet performance, particularly the opening and closing phases of the Balaton operation.)

Ivanov, General S., ‘Sryv kontrnastupleniya nemetsko-fashistskikh voisk u ozera Balaton’,
VIZ
, 1969 (3), pp. 14–29. Operational narrative-analysis from Gen. Ivanov, then Chief of Staff, 3rd Ukrainian Front: initial disbelief in Soviet General Staff at 3rd Ukrainian Front intelligence that German armour moving to Balaton—why was that armour not defending Berlin?—confirmation of movement of Sixth
Panzer, Stavka
directive Feb. 17, 3rd Ukrainian Front strength (incl. 400 tanks), Tolbukhin’s decision on defence Feb. 20, assignments to armies, readiness by Mar. 3, Stalin’s misgivings and enquiry of Tolbukhin about withdrawal to east bank of Danube, Tokbukhin’s proposal to stand fast accepted by Stalin, German offensive and Soviet defensive actions,
Stavka
’s refusal of Tolbukhin’s request to bring 19th Guards Army out of reserve, importance of artillery and aviation in repelling German offensive.
(Note:
This highly authoritative account tends to undermine, if not actually contradict, Shtemenko,
General’nyi shtab
, vol. 2.)

Kuznetsov, P.G.,
Marshal Tolbukhin
. See ‘On the Vienna axis’, the Balaton defensive battle, pp. 224–35.

Malakhov, Colonel M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie Vengrii i vostochnoi Avstrii
, ch. 2, Balaton defensive operation, 3rd Ukrainian Front action Feb. 20–Mar. 16, pp. 175–218; see also summary of operational characteristics, pp. 225–33; ch. 3, Soviet planning for drive on Vienna, Soviet counter-blow Balaton, pp. 234–62. (Detailed operational narrative, stage-by-stage analysis of Soviet counter-blow.)

Malinovskii, R.Ya. (ed.),
Budapesht Vena Praga
, ch. 4, ‘Balatonskaya bitva’, Balaton operations, pp. 173–224. (Mixture of analytical and memoir material, also referring to Anglo–American ‘underhand’ dealings for a German surrender in N Italy in order to beat the Red Army into Austria.)

Minasyan, M.M.,
Osvobozhdenie …
, pp. 380–402, Balaton operations (third stage of Soviet operations in Hungary),
Stavka
directive Feb. 17 for 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to drive on Vienna, offensive to open March 15, analysis of German decision to move 6
SS Panzer
to Hungary and strengthen entire southern wing, German attack on Soviet bridgehead on the Hron defended by 7th Guards Army a complete surprise, 7th Guards Army lost 8,800 men Feb. 17–24 and forced to eastern bank of Hron (p. 385), see analysis of causes of Soviet reverse—lack of depth in army/corps deployments, lack of reserves … (p. 385), Marshall’s signal to Gen. Antonov, Stalin’s retort that this possibly a form of disinformation (see
Perepiska
, vol. 2), Soviet preparations for Balaton defensive battle, German operational plan,
Stavka
instructions to Tolbukhin (p. 388), Tolbukhin’s deployments, overall weakness in 3rd Ukrainian Front armies (divisional strength in 4th Army down to 5,100, 26th Army 4,250, 27th Army 4,100 men—18th and 23rd Tank Corps, 1st Guards Mech. Corps had only 166 tanks between them, tank/
SP
-gun regiments reduced to 2–8 tanks or
SP
guns, see p. 389), German offensive March 6,
Stavka
refuses permission to commit 9th Guards Army to defensive battle—signal March 9 (p. 391), importance of operations of 17th Air Army (6,000 sorties) also Goryunov’s 5th Air Army, operations on the river Drava line, Soviet offensive opened March 16 on ‘Budapest–Vienna axis’, alterations in operational concept embodied in
Stavka
directive March 9, main attack to be mounted by 3rd Ukrainian Front, Tolbukhin’s planning for Soviet counter-blow, 6th Guards Tank Army assigned to 3rd Ukrainian Front March 16, 9th Guards Army well equipped (nine divisions each with 11,000 men, substantial artillery complement) but lacking combat experience, no infantry-support tanks and too many 76mm
SP
guns (pp. 396–7), heavy German losses between Danube and Balaton March 16–23/25, final clearing of Hungarian territory,
Stavka
directive 1 April for joint operation 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts aimed at Vienna. (This is a very detailed analysis which must be accounted the best and most reliable Soviet account.)