The Road to Berlin (164 page)

Zhukov, G.K.,
Vospominaniya
… , vol. 2, pp. 297–301, Jan. 25 conversation with Stalin–Zhukov proposed continuing drive to Oder, Stalin points to gap with 2nd Belorussian Front (150 km), also need to wait on 1st Ukrainian Front, Zhukov asks permission to continue his drive, particularly to penetrate Miedzyrzecz line, Stalin makes no immediate reply—redeployment of 1st Belorussian Front armies to face north but time enough to reach Oder before Pomerania threat materialized, Jan. 31 signal to Stalin on situation of right flank 1st Belorussian Front and need to urge 70th Army (Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian Front) forward (p. 302), attack on and denunciation of Chuikov’s previous arguments about ‘non-stop’ drive for Berlin (pp. 303–4), Jan. 26 submission of provisional attack plan to
Stavka
(similar submission by Koniev),
Stavka
endorsement Jan. 27–29, 1st Belorussian Front ‘orientation’ (text, pp. 304–5), danger from E Pomerania further refutation of Chuikov that enough force available to strike on Berlin, only 4 under-strength armies actually available (out of 8 rifle and 2 tank armies), 3–4 tank armies (as suggested by Chuikov) simply not available, impact of heavy losses on Soviet divisional strength, tank brigades with only 15–20 tanks (p. 308), logistics problems, need to redeploy aviation, no meeting on Feb. 4 as Chuikov suggested and no call from Stalin (p. 3091, Zhukov’s instruction to 5th Shock Army.

Note on Soviet logistics:
The strain on the supply system, particularly lorried transport, had become almost intolerable; if during the 15 days before the offensive lorries delivered 165,900 tons of supplies, in the next 15 days of active operations they delivered 320,101 tons, but daily runs were now reduced from a planned 200 kms to only 140 kms and reached a low of 100 kms due to poor road conditions. As 1st Belorussian Front raced westwards, a full run from base to the front and back took 10–12 days; the Front command therefore decided to utilize 500 gun-towing tractors to move supplies, but this left the heavy guns marooned. More lorries were needed to move field hospitals forward and captured supplies back to the rear. In moving fuel up to the Front the lorries consumed a great deal themselves—never less than a quarter. Each lorry moved an average of 2 tons per day, but the Front command demanded priority for ammunition and offered cash bonuses to drivers who exceeded their ‘ton/kilometre’ norms; some drivers received cash payments of more than 500 roubles during the course of the month. See N.A. Antipenko,
Na glavnom napravlenii
(Nauka, 2nd edn 1971), pp. 220–25. General Antipenko was commander/logistics 1st Belorussian Front at this time.

Polish materials

Golczewski, K.,
Wyzwolenie Pomorza Zachodniego w roku 1945
(Poznań: Wydaw. Poznanskie 1971). (Operations, western Pomerania.)

Majewski, R. and Sozańska, T.,
Bitwa o Wroclaw
(Wroclaw/Warsaw: Ossolineum 1972). (Breslau/Wroclaw; siege, assault.)

Majewski, R. (ed.),
Wroclawska epopeja
(Wroclaw/Warsaw: Ossolineum, 1975). (Wroclaw/Breslau.)

Okȩcki, S.,
Wyzwolenie Poznania 1945
(Warsaw: MON 1975), pp. 9–82, Poznan operations Jan.–Feb. 45. (Extensive use of Polish and Soviet military archives, captured German documents incl.
Fremde Heere Ost
situation reports.)

Peikert, Paul,
‘Festung Breslau’ in den Berichten eines Pfarrers
, 22 Januar bis 6 Mai 1945 (Wroclaw/Warsaw: Ossolineum 1966). (Diary, newspaper reports, orders, leaflets—Breslau.)

Sta̧por, Z.,
Bitwa o Berlin. Dzialania 1 Armii WP kwieceń–maj 1945
(Warsaw: MON 1973), pp. 45–59, deployment, operational role of 1st Polish Army, regrouped right-flank 1st Belorussian Front (29 Jan.-20 Feb. 45). (1st Polish Army operational assignment, changes in Soviet operational plan, redeployments.)

Yalta (Crimean Conference) pp.
476
–
489
and pp.
489
–
507

The circumstances of Yalta (the Crimean Conference) have by now been thoroughly rehearsed both in documents and memoirs, but the dispute over its impact—sometimes seen starkly in terms of Western surrender and Soviet aggrandisement—continues. Among the accounts by participants I have made essential recourse to Arthur Bryant,
Triumph in the West 1943–1946
(ch. 12, Yalta, Brooke on the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, with his comment on General Antonov); Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War
, vol. 6:
Triumph and Tragedy
, bk II chs XX–XXIII (preparations for a new conference, Yalta and planning for world peace, the Polish problem and the Soviet promise, Yalta finale); Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon),
The Reckoning
(London, Boston, 1965) and also my own conversations with Sir Anthony Eden on Stalin and Stalin’s
conduct of affairs; Lord Moran,
Winston Churchill
, pt 3, ch. 24, ‘Yalta Diary’; Robert E. Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins;
and Edward R. Stettinius,
Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference
(New York: Doubleday 1949). Not being a diplomatic historian, I remain enormously indebted to studies by Diane Shaver Clemens,
Yalta
(New York: OUP 1970) (an account as comprehensive as it is judicious, especially ‘Yalta as History’, pp. 274–9, and ‘Yalta as a Negotiating Experience’, pp. 279ff.); David Dallin,
The Big Three
(London: Allen & Unwin 1946); Herbert Feis,
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin
, and
The China Tangle
(Princeton: Princeton UP 1957); William Hardy McNeill,
America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941–1946
(New York: OUP (RIIA) 1953); Edward J. Rozek,
Allied Wartime Diplomacy. A Pattern in Poland
(especially ch. 7, Yalta and Stalin’s ‘tactical handling’ of Polish problem, pp. 338–56); John L. Snell (ed.),
The Meaning of Yalta
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press 1956), Tang Tsou,
America’s Failure in China, 1941–1950
(Chicago/London: Chicago Univ. Press 1963) (see especially ch. VII, pp. 237–52, Yalta agreement, American planning and Stalin’s ‘dual course’, effect of secrecy of Yalta agreement—lack of firm evidence of Soviet intentions nurtured Japanese illusion that via Soviet mediation she might obtain peace settlement with the Allies); John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls,
The Semblance of Peace
(pt 1, ch. 11 on Yalta conference, pp. 214–50, also ch. 16, on the question of Soviet participation in the Pacific War, pp. 348–52). I should like to note here that I have used the
Soviet
transcript/records of Yalta, all to the end of depicting
Stalin’s
behaviour and negotiating mode, not to mention his ‘tactical handling’.

Documents

(1)
US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945
(Washington, DC: US Govt, Printing Office 1955). (See a Soviet appraisal, I. Nikolayev, ‘Eshchë odna popytka falsifikatsii istorii. K opublikovaniyu Gosdepartamentom SShA ‘dokumentov’ Krymskoi konferentsii’,
Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn
, 1955, No. 5, pp. 35–47.)

(2)
Soviet documents: Yalta (Crimean Conference). Krymskaya konferentsiya rukovoditelei trekh soyuznykh derzhav
—
SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (4–11 fevralya 1945)
. Sbornik dokumentov, vol. IV in series
Sovetskii Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda VOV 1941–1945 gg
. (Moscow: Politizdat 1979), 326 pp.

Pt 1. Record of conversations: Molotov with Harriman, Molotov with Eden, Feb. 4, pp. 45–8; Stalin–Churchill, Feb. 4, pp. 48–9; Stalin–Roosevelt, Feb. 4, pp. 49–53; conversations, three heads of government, 4–5 Feb., pp. 53–83; Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Feb. 6, pp. 84–7; conversations, three heads of government, Feb. 6, pp. 87–103 (appendices: American position on voting, draft proposal on voting in Securtiy Council, pp. 104–7); Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Feb. 7, pp. 107–14 (appendices: on special French zone of occupation in Germany, levying of reparations on Germany, pp. 114–15); conversations, three heads of government, Feb. 7, pp. 116–27 (appendices: decisions, Foreign Ministers’ meeting on dismemberment of Germany, Roosevelt letter to Stalin—Feb. 6—on Polish question, Soviet draft on Polish frontiers and Polish government, pp. 127–31); meeting, Foreign Ministers, Feb. 8, pp. 131–7; conversation, Stalin–Roosevelt, Feb. 8 (on Soviet entry into war against Japan), pp. 139–43; Memorandum to Stalin, Feb. 7, on making airfield/refuelling facilities near Budapest available to US aircraft, p. 144, also Roosevelt memorandum to Stalin (on bombing survey), p. 145; Memorandum, Roosevelt to Stalin, Feb. 5, on supply line through Pacific to E Siberia, basing of US aircraft in Komsomolsk, p. 145; conversations, three heads of government, Feb. 8, pp. 146–57; Foreign Ministers’ report, Feb. 8, inclusion of two (or three) constituent Soviet republics in world organization … , pp. 157–8; US delegation draft on the Polish question (received Feb. 8), pp. 158–9; revised formulation/Polish frontiers, Polish government, pp. 159–60; Foreign Ministers’ meeting, record of conversations, Feb. 9, pp. 160–67 (appendices: on world security organization, agreement on admission of two Soviet constituent republics, Stettinius proposal on question of Polish government, Feb. 9, on reparations from Germany, on voting procedures/Security Council, draft agreement on Persia, British delegation amendments to Tito-Šubašić agreement, alternative British formulation on question of the Polish government, pp. 166–73); record of conversations, three heads of government, Feb. 9, pp. 173–84 (appendix: report to plenary session on Foreign Ministers’ meeting—Polish question, reparations, Dumbarton-Oaks, Iran, Yugoslavia, declaration on liberated Europe, revision to the draft, Churchill to Stalin, Feb. 9, on operations in Germany and on situation in Greece, pp. 184–9); record of conversations, Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Feb. 10, pp. 194–7 (appendices: revision to text/Polish question, reparations from Germany, note on Austro–Yugoslav frontier Venezia–Giulia, petroleum installations in Rumania/reparations, Greek claims on Bulgaria, on Allied/Soviet Control Commission in Bulgaria, pp. 198–207); record of conversation, Stalin–Churchill–Eden, Feb. 10, pp. 207–12 (Churchill’s question to Stalin on role of German generals captured by the Red Army); record of conversation, three heads of government, Feb. 10, pp. 212–18 (appendices: draft statement on Poland, British draft on Yugoslavia for Soviet and American consideration, British draft declaration on Polish frontiers, pp. 218–20); record of conversations, three heads of government, Feb. 11, pp. 220–23 (appendices: draft press communiqué on results of Crimean conference, on reparations, draft text communiqué (Stettinius draft), pp. 223–38); Foreign Ministers’ meeting, record of conversations, 11 Feb., review of proposal communiqué, drafts of Conference decisions, draft telegram from three heads of government to De Gaulle, pp. 238–55; Eden–Molotov letter, Feb. 11, on unfinished business, pp. 255–6 (appendices: Austro–Yugoslav frontier question, British memorandum on organization of relief, Soviet contingent to London for participation in preparatory work on Control Commission for Germany, pp. 256–9); Roosevelt–Stalin letters, Feb. 10–11, on raising US vote to three in World Organization, pp. 259–60.

Pt II. Documents/notes agreement on the Far East, protocol of Conference proceedings, on liberated prisoners of war and displaced citizens, pp. 282–300. (An earlier version of the ‘Yalta records’ was published in the journal
Mezhdunarodnaya Zbizn
(also in translation,
International Affairs/Moscow)
, 1965, Nos. 6–10, under ‘Dokumenty: Krymskaya i Potdamskaya konferentsii rukovoditelei trekh velikikh derzhav’. This has now been wholly superseded by the composite volume (with appendices, documents) on the ‘Crimean conference’, vol. IV, cited above.)

(3)
Polish documents: Yalta

Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations 1939–1945
, vol. 2:
1943–1945
. No. 305, Roosevelt-Stalin, Feb. 6, proposed invitation to Yalta of representatives of Lublin regime and émigrés from London, pp. 517–18. No. 306, Molotov’s proposals, Feb. 7, on Polish frontiers and new Polish government, pp. 518–19. No. 307, US memorandum on reorganization of Polish government (dropping Presidential Committee), p. 519. No. 308, resolutions of Crimean Conference, Feb. 11, on Poland, pp. 520–21. No. 309, protest of Polish government in London, Feb. 13, on Crimean Conference resolutions, pp. 521–2. No. 311, Roosevelt–Arciszewski (and reply) on decisions over Poland, Feb. 16/17, pp. 522–3. No. 312, Tarnowski-Sir Owen O’Malley on resolutions on Poland, Feb. 18, pp. 523–7. No. 314, Raczyński-Eden conversation, Feb. 20, on Polish protest at decisions of Crimean Conference and appointment of new Polish government, pp. 528–32. (Eden denial that agreement at Yalta a Soviet success and loss of full independence for Poland.)

Diplomatic / official histories

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(single volume), ch. XXVIII, Yalta conference, pp. 484–501: no preliminary meeting of Foreign Secretaries, US–Soviet dealings over Far East, on the Declaration on Liberated Europe; discussions on dismemberment of Germany, reparations question, Soviet acceptance of compromise on voting for World Council, Anglo-Soviet disagreement over reparations figures, the Polish question at Yalta.